India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a war of attrition through the use of the soft power of the electronic media and skilful psychological warfare in the hope of thereby making each other's traditional position on the Kashmir issue increasingly untenable and thus making possible a forward movement in their bilateral negotiations on the subject.
The inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service on April 7, 2005,, for which the initiative was taken by India, and the proposals for other confidence-building measures (CBMs) dangled by India before Pakistan and the people of Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control (LOC) in order to reduce their psychological pains of separation are a good example of this use of soft power by New Delhi.
TV images of the inauguration on Indian as well as foreign channels dramatically brought out the enthusiastic response to the Indian initiative from the Kashmiri people on both sides of the LOC except in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The scenes of jubilation at the inauguration of the bus service all over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including even in the capital Muzaffarabad, clearly showed, much to the discomfiture of Islamabad, that the CBMs are having a positive impact on the mood of the people even in the areas under its control.
The scenes also buttressed India's arguments that the CBMs themselves could be an important first step in the efforts to break the logjam over Kashmir. This challenged the oft-repeated position of Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf that the CBMs, however desirable, cannot be a substitute for hard negotiations for a satisfactory solution to the Kashmir problem, which would be acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of the State.
The TV images also carried two other messages to the people of J&K and other parts of India, the people of the POK and the Northern Areas of J&K (Gilgit and Baltistan), presently under occupation by Pakistan, the people of Pakistan itself and the international community:
The support for the Pakistani-sponsored jihadi terrorists is now largely confined to the capital Srinagar. They have lost considerable ground outside Srinagar, where a jihadi fatigue has set in amongst the people.
The leaders of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, sponsored and funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have very little following outside Srinagar. Even in Srinagar, the seeming support for them amongst certain sections of the local population is more due to the intimidatory power of the jihadn terrorists than due to genuine conviction in their leadership. This negates Pakistan's argument, based on wishful thinking, that the Hurriyat constitutes the only authentic voice of the people of J&K.
The present Congress (I)-led coalition Government in New Delhi headed by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh has thus far shown itself to be more adept than the previous Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition Government headed by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpaye, the former Prime Minister, at wielding the soft power of the State against Pakistan.
The low protocol, but high profile visit of Gen.Musharraf to India from April 16 to 18 is designed to offset the undeniable advantages thus far gained by New Delhi in this war of attrition through soft power. Musharraf has skillfully transformed what he initially projected as a goodwill visit to watch a cricket match between the two countries into a substantive visit for substantive discussions on Kashmir, with cricket relegated to a minor diversion.
His apparent objectives are three-fold:
To restore the focus, in the eyes of the international community, on the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the Kashmir question as the only way of averting another military conflict in the region, which, according to his projection, could degenerate into a nuclear war.
While maintaining the momentum on the CBMs, which enjoy considerable international support, to draw the focus away from them by projecting them as tactical palliatives without much strategic significance if there is no forward movement in the negotiations on the Kashmir issue.
To re-direct the spotlight on to the Hurriyat leaders in order to help them recover the lost ground.
Musharraf understands media and perception management better than any other Pakistani leader, civilian or military, of the past. He also understands in equal measure the use of the electronic media as a very important component of soft power. As Mr.Joseph Nye, the former Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Clinton Administration and presently the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government in the Harvard University, once remarked, the electronic media enables a leader to take his battle and message directly to the people of the adversary state sitting before the TV sets in their drawing rooms over the heads of their leaders. That is what Musharraf sought to do during his first unsuccessful visit to India in 2001, which was high in protocol and Musharraf-staged drama, but meager in results.
Would his wielding of this soft power during his second visit be more subtle and sophisticated or as crude as it was last time and counter-productive? What impact he would make this time on public opinion in India, including J&K, and abroad? Would he seek to return to Pakistan with a halo round his head in the eyes of his people at a time when the opposition to him at home from the religious parties continues to be relentless, but as yet still manageable?
The answers to these questions would depend as much on our skills in the use of soft power as his. Our objective should be not to deny him the theatre which he always seeks, but use that theatre to cut him down to size.
The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute of Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: [email protected]. Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper no. 1336, April 15, 2005.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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