A nightmare scenario facing the world today is that of nuclear weapons in the possession of terrorists. As US President George Bush remarked during his recent UK trip, "the greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists." Terrorist groups, as they have proved time and again in the past with conventional weapons, will have absolutely no qualms about using nuclear weapons or other unconventional weapons and many such groups have made their intentions of trying to possess such weapons, well known.
Knowing this, it is frightening to know the following points about nuclear weapons as brought out in the fact sheet issued by the Eisenhower Institute:
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Approximately 14, 300 strategic nuclear weapons exist worldwide, more than 95% of which are in the arsenals of the US and Russia
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More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia maintain approximately 4, 600 warheads on hair-trigger alert, or "launch-on-warning' status, for immediate launch in the case of a nuclear attack
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It takes only a few pounds of plutonium (or several times that amount of Highly Enriched Uranium to make a nuclear weapon. Plutonium is created by the fissioning of uranium. Prior to 1942, there was no plutonium in the world. Today there is more than 1, 000 tons of plutonium.
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Plutonium has a half-life of 24, 400 years. This means that existing stocks of plutonium will be dangerous to humans and other forms of life for nearly 250, 000 years.
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While a number of countries in the world possess significant stocks of these materials, the largest inventory in the world is held in the Newly Independent States (NIS): an estimated 1, 350 metric tons of plutonium and HEU, enough to produce approximately 40, 000 nuclear weapons. More than 99% of this material is located in Russia, with smaller stocks held in other NIS, including Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Ashton B. Carter, a professor on American national security policy, points out that both plutonium or enriched uranium nuclear weapons material: are exceedingly difficult to find and eliminate; last for thousands of years; can be fashioned into bombs; and can fall into the hands of unstable nations or terrorists.
Nuclear terrorism could soon become a reality and terrorists with nuclear weapons have to succeed only once for a terrifying and catastrophic result. How difficult would it be to make a nuclear weapon? Luis Alvarez, a physicist with the Manhattan Project, had noted in his memoir Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicists that "with modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low that terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated U-235 is at hand it's a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion…Even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order." Matthew Bunn states a bomb with the explosive power of 10, 000 tons of TNT, which is smaller than the Hiroshima bomb, could kill half a million people and cause over $1 trillion in direct damage if it is set off in mid-town Manhattan. He reminds us of the awesomeness of the nuclear weapon - 10, 000 tons of TNT is 10 million pounds of high explosive. It is a frightening fact that less than 18 pounds of plutonium or 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium are sufficient to make a nuclear bomb but these very materials circulate in civilian nuclear commerce in tons. While there are currently 440 commercial nuclear reactors (with 30 new nuclear power plants under construction) in 31 countries with a total capacity of about 351 gigawatts, additionally, 56 countries operate civil research reactors. While a typical plant generates 20 metric tons per year, the nuclear industry generates about 2, 000 metric tons per year. Over the past four decades, the industry has produced about 40, 000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel. The current arsenals of the recognized nuclear-weapon states (NWS) of China, France, Russia, UK and the USA consist of around 14, 300 strategic warheads, as has been mentioned earlier, while those in the unrecognized NWS of India, Israel and Pakistan are estimated to be anywhere between 150 to 270 warheads. Also the states of immediate proliferation concern include North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
Given all this, have there been cases of weapons-usable nuclear materials smuggling? As far back as 1994, nuclear smugglers were arrested in the Czech Republics on December 14 and three kilograms (6.6 pounds) of HEU were seized from them. That same summer, there were three seizures of plutonium and one of HEU in Germany, although these were in gram quantities.. There were also reported seizures of larger amounts of HEU of six pounds in St. Petersburg in March 1994; three pounds near Moscow in October 1992 and about four and a half pounds in Lithuania in 1992. A National Intelligence Council Congressional Report stated that four grams of HEU were seized in Bulgaria. What was of real concern, was an incident of theft, not independently confirmed, from an unnamed enterprise in Chelyabinsk Oblast in 1998, when, according to Viktor Yerastov, chief of Minatom's Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control Department, the amount stolen was "quite sufficient material to produce an atomic bomb." A recent high profile case involved the arrest of Alexander Tyulyakov, Deputy Director for administrative issues of the Russian state-owned Atomflot, in Russia's northern port of Murmansk, in September this year. Atomflot carries out repair work and spent nuclear fuel storage for Russian nuclear icebreakers and nuclear submarines. Tyulyakov is reported to have kept more than 6 pounds of enriched uranium (uranium-235 and uranium-238), in his car, garage and summer cottage.
What then are "loose nukes"? "The term originally referred to poorly guarded nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union that might tempt terrorists or criminals. Today, experts use the term to refer to nuclear weapons, materials, or know-how that could fall into the wrong hands." (CFR) Why is the former Soviet Union a likely target for potential nuclear smugglers? As Prof. Bunn has pointed out, during the Soviet era, the nuclear-security system was designed for a single state with a closed society, closed borders, and well-paid nuclear workers. Today, that system has been splintered among multiple states with open societies, open borders, unpaid nuclear workers and rampant corruption. It has already been mentioned that the largest stock of fissile materials in the world, i.e., an estimated 99% of the 1, 350 metric tons of plutonium and HEU, which is enough to produce approximately 40, 000 nuclear weapons is located in Russia. A recent progress report compiled by 21 research institutes in 16 European, Asian and North American countries known as the Strengthening the Global Partnership project warned that despite a decade of development assistance, only 17 % of Russia's 600 tons of nuclear material and 10 % of its 20, 000 warheads are in facilities which have had comprehensive security upgrades.
What has been done about safeguarding nuclear material and what can further be done? From 1991, the $400 million a year Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 6, 072 nuclear warheads, destroyed 515 ballistic missiles, 441 ballistic missile silos, 115 bombers, 399 submarine-launched missiles, 408 submarine missile launchers, and 27 strategic missiles submarines, sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. More than 20, 000 scientists formerly employed in cooperative, peaceful endeavors. This program has also succeeded in removing all of the nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, as shown in the report mentioned above, this represents a fraction of what's left in Russia and a lot more needs to be done. Apart from the Nunn-Lugar program, the Group of Eight last year pledged a total of $20 billion for securing stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Also, on November 7th, the US and Russia signed an agreement in Washington. Under the terms of this agreement, Russia will retrieve uranium from research reactors in 17 countries, within the next 5 to 10 years. These reactors are among the 100-plus research nuclear installations that had been place around the globe in about 40 countries, by the US and the Soviet Union, when the Cold War between the two was at it height.
What needs to be done further? Prof. Bunn has given a comprehensive plan for addressing this security hazard. He suggests that a focus should be made on the following six key steps:
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Radically accelerate security and accounting improvements, upgrading security for all the plutonium and HEU in the former Soviet Union within a few years.
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Pay Russia to blend down all of its excess HEU within a few years, permanently eliminating an enormous security hazard.
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Finance the needed program to get rid of Russia's huge excess-plutonium stockpile.
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Boost efforts to help Russia shrink its nuclear weapons complex and reemploy excess weapons experts - in return for Russian agreement to measurable step to reduce the complex's threat.
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Finance dismantlement of thousands of Russian warheads, with monitoring to confirm it is taking place (without revealing classified information) - and with substantial US dismantlement as well, under identical monitoring measures.
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Create new revenue streams for nuclear security, through projects such as commercial spent-fuel storage, a 'debt-for-security swap,' and relaxing trade restraints on Russia's legitimate nuclear exports, with a substantial portion of the proceeds targeted for auditable financing of nuclear-security efforts.
It is true that nuclear materials are in the possession of countries scattered all over the globe. However, the biggest threat is from loose nukes in Russia falling into wrong hands. If adequate precautions are not taken, it will not be a question of whether; it will only be a question of when.
Dr Kalpana Chittaranjan is Research Fellow with ORF
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