ATTACKING the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Mr Chandrababu Naidu, on October 1, 2003, is most spectacular act that Naxalites of the People#146;s War (formerly People#146;s War Group or PWG) have carried out till date. The rebels have not only proved that they have the ability to strike at locations far away from their traditionally known strongholds but also that they were poised to expand their influence beyond the state boundaries.
A preliminary study conducted by this writer on left-wing extremist violence in India as part of an ongoing project of the Observer Research Foundation reveals that the Naxalites have been clearly following a policy of carefully planned expansion into newer areas, consolidation in the existing pockets of influence, and re-emergence in parts from which they have been ejected. At the same time, they have been systematically enhancing their lethality and adding to their finances and cadre strength. The attack on Mr Naidu is part of this strategy. In fact, the attack comes in the wake of the death in an encounter of a top Naxalite leader, Polam Sudarshan Reddy "Ramakrishna", in April 2003 in Adilabad district.
On many occasions in the past, the PWG has killed important political leaders and senior police officials in well-coordinated and meticulously planned operations. The then Panchayat Raj Minister, Mr A Madhava Reddy, who had served extended terms as the state#146;s Home Minister, was killed in a landmine blast on the outskirts of the state capital, Hyderabad, in March 2000. A former Speaker of the state, D Sripada Rao, was shot dead in April 1999, in his native Karimnagar district. Assistant Inspector-General of Police Chedalavada Umesh Chandra and the founding chief of the elite anti-Naxalite force, Greyhounds, K S Vyas, were killed in broad daylight in Hyderabad.
Evidently, the rebels carefully choose their target and make a lot of advance preparation before striking. It is believed that preparations for the attack on Mr Naidu commenced at least a year ago. The PWG cleverly chose a bend on the road and planted 17 claymore mines in a steel pipe that would act like a canon when triggered. Of those, eight exploded leaving Mr Naidu#146;s car in a mangled mess, and damaging the other vehicles in the convoy, besides leaving a thick pall of smoke. A similar attack was conducted in July 2001 on Yeturunagaram police station in July 2001. Furthermore, Mr Naidu#146;s security officials seem to have been driven into the misconceived notion that the PWG would attack him from close quarters, but not in a landmine blast. Also, Chittoor in the Rayalseema region was never known to be a PWG area of operation, let alone stronghold. The police there was caught napping. Unfortunately, unlike in Telengana, the PWG#146;s traditional stronghold, the police as well as the civil administration are not adequately sensitive to the rising trend of Naxalite presence and violence in their jurisdiction, as in some other parts of the state.
The PWG has a presence - negligible or formidable - in all of Andhra#146;s 23 districts. Within the state, the PWG claims that it has established special guerrilla zones in North Telengana, South Telengana, Nallamala and north-coastal regions. Presently, the PWG is battling for survival in its former strongholds, attempting to make ingress into new areas and struggling to revive its activities in areas from which it has been ejected. Within the organisation, weeding out coverts and retaining cadres has been a major challenge to the rebels.
In the wake of intense anti-Naxalite operations in Telengana, the PWG has moved to coastal Andhra and Rayalseema. Also, the rebels have expanded to Chhattisgarh, southern Orissa and parts of Maharashtra, all bordering Andhra Pradesh. To make matters worse, the PWG is banned in Andhra, while there is no such curb either in Chhattisgarh or Orissa where the activities of the PWG have been spiralling for the past two years and more.
Besides, the police in many Naxalite-affected areas does not have adequate capability to foresee an impending threat or adopt imaginative tactics to defeat the rebels. The state has always been reactive while the Naxalites continue to seize the initiative. Moreover, the authorities think that the Naxalite problem can be managed. Therefore, laxity creeps in while the rebels gradually expand their presence. Once they enter an area, the PWG Naxalites force the structures of civil governance into retreat. Their declared objective is to paralyse and eject structures of civil governance in order to attain and retain unquestioned sway over such regions.
They then indulge in extortion, abductions for ransom and killings, and hold kangaroo courts, feeding upon the grievances the people have against the government - that it has neglected them and has been responsible for their continued deprivation.
Thus, projecting themselves as friends of the people, the PWG rebels entrench themselves in an area. Thereafter, they seek to bolster their cadre strength and coffers. One estimate holds that the PWG earns around Rs 70 crore annually through extortion in Andhra alone. The PWG is active in nine states in India.
The PWG utilises a portion of that money to built its arsenal. It runs its own arms factories in thick jungles. The rebels began their campaign of violence using farm implements. Now, they can actually service an AK series assault rifle and manufacture an SLR. Furthermore, the designs of an RPG were recovered from a PWG dump in the Orissa-Andhra border area a few weeks ago in 2003.
The Maoist insurgents of Nepal, who had looted an RPG from the Royal Nepal Army in September 2002, might have passed on the RPG design to the PWG. The PWG and the Maoists are among the leading members of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), a group whose formation was announced on July 1, 2001. The CCOMPOSA was formed with the explicit objective to unify and coordinate the activities of Maoist parties and organisations in the South-Asian region. The idea was reportedly floated during the late 1980s-early 1990s.
The writer is a Research Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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