Naxalites of the People's War Group (PWG) and the security forces (SF) continuously devise tactics and counter-tactics to defeat one another. In a latest move, the SFs formed Counter Action Teams (CAT) to target the Permanent Action Teams (PAT) of the PWG. The tactic achieved its first success in Warangal District, Andhra Pradesh (AP). On April 11, 2004 two prominent Naxalites were hunted down by a CAT in the district, after reportedly engaging them in an encounter.
The PWG formed the PATs and their existence was made public in October 2001. A PAT operates in the form of a 'cell', a method that became well-known and notoriously famous after the 9/11 attacks on the United States by the al Qaida. It is by now widely known that a cell operates in the most secretive manner, often, with the cell leader alone knowing who the other members of the cell are. Communication between the cell leader and the members and between the leader and the higher leadership is encrypted and is normally conveyed through human courier. The PWG's PAT is given specific targets to eliminate and is let loose. Normally, it consists of two or three members. The targets include political leaders, police informers and SF officials.
The PWG decided to constitute PATs after it realized that the movement of an armed squad consisting of some five to seven members was easily prone to detection by the SFs, and, hence, attacking targets, especially those living in urban areas, would be difficult. Therefore, it was believed that a very small team would produce better results. A PAT consists of highly motivated cadres and each team could have cadres recruited from different districts. Once a target is decided by the PWG leadership, the PAT would not leave him or her until killed.
In the past, the PWG undertook targeted killings, abductions for ransom, and the like through Special Action Teams (SAT). These teams consisted of two to four members and were disbanded after an operation was completed. A PAT, on the other hand, is permanent. It would undertake one mission after the other, but would not be disbanded upon completion of an assignment.
In their counter-tactics, the SFs meticulously gathered intelligence about the various PATs operating in Warangal district, and also obtained their digitized pictures. Thereafter, they had trained their men to memorize the picture and identify him, even while moving is disguise. The movements of the PAT were monitored and sound intelligence was gathered. Eventually, the PAT was liquidated. In fact, it has been reported that at least four CATs were deployed to hunt this PAT, and is said to be the bravest among all the PATs operating in the district, either in the forests or in the plain areas.
There are other aspects of these tactics and counter-tactics, too. PWG squads waiting on the prowl in the forests set-off landmine blasts to target SFs moving in vehicles. As a result, foot patrol method was introduced. Thus, the SFs avoided 'concentration', even as they treaded cautiously, in order to avoid stepping on a landmine and being blown-up. At best, either one or two personnel would fall victim, in case a mine blew-up, rather than many more being killed if their vehicle struck a landmine. Subsequently, the SFs devised another tactic and began to travel in public transport buses while moving in high risk areas, because the PWG, wary of the infuriation that would ensue from the general public, would not target such buses. Indeed, on one occasion, on November 18, 2002, the PWG erroneously thought that a public transport bus was carrying SF personnel alone, but no civilians at all, and blasted it killing 20 civilians, mostly tribals, near Chintagudem village, in the Eturunagaram area of Warangal district. The incident provoked immense revulsion against the PWG in AP.
Probably, the PWG seems to have just about devised a counter-tactic to the SF practice of traveling in public transport buses. In order to lure the SFs into an armed clash, the guerrillas now set-off a landmine blast a little ahead of the bus, thus avoid any civilian casualties, and wait for the SFs to launch an attack. The waiting guerrillas would then engage the SFs in a pitched battle. This was the modus operandi followed on April 10, 2004, in Guntur district, in Remidicherla village on the fringes of the Nallamala forests. In the incident, two SF personnel were killed, even as they were searching in the area for the rebels, when the latter set-off a second landmine blast.
Thus, the game of employing tactics and counter-tactics continues perennially claiming lives almost every passing day. In Andhra Pradesh, in the year 2003 alone at least 235 persons, including civilians, SFs and rebels were killed in PWG Naxalite violence.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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