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The August 3 suicide attack aimed at the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, which killed over nine children and 14 others, signals a renewed attempt to force Taliban dominance in the Afghan reconciliation process. It is clearly an act of desperation following the quick collapse of the Doha process engineered principally by Pakistan Army and the US.
Two immediate conclusions from the attack need elaboration. First is that Pakistan Army, which controls two key terrorist groups which have targeted Indian as well as other targets in Afghanistan in the past, has not given up terrorist attacks as a means to achieve its 'strategic depth'.
Indian officials believe Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) is behind the attack. It can also be the Haqqani Network, or both the groups working in tandem, as in the past attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008.
It has been well known for several years now that LeT, based out of Pakistan's Punjab province, has a close alliance with the Haqqani Network and the Taliban. LeT first came into operation during the Afghan Jihad in the late 80s in Kunar, Nuristan and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan. The first training camps for new LeT cadres were set up by al Qaida which subsequently became a training ground for the Taliban.
This close working relationship between various terrorist and extremist groups in the area has been exploited by Pakistan Army to target Indian and western interests in Afghanistan for several years now. The July 2008 and October 2009 attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul were traced to LeT, the Haqqani Network, the Taliban combine, and Pakistan Army. Investigations into the July 7, 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul showed the hand of a 22-year old Hamza Shakoor, a Gujranwala recruit of LeT, trained and sent by the group to target the Indian embassy. In February 2010, two guest houses frequented by Indians was bombed by the Taliban, killing at least nine Indians, including two Army officers of the rank of Major. In May 2010, a Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) convoy, escorting Indian diplomats from Jalalabad to Kabul, was targeted twice by LeT using IEDs.
What further strengthens LeT's hand in the Jalalabad attack is the group's presence in many of the eastern Afghan provinces reported by NATO, Afghan and other security forces since 2008. It has by the group's presence in the neighbouring Mohmand Agency. In June this year, Pakistan Army had launched a combined force of LeT and Ansar-ul Islam to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an anti-Pak terrorist group, which seized control of critical sanctuaries in Khyber and Mohmand, two tribal agencies neighbouring Nangarhar and Kunar provinces in Afghanistan. LeT has had a presence in Lower Dir and Upper Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since 2006 when the ISI had relocated many of the LeT and other militants from Pakistan occupied Kashmir after the October 2005 earthquake. LeT had established training camps in Dirs with generous funding and manpower help from ISI to train new cadres for the Taliban.
NATO has found credible evidence of LeT's operations in and around Nangarhard since 2010. LeT is actively helping militants to cross between the two countries. Many of the militants cross into Nangarhar through legal crossing points like Torkham, a town 35kms off Jalalabad. These militants carry fake passports and other travel documents issued by LeT operatives in Pakistan. NATO also detected increased evidence of LeT presence in Nangarhar at about the same time. In July 2010, NATO caught a Taliban commander working for LET in Khugyani district of Nangarhar. In November 2010, ISAF reported arresting a LeT commander running a cell of about 50 foreign fighters in Nangarhar. In May 2011, Afghan intelligence caught two persons alleged to have been hired by ISI to kill the Indian consul general in Jalalabad.
This increased LeT activity was further confirmed in June 2012 when NATO air strike in Kunar killed two senior LeT commanders who were working with the Taliban and al Qaida to target the US forces in Afghanistan.
With such an indelible association and so much at stake, the suspicion about Pakistan Army's role in the Jalalabad attack is not without reason.
The second conclusion concerns the Taliban and the ability of Afghan security forces to contain the insurgent threat in 2015. Jalalabad is the capital city of Nangarhar, an eastern province abutting Pakistan's Khyber Agency, which has of late been a battleground for the Taliban and its allies. The surge in Taliban attacks in the province this year is evident in the continuous attacks against the security forces reported from various parts of the province. The Afghan forces had taken over the security responsibility of Nangarhar in December 2012. But several military offensives this year had revealed the force's weakness and the need for the US Army support in terms of planning, logistics and operations. The US Army is also suspicious of the Taliban infiltrating the Afghan forces.
Taking Nangarhar is important for the Taliban. Its strategy is to dominate eastern Afghanistan which runs contiguous to the Pashtun-dominated tribal areas of Pakistan. The Taliban already has considerable presence and control in the neighbouring Kunar and Khost provinces.
After the US withdrawal in 2014, the Taliban, with the help of Pakistan, could plan a low-key but protracted military push towards Kabul. This year's attacks in Kabul by the Taliban are an indication of this strategy. The continuing Taliban offensive could undermine the 2014 presidential elections and seed doubts in Afghan security forces' capability, leaving the door open for a future domination. Pakistan's sees this as helping its own agenda in Afghanistan and an important element of this strategy being forcing India to draw down on its financial and military help to Afghanistan. The Jalalabad attack could be the opening shot in this treacherous game which will push the region towards greater instability in the next one year.
(Wilson John is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
The August 3 suicide attack aimed at the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, which killed over nine children and 14 others, signals a renewed attempt to force Taliban dominance in the Afghan reconciliation process. It is clearly an act of desperation following the quick collapse of the Doha process engineered principally by Pakistan Army and the US.
Two immediate conclusions from the attack need elaboration. First is that Pakistan Army, which controls two key terrorist groups which have targeted Indian as well as other targets in Afghanistan in the past, has not given up terrorist attacks as a means to achieve its 'strategic depth'.
Indian officials believe Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) is behind the attack. It can also be the Haqqani Network, or both the groups working in tandem, as in the past attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008.
It has been well known for several years now that LeT, based out of Pakistan's Punjab province, has a close alliance with the Haqqani Network and the Taliban. LeT first came into operation during the Afghan Jihad in the late 80s in Kunar, Nuristan and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan. The first training camps for new LeT cadres were set up by al Qaida which subsequently became a training ground for the Taliban.
This close working relationship between various terrorist and extremist groups in the area has been exploited by Pakistan Army to target Indian and western interests in Afghanistan for several years now. The July 2008 and October 2009 attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul were traced to LeT, the Haqqani Network, the Taliban combine, and Pakistan Army. Investigations into the July 7, 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul showed the hand of a 22-year old Hamza Shakoor, a Gujranwala recruit of LeT, trained and sent by the group to target the Indian embassy. In February 2010, two guest houses frequented by Indians was bombed by the Taliban, killing at least nine Indians, including two Army officers of the rank of Major. In May 2010, a Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) convoy, escorting Indian diplomats from Jalalabad to Kabul, was targeted twice by LeT using IEDs.
What further strengthens LeT's hand in the Jalalabad attack is the group's presence in many of the eastern Afghan provinces reported by NATO, Afghan and other security forces since 2008. It has by the group's presence in the neighbouring Mohmand Agency. In June this year, Pakistan Army had launched a combined force of LeT and Ansar-ul Islam to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an anti-Pak terrorist group, which seized control of critical sanctuaries in Khyber and Mohmand, two tribal agencies neighbouring Nangarhar and Kunar provinces in Afghanistan. LeT has had a presence in Lower Dir and Upper Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since 2006 when the ISI had relocated many of the LeT and other militants from Pakistan occupied Kashmir after the October 2005 earthquake. LeT had established training camps in Dirs with generous funding and manpower help from ISI to train new cadres for the Taliban.
NATO has found credible evidence of LeT's operations in and around Nangarhard since 2010. LeT is actively helping militants to cross between the two countries. Many of the militants cross into Nangarhar through legal crossing points like Torkham, a town 35kms off Jalalabad. These militants carry fake passports and other travel documents issued by LeT operatives in Pakistan. NATO also detected increased evidence of LeT presence in Nangarhar at about the same time. In July 2010, NATO caught a Taliban commander working for LET in Khugyani district of Nangarhar. In November 2010, ISAF reported arresting a LeT commander running a cell of about 50 foreign fighters in Nangarhar. In May 2011, Afghan intelligence caught two persons alleged to have been hired by ISI to kill the Indian consul general in Jalalabad.
This increased LeT activity was further confirmed in June 2012 when NATO air strike in Kunar killed two senior LeT commanders who were working with the Taliban and al Qaida to target the US forces in Afghanistan.
With such an indelible association and so much at stake, the suspicion about Pakistan Army's role in the Jalalabad attack is not without reason.
The second conclusion concerns the Taliban and the ability of Afghan security forces to contain the insurgent threat in 2015. Jalalabad is the capital city of Nangarhar, an eastern province abutting Pakistan's Khyber Agency, which has of late been a battleground for the Taliban and its allies. The surge in Taliban attacks in the province this year is evident in the continuous attacks against the security forces reported from various parts of the province. The Afghan forces had taken over the security responsibility of Nangarhar in December 2012. But several military offensives this year had revealed the force's weakness and the need for the US Army support in terms of planning, logistics and operations. The US Army is also suspicious of the Taliban infiltrating the Afghan forces.
Taking Nangarhar is important for the Taliban. Its strategy is to dominate eastern Afghanistan which runs contiguous to the Pashtun-dominated tribal areas of Pakistan. The Taliban already has considerable presence and control in the neighbouring Kunar and Khost provinces.
After the US withdrawal in 2014, the Taliban, with the help of Pakistan, could plan a low-key but protracted military push towards Kabul. This year's attacks in Kabul by the Taliban are an indication of this strategy. The continuing Taliban offensive could undermine the 2014 presidential elections and seed doubts in Afghan security forces' capability, leaving the door open for a future domination. Pakistan's sees this as helping its own agenda in Afghanistan and an important element of this strategy being forcing India to draw down on its financial and military help to Afghanistan. The Jalalabad attack could be the opening shot in this treacherous game which will push the region towards greater instability in the next one year.
(Wilson John is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
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