Originally Published 2004-01-23 09:28:36 Published on Jan 23, 2004
It is indeed tempting to wax eloquent about the shikaras full of tourists on the Dal Lake in Srinagar and the peace moves in the air between India and Pakistan. However, a pragmatic assessment of the military situation in the fifteenth year of insurgency reveals that a state of strategic stalemate now prevails in Jammu and Kashmir (J).
Strategic Stalemate in Kashmir
It is indeed tempting to wax eloquent about the shikaras full of tourists on the Dal Lake in Srinagar and the peace moves in the air between India and Pakistan. However, a pragmatic assessment of the military situation in the fifteenth year of insurgency reveals that a state of strategic stalemate now prevails in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Even as the peace process moves forward, the internal security situation continues to be precarious and innocent Kashmiris as well as security forces personnel are still dying everyday. The only positive aspect is that a tenuous military control has been achieved.

A lot of water has flowed down the Jhelum since the Kashmir Valley was up in flames with a spontaneous people's uprising in 1989-90 and slogans of azadi rent the air. The bridges and culverts destroyed by the Kashmiri militants have been repaired, schools and colleges have re-opened, trade and commerce have been resumed and tourists are again descending on the "heaven on earth" in droves. Above all else, elections have been held, the political process has begun anew and the Kashmiri people have re-staked their claim to self-governance. Though they still nurture their grievances for the perceived injustices done to them by the Indian state, they have apparently realised the futility of an armed struggle. There is deep anguish that the lives of almost a whole generation have been laid waste and the Kashmiri people are more than willing to negotiate a just settlement. Of course, the same cannot be said of the bulk of their political leadership that has been rather unashamedly engaged in personal enrichment and petty politics and has let the people down at every step.

Meanwhile, the militancy has passed entirely into the hands of Pakistan army-sponsored mercenary terrorists who are armed, trained, equipped, funded, provided logistics support and controlled by the ISI. These so-called mujahideen are detested by the people and if they still manage to get food and shelter occasionally, it is only at the point of their dreaded Kalashnikovs. This has forced the terrorists to establish hideouts on the upper reaches of uninhabited mountains like Hill Kaka on the Pir Panjal Range. So as to not alienate the Kashmiri people any further, these terrorists and suicide bombers have orders from their ISI handlers to strike only at military targets and pro-India or neutral politicians. This is the reason for the recent spate of suicide attacks against security forces' camps and the major spurt in both the number of terrorists killed as well as the number of Indian security forces' casualties this year.

In the absence of a government White Paper, one has only news reports to go by and as per these the number of active terrorists in J&K is between 2,000 and 3,000, almost half of them being foreign terrorists. Almost a similar number is available to the ISI as an immediate reserve, to be pumped in through various channels on a nod from General Musharraf. Also, with the United States army breathing down his neck for harbouring large numbers of Taliban militiamen and al-Qaeda operatives, when the going on its western border gets hot, Musharraf will not lose any sleep in switching these foot soldiers of fundamentalist Islam to Kashmir. While the Indian security forces are perfectly capable of maintaining the present level of military control over the internal security situation, with additional battalions that are now under raising being deployed when necessary, it needs to be appreciated that the war against externally aided terrorism cannot be won by continuing to confine the fight to the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC).

Pakistan's India policy has for long been formulated and executed from the army's General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. The army's stated aim is to annex Kashmir at any cost as it considers it the unfinished agenda of partition. By keeping the pot boiling in Kashmir, the Pakistan army not only seeks to destabilise and weaken India but also to further its all-weather ally China's objective of preventing India from attaining its true potential as a regional power. It has succeeded to a large extent in tying down the Indian army and other security forces in having to fight a long drawn out insurgency. For the Pakistan army a strategic stalemate is a win-win situation as between two neighbours with military asymmetry, a stalemate equals victory for the smaller neighbour. Hence, it would be reasonable to deduce that the ongoing peace overtures are only a tactical move and that the Pakistan army will continue its low-cost, low-risk, high-payoff option of waging a proxy war against India. It will never allow the elected government in Pakistan to wind down its proxy war in Kashmir.

As the present policy of wearing down the militancy in J&K to the point of strategic fatigue has not delivered the desired results, there is an urgent requirement to formulate a more pro-active military strategy to wrest the initiative from Pakistan and put an early end to senseless violence in the state. Since the remaining roots of militancy are now almost entirely in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), aggressive trans-LoC measures are necessary to raise the cost of waging a proxy war for the Pakistan army. These should be both covert and overt. From this point of view, the present cease-fire along the LoC is inconvenient for the Indian army as it allows the Pakistan army the freedom to continue its nefarious activities in Kashmir without fear of Indian retribution.

Therefore, the fight has to be taken across the LoC by other means. Indian Special Forces must be employed on a regular basis to raid known ISI terrorist training camps and launch pads for infiltration. They should be utilised to launch clandestine attacks to destroy logistics installations and army infrastructure in POK such as ammunition and FOL (fuel, oil and lubricants) dumps, bridges, radio-relay communications towers and battalion and brigade headquarters. Special Forces personnel should be utilised to ambush Pakistan army convoys, shoot down army and air force helicopters with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, cut telephone lines at random and jam army radio communications, thereby disrupting command and control. Well-equipped, well-trained well-motivated Special Forces commandos are perfectly capable of undertaking all these tasks once government approval is accorded. If and when the cease-fire breaks down again, punitive artillery assaults should be delivered on Pakistani posts through which infiltration takes place and missile, rocket and artillery attacks should be launched on headquarters and administrative installations so as to cause maximum casualties to regular Pakistan army personnel.

The nation has paid dearly for fifteen years of Pakistan's proxy war in J&K. The large number of security forces casualties and the daily loss of innocent Kashmiri lives should no longer be acceptable. Only trans-LoC pro-active measures will raise the Pakistan army's military and political cost for waging a proxy war and act as a deterrent.

(Courtesy: Indian Express, January 23, 2004)
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