The reluctance of, and inordinate delay by, the Union Government, to evolve a national approach and policy to tackle Naxalites of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is, indeed, baffling. Meanwhile, the Maoists' daring attacks, lethality, presence and influence have rapidly been rising; also, there is marked shift in their method of attack.
In an incident that has recorded the highest fatalities yet in a Maoist attack, the rebels killed 24 policemen on September 3, 2005 in their bastion in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district. In Andhra Pradesh (AP) they have, thus far, fielded rocket launchers on five occasions. In another incident, on Independence Day, in AP they fired from an AK-47 at a public function, killing 10 persons, including an MLA.
On June 23, over 200 Maoists went on a rampage in Madhuban, East Champaran district, Bihar. They looted arms, set a police station afire and killed three policemen, attacked the Block Office, looting arms and killing two guards, and looted two banks.
Earlier on February 6, 2004, in the biggest attack of its kind in the history of Naxalite movement in India, the Maoists looted all 500 weapons and ammunition from the District Armoury in Koraput, Orissa, in a very meticulously planned and executed operation, which included snapping telephone and power lines and blocking the highways and roads leading to Koraput to prevent security reinforcements from rushing in.
Fatalities high
In fact, fatalities in Naxalite-related violence across India have been high. The Lok Sabha was informed on July 27, 2005, that 251 persons and 101 Naxalites were killed until June 30 in 2005, in 10 States, while Parliament was earlier informed that a total of 566 lives have been lost in Naxalite-related violence in 2004, 515 in 2003 and 482 in 2002.
Besides, the Maoists are working systematically with the ultimate objective of 'capturing state power through protracted armed struggle'. At the founding of the CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2004, following the merger of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Center of India, they had adopted a 'constitution' and other documents: political resolution; party programme; domestic situation; and strategy and tactics.
Moreover, the Maoists are making intense efforts to penetrate into virgin territories like Nainital, Almora, Champawat, Pittoragarh and Udham Singh Nagar in Uttaranchal in the North, and Dharmapuri, Salem, Coimbatore and Madurai in Tamil Nadu, Bidar, Gulbarga, Raichur, Bellary, Shimoga, Udupi, Chikmagalur, Dakshin Kannada and Kolar in Karnataka - in the South. They are also eyeing 16 districts in West Bengal, from where they were once completely ejected.
On the map of India, if one were to plot the districts currently under Maoist influence, or being targeted, it clearly emerges that they might soon gain an uninterrupted presence along the length and breadth of the country and form a north-south and east-west corridor. Bastar in Central India's Chhattisgarh, where the Maoist highest leadership is said to be in hiding, lies at the intersection of these two corridors.
Maoists can bargain
If the Maoists were to ever launch coordinated, simultaneous attacks along the east-west corridor, they would be able to near totally cut off peninsular India from the rest of the country.
"On the other hand, the north-south corridor can virtually drive a wedge through the vital areas of the country, cutting off the rich north-eastern part of India from the rest of the country. This very large zone will have control over huge deposits of minerals, oils and industrialised territory", and give the Maoists "a powerful bargaining chip," noted Ranjit Kumar Gupta, former Police Commissioner of Kolkata who fought the Naxalites in West Bengal in the 1970s.
Because there is no external involvement, and as the Naxalite movement is not secessionist, the Union Government has, as yet, failed to comprehend the grave threat of a 'Maoist corridor'.
Moreover, political opinion on tackling the Maoists is sharply divided. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh of the BJP has repeatedly urged for a national policy while the CPI-M's Sitaram Yechury said on August 21, 2005 that 'it is not possible to have a national policy'. Meanwhile, the Report of the Congress's M Shahshidhar Reddy Task Force on Naxalite Violence is beginning to gather dust.
In fact, speaking in Parliament on 'internal security situation in the country', on December 15, 2004, the former Chief of Army Staff and Rajya Sabha Member, Gen Sharkar Roy Chowdhury said "… unless the Centre and the State Governments work together, the internal security situation of the country can't be improved".
Thus, in the light of the trajectory of the Maoist movement, its pan-India presence and objective, and its potential to threaten India's internal security and integrity, there is an urgent need to evolve a national approach and a national policy based on consensus, rather than leave it to individual affected states to frame their policies, which are sometimes strikingly opposite and conflicting.
The author is a Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
Source: Deccan Herald, Bangalore, September 14, 2005.
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