Originally Published 2005-04-01 10:05:21 Published on Apr 01, 2005
Following a tip off, the Colombian Police have chanced upon an indigenously built mini submarine in the port of Tumaco, near the Colombian border with Ecuador. Reportedly, the vessel can carry up to 10 tonnes of cocaine valued at about $US200 million in the international market. According to Eduardo Fernandez, head of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), a detective force, ¿They started building the submarine about six months ago, using small pieces so as not to make people suspicious.
Mini Submarine-A Vessel of Choice with Drug Cartels and Terrorists
Following a tip off, the Colombian Police have chanced upon an indigenously built mini submarine in the port of Tumaco, near the Colombian border with Ecuador. Reportedly, the vessel can carry up to 10 tonnes of cocaine valued at about $US200 million in the international market. According to Eduardo Fernandez, head of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), a detective force, "They started building the submarine about six months ago, using small pieces so as not to make people suspicious. They wanted to have it ready for Easter because they thought the police would drop their guard". 

This is the third time that the Colombian Police have discovered a mini submarine in the country. Earlier, in 1995, a relatively unsophisticated mini-submarine to transport drugs had been discovered. But in 2000, a similar vessel was confiscated in a mountain workshop in Facatativa just 18 miles west of Bogota, Facatativa is a rural town and is roughly 7,500 feet above sea level in Andean region. The mini submarine had hydraulic tubing, a protected propeller, a double hull and diving rudders that would allow it to dive to 325 feet. The vessel could carry 11 tons of cargo. The discovery had stunned both the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Colombian police who noted that in the past drug cartels had used high-speed boats and low-flying planes to smuggle cocaine. This was indeed a huge leap. 

What was perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the find was that Russian-language manuals with Spanish translations were recovered. In 1997, Colombian gangs had been suspected of trying to buy a diesel-powered Russian submarine. Highly professional Russian engineers may have also been helping to build the submarine. 

Similarly, the LTTE attempts to build a mini submarine in Phuket, Thailand were uncovered. In April 2000, Christie Reginald Lawrence, a Sri Lankan born Norwegian citizen, was caught by the police, while building a mini submarine with a Norwegian Engine at the Sea Craft Company a shipyard jointly owned by Lawrence, a Thai and an American national. 

With the discovery of a mini submarine under construction at the Sea Craft Company yet another small submarine construction was sighted in the waters off Koh Hey Island, south of Phuket's Chalong Village. Chalong police found not one, but three mini submarines at a boatyard in Moo, Rawai Village. The boatyard Sea Station Partnership is owned by Sithichai Wonsrivijit alias Go Chai. Go Chai also runs a diving and snorkeling business at Koh Hey and claims to be an inventor. He invented a helmet for sea walking and had completed building his latest invention. 

Phuket has also served as an important base for LTTE arms procurement and smuggling. For instance, in February 1996 M V Horizon and M V Comex Jules were destroyed by the Sri Lankan Air Force as the vessels were believed to have onboard a huge consignment of arms that originated in Cambodia and were loaded at Phuket. 

Reportedly, in June 1999, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had made enquires with North Korea for a possible sale of a mini submarine. A brochure describing a mini submarine ' 45-foot long with the capacity to carry six persons, including two divers … designed for special operations with a good tactical range and a low noise level' was found. North Korea has sold more than 10,000 automatic rifles and other arms to the MILF. In early 2003, Philippines forces had discovered some documentation from the MILF camp, which suggested that the MILF was considering purchasing underwater scooters from Scandinavia. 

These developments are a clear indicator that both the terrorists and drug cartels are employing similar tools for their operations. Their focus now appears to shift to underwater capability. This raises two issues: First availability and cost of underwater vehicles and second their crew and operations. 

As regards availability, these are constructed by using commercially available off-the-shelf technology equipment. According to Dr. Giunio Santi, a naval architect, "a modified underwater barge can support two mini-subs for six months at sea. The barges and all other support equipment are commercially available and are not considered to be weapons, so that any country - including those restricted in their arms purchasing capabilities - can buy them without the supplying company filing purchase notification statements." The cost of a personal mini submarine can range from several hundred thousand dollars to tens of Millions of dollars depending on the size. As far as crew is concerned, it is not difficult to train. All they need is good deep-sea diving training and basic engineering knowledge of batteries and underwater propulsion. 

Some of the above incidents have prompted the US navy to start training on conventional submarines. On October 28, 2004 the Swedish government accepted a U.S. Navy proposal to lease an AIP-equipped submarine and its crew of 25 for anti-submarine warfare training, which begin in 2005. Post Cold War, the US has witnessed a marked decrease in anti submarine warfare training including those in shallow waters and close to the coastline. These sea spaces are described as littorals and constitute crowded waters like the mouth of ports and harbours as also entry and exit points of strategic choke points like the straits of Hormuz and straits of Malacca. 

Since the early 1990s, the strategic literature on naval strategy introduced the concept of 'littoral warfare'. Although the term 'littoral' is not new, it gained great significance in US military literature primarily due to the fact that littoral spaces are considered congested due to dense shipping activity, civilian air corridors and shallow waters which can result in projection of power in the littorals, a potentially challenging exercise. These sea spaces are also infested with activities of non-state actors who engage in terrorism, piracy, gunrunning and drug smuggling. Besides, the underwater environment is complex due to underwater noise generated by the immense traffic that can be an impediment for an optimal performance of even the most advanced sonar systems. 

Major General Mike Myatt, former Director of US Expeditionary Warfare, coined the term "chaos in the littorals". General Myatt's hypothesis is that most future conflicts would take place in the littoral. He argued that littorals provide a home to most of the world population, wealth and industrial capacity and the nerve center of international relations through which people, goods, ideas and cultures pass. "Conurbations such as Lagos, Cape Town, Karachi and Manila lie in the littorals; besides being the hub of maritime trade activity were also centers for disorder." 

Unfortunately General Myatt's prediction has come true. "Chaos in the littorals" is a reality and the world's coastal areas have become more chaotic. In this chaos, the role of non-state actors in intra-state and inter-state violence is increasingly becoming a matter of great concern. These entities are grouped under various categories like liberation army, insurgents, belligerents etc. Several types of non-state actors have now acquired the status of international actors like the Al Qaeda and the LTTE. The results can be seen in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and South East Asia in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 

The terrorists have developed sophisticated tactics that entail attacking ships both in harbor and at sea. Improvised explosive devices, submersibles, mini submarines and high-speed boats are weapons of choice. Off the shelf communication equipment and water sport/diving equipment are part of their inventories. In the absence of technological superiority over a stronger military, these groups have adopted asymmetric strategies and options to challenge maritime forces and inflict unacceptable costs. The asymmetric tactics and strategies adopted by terrorists and drug cartels will continue to challenge maritime forces. 

The author is Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper no. 1312, March 30, 2005.

* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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