Disappointed at the lack of progress in resolving the Kashmir issue through the Indo-Pak composite dialogue, Gen Pervez Musharraf is reported to have said, "Let me give another bombshell, I propose, one way of moving forward.... Take three towns, Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramula. Let all the military move out of the cities to the outskirts. (We) will ensure there is no militancy inside.... Pakistan will be with the Indian government and Kashmiris to ensure that there will be total peace and tranquility in these three places."
Within hours of this so-called bombshell, the Government of India reacted coldly and shot down the suggestion stating that such a decision could not be dictated by any foreign government. It was a bad omen for the start of the third round of the composite dialogue process on January 16.
Actually, there is nothing new in General Musharraf's suggestion. Therefore, it is not such a bombshell. But the statement conveys complicity, naivety, and deliberate interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country; things that are carefully avoided in practising international relations by mature statesmen and nations.
Not many people in India may be aware that we had implemented such a move in 1997-98. It produced no results because the ISI and its terrorist outfits exploited the situation. Later, the Pakistan Army intruded into Kargil sector, which led to a limited war in 1999.
After the state and parliamentary elections in 1996-97, people in the Kashmir valley showed considerable enthusiasm, fresh hopes and clear signs of disenchantment with militancy. In order to strengthen the hands of the elected state government, we (I was Army Chief then) removed Army deployments from Baramula, Sopore, Srinagar, Badgam and Anantnag towns. Only paramilitary troops were deployed in these towns to assist the civil authorities and the police in maintaining law and order.
For some time terrorism in the valley appeared contained. But this was not to the liking of the ISI and its terrorist outfits. They extended terrorist activities to Kishtwar, Doda and other areas south of Pir Panjal Range. Among the infiltrators, the number of foreign terrorists shot up suddenly. They took over control of the local militants. At one stage, terrorists took control of Sopore town. Army units had to be re-deployed to bring about normalcy in that town.
When the Lahore Declaration was signed, violence erupted all over in Jammu and Kashmir. Between February and April 1999, there were 618 incidents of violence in which 487 civilian, security forces personnel and terrorists were killed. Thereafter, because of the Pakistan Army's intrusion in Kargil, our regular Army units and their formation headquarters (8 Mountain Division) were moved to Dras. Rashtriya Rifle units were deployed in their place in the valley.
The General's suggestion is also not a bombshell because only a few months ago Pakistan's ambassador in the US, Gen Jehangir Karamat, had spoken similarly of demilitarisation of Baramulah and Kupwara districts. The strategic and military implications and the risks involved in such a move are quite obvious. It would facilitate infiltration on the most usable routes, and some day may even facilitate Pakistan's influence/domination/control of Shamsabari Range and areas north of Jhelum, including the three cities; virtually more than half the valley.
How will the Pakistan President ensure total peace and tranquility in Baramulah, Kupwara and Srinagar after our military units move out? Doesn't that reflect Pakistani command and control over terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir?
I am surprised at the naivety of the suggestion. Does he really expect India to ask those very elements that sponsored cross-border terrorism to pull its chestnuts out of the fire now?
The General is loudly speaking against "autonomy" and promoting "self-rule" outside the Indian constitution in Jammu and Kashmir. Does the "self-rule" apply to PoK and Northern areas, where there are no elected representatives? It is surprising that the Government of India has not reacted strongly to this blatant interference in its internal affairs which sabotages the Indian government's efforts in domestic political dialogue, in working out details of autonomy in the state (a task assigned to Mr N.N. Vohra, former Defence and Home Secretary). It may release centrifugal forces that can cause more trouble for India.
Analysts wonder whether India has given up political claim to Jammu and Kashmir on the other side of the LoC. Lack of that articulation is obviously making General Musharraf bolder and his task easier by focusing on Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of the LoC.
Why is President Musharraf so impatient that he keeps floating new balloons on Jammu and Kashmir every few days?
He has three constituencies: himself, Pakistan military and the articulate Pakistani liberal elite. Personally, he needs legitimacy to be able to continue as President after shedding his uniform. For this, he has to deliver on the domestic and India front. On the domestic front, he needs plural support, economic progress, and social stability. Having created a fairly stable PML (Q) and nominating an economic technocrat as Prime Minister who is managing the economy well, his performance on the domestic front has been fairly satisfactory. Post-9/11 strategic cooperation with the US, particularly for Operation Enduring Freedom, has benefited Pakistan (and thus him) in financial resources and as a "Major Non-NATO Ally".
On the India front, he needs a breakthrough in the composite dialogue, particularly on Kashmir. But he is unable to change the Indo-phobic mindset of the Pakistan military, which traditionally looks at the threat and competition from India as a justification for its own relevance and primacy. He cannot afford to upset this establishment and, therefore, cannot or does not wish to eschew support to the Kashmiri terrorism. He wants to please the Pakistani liberal elite to be able to get its support, retain power and to maintain his own liberal image.
General Musharraf is also a prisoner of his own rhetoric. As the time for shedding uniform is running out, he is under pressure to deliver. But if he continues to drive the Jammu and Kashmir agenda in this manner and tries to use it as a benchmark for all discussions, the Indo-Pak composite dialogue is unlikely to see substantive progress in the near future.
The writer, a former Chief of Army Staff, is President, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi.
Source: The Tribune, Chandigarh, January18, 2006.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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