Left-wing extremists, popularly known as Maoists worldwide and as Naxalites1 in India--have been gaining in strength and influence since some time. Today, the menace of Left-wing extremism is the single internal security threat that affects the largest number of States in India.
| State | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Andhra Pradesh | 113 | 180 | 96 |
| Bihar | 170 | 111 | 117 |
| Chhattisgarh | 48 | 37 | 55 |
| Jharkhand | 193 | 200 | 157 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Maharashtra | 11 | 7 | 29 |
| Orissa | 3 | 11 | 11 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 4 | 12 | 6 |
| West Bengal | 2 | 4 | 7 |
| Other States | 2 | - | 1 |
| Total | 550 | 564 | 482 |
Source: India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002-2003, New Delhi, Department of Internal Security, Jammu and Kashmir Affairs, States and Home, 2003, p. 86.
Though the intensity and scale of Naxalite activity varies from State to State, certain broad patterns are, nevertheless, discernible:
Of all the Left-wing extremist groups, the PWG has the largest presence, in different parts of the country. At the present, the rebels claim that they have established seven guerrilla zones of domination, four in Andhra Pradesh, where the group was originally founded on April 22, 1980, one in Bihar, one in parts of Maharashtra-Madhya Pradesh border, and the other in the Dandakaranya forest in central India 7 . Further, the PWG has a State Committee to over see its activities in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Bihar, West Bengal, Haryana and Punjab. The MCC has, in the year 2003, acquired a new presence in Punjab after a little known Naxalite group, the Revolutionary Communist Center of India--RCCI (M), merged with it 8 .
The rebels indulge in killings--of security force personnel, political leaders and civilians who they brand as police informers. In short, anyone who 'they' consider as 'their enemy' is eliminated. This is a crucial element in their strategy as is common with all non-state violent actors in India and across the world. They undertake abductions for ransom or for securing freedom to their jailed colleagues, and 'interfere' in democratic processes. Further, they behave like modern day Robin Hoods--hold kangaroo courts, dispensing quick justice, threaten corrupt Government officials and rich landlords as well as political leaders who act against the interests of the 'people'. At the same time, they organize peasants and tribals against traders and the government. To finance their activities, the Naxalites 'accept contributions' and also extort vast amounts from businesses, political leaders, corrupt government officials, rich land lords and professionals, in other words from anyone who has ill-gotten wealth.
The activities of the Naxalites are in pursuance of their declared objective of seizing political power, through the power of their gun. In the process, they have widened their horizon and have established linkages with fraternal groups abroad, as well as with terrorist groups operating in India.
Activities
Murders
Routinely, the Naxalites have killed political leaders belonging to various levels and have, on occasion, apologized terming the killing a 'mistake'. For instance, the PWG Naxalites had shot dead in cold blood a former Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly, Duddilla Sripada Rao 9 , and a serving Legislator of the same Legislature, who belonged to the tribal community, Ragya Nayak 10 . Subsequently, they had apologized for their mindless act 11 . Such indefensible violence had brought them disrepute and had put in doubt their credibility because both Rao and Nayak were reportedly known for their selflessness and strong commitment towards their constituents. The PWG rebels have proved more than once that that they would not desist from revenge killings. Their most daring act, as yet, has been the failed assassination attempt on October 1, 2003, in which they sought to kill the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Nara Chandra Babu Naidu. In a well-planned operation, the PWG Naxalites triggered a series of landmine explosions causing injuries to Naidu, besides a Minster and two other Legislators 12 . Naidu had a miraculous escape. However, on another occasion, his Cabinet colleague was not as lucky. The Naxalites, in a similar and meticulously executed operation, planted a landmine at Ghatkesar, a suburb of Andhra Pradesh Sate capital Hyderabad, and killed Minister for Panchayat Raj A. Madhava Reddy 13 . As Home Minister earlier, Reddy had ordered a crackdown on the rebels. In a botched up abduction attempt, a few years earlier, the same Naxalites, shot an industrialist and liquor baron, Magunta Subbirami Reddy, who was at the time of his killing in Ongole, Andhra Pradesh, a serving Member of Parliament (MP) . 14
Abductions
The Naxalites' abduction attempts had on some other occasions brought them 'rich dividends'. Way back in 1987, on December 27 15 , they had boldly abducted a group of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers in the forest area in East Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh, and set them free in exchange for their colleagues detained at the Central Prison in Rajahmundry, a few days later. It is said that the primary objective in indulging in that incident was to secure the release of a prominent Naxalite leader, 'Kranti Ranaveer'. On another occasion, they had abducted, in broad daylight from Hyderabad, a young leader of the Congress party, Sudhir Kumar, whose father P Shiva Shankar had earlier been a Minister in the Union Government . 16
These abductions are not limited to political leaders alone. Security force personnel as well as businessmen, too, have been abducted on several occasions. For instance, the Naxalites abducted four constables in Visakhapatnam district, Andhra Pradesh, from the Ankapalle police station, for the first time in the plain areas of north coastal Andhra, on August 23, 2002. On the same night, the Naxalites attacked the nearby Chodavaram police station, too. In the Anakapalle attack the PWG looted weapons and had taken five policemen hostage, of whom one was subsequently killed, while the remaining four were released, a few days later 17 . On another occasion, in the same State, in Guntur district, two policemen of the Dachepalli police station were abducted from Takkellapadu village, on December 19, 2002 and were set free in exchange for 13 jailed jailed Naxalite sympathizers 18 . In another incident, on April 2, 2003, a large group of 20 to 30 PWG Naxalites forced out four policemen, including a sub-inspector, from a stationary bus near Katamraju tanda, in Peddaraveedu village, on the fringes of the Nllamala forests, in Prakasam district, also in AP 19 . All four were later set free.
The Naxalite groups continue to abduct businessmen because it is lucrative. The amounts they, thus, earn, by of ransom, varies with the 'paying capacity' of the concerned person or his family. Indeed, one Naxalite leader demanded and secured a vast amount as ransom. The Karimnagar district committee secretary of the Janasakthi Naxalites, 'Ranadheer', led the abduction of a rich contractor, Marthanda Rao, who is related to a Union Minister of State 20 , and set him free after holding him captive for a few days. The amount that changed hands in exchange for the safety and freedom of Marthanda Rao, a subject of dispute, was allegedly several million rupees 21 . The Naxalite leader, later on, surrendered to the police. Such unscrupulous elements have, thus, turned the Maoist revolution into a 'lucrative industry'.
Extortion
The amounts the Naxalite groups earn through extortion are phenomenal. In Andhra Pradesh alone the PWG, according to one rough estimate, earns seven hundred million rupees annually; the PWG is active in nine States in India. 22 Furthermore, there are 19 Left-wing extremist groups operating in Andhra Pradesh. Another report held that the MCC earns one billion rupees annually in Bihar alone. Extortion appears to be the primary motto of existence for the lesser known Naxalite groups. During the season in which tendu (similar to tobacco) leaf is plucked, all these groups move to the areas where the leaf is grown and plucked and implement strong arm methods to extort money from the contractors. At times, those who refused to pay-up had to pay for it with their lives. Angered, generally, at the activities and methods of the PWG, one senior police officer commented, while speaking to the media, that 'the Naxalites have no ideology as claimed by some of their leaders. On the contrary, the PW
The extremists have an organized method of financing their activities. They threaten the tendu leaf contractors and earn money. On the other hand, they organize the labourers employed in the collection of tendu , fight for their wages and 'accept' contributions from them in the name of party funds. In Orissa, the PWG Naxalites organize workers employed in timber felling and accept from each of them a daily contribution of rupees five. Further one paper mill in Andhra Pradesh pays an annual amount of 60 million rupees to the Naxalites 24 . In Warangal district, another industry pays an annual amount of 10 million rupees to one Naxalite group. 25
The amounts that are extorted from the people are used in various ways. On conditions of anonymity, one senior police officer in Andhra Pradesh told this author in February 2002 that a miniscule proportion, roughly an estimated five per cent, of the annual earnings of the PWG goes into financing 'development activities' in their pocket of influence. These could be in the form of laying roads, or running mobile hospitals in remote parts of the country.
Continued Appeal
In spite of their violent activities, their dogmatic, declared antipathy towards religion, rejection of parliamentary politics and an avowed commitment to armed struggle, the Naxalites enjoy sympathy and support among sections of the people probably because they are seen as 'performing' the duties that should originally have been carried out by the 'welfare state'. In that sense, they apparently have replaced the state, and for the people they, thus, become the 'deliverers', where as the state is seen as having neglected and had, in a way, been partially responsible for their continued deprivation. Another probable reason for the Naxalites receiving people's support could be that they are seen as selfless, striving for the benefit of the poor and downtrodden and willing to lead a harsh underground life, at times, leading to death in clashes with the security forces.
Thus, feeding upon grievances - real or perceived - the people have against the state, the Naxalites enter into an area and gradually entrench themselves. The task of the Naxalites is made easy because of the absence of the structures of civil governance in the remote areas of the country. Once they gain more than a toe hold in an area, the Naxalites seek to eject the rudimentary structures of civil governance in existence in those areas to attain and retain unquestioned sway and hold over them.
Ultimately, the rebels seek to declare as many areas as 'liberated'. In Naxalite parlance, a 'liberated area' or 'zone' is one in which the state is running for cover while they are in a dominant position. In a guerrilla zone, the rebels and the state are said to be on an equal footing, while in a base area the state is in a dominant position 26 .
In the process of ejecting and paralyzing the structures of civil governance, the rebels 'warn' elected people's representatives at the village and taluk level as well as leaders of political parties, especially those belonging to the ruling party, to resign from their positions or face violent death. In the past, many have obliged the 'Naxalites'; those who did not do were killed. For instance, on July 1, 2003, several elected leaders--Mandal Praja Parishad Members of Mamillapalli, Taduru and Upparapalli, all in Mahabubnagar district--resigned from their posts 27 . Furthermore, organization leaders of Amrabad and Linagala mandals of the ruling Telugu Desam Party (TDP) quit their party membership complying with a PWG 'directive'. On another occasion, Naxalites in Anantapur district, to mark their anger and disapproval of the police alleged killing a cadre and two of their staunch supporters in a fake encounter, directed, on October 7, 2003, through a statement, all political leaders from the village level upwards to Members of Parliament belonging to the district to quit their posts or face retribution through violent death 28 . In the wake of the encounter, one Legislator, Paritala Ravindra, in a statement accused the police of having picked up from their homes and shot the two youth dead. 29
Naxalite-Politician Nexus
On the other hand, the Naxalites have established linkages with political leaders. On conditions of anonymity, one senior police official accepted the fact in an interview with this author, but declined to name some such leaders. These leaders could belong to various levels. The Naxalites and the political leaders take advantage of another and hence maintain linkages. As the Advocates Committee on Naxalite Terrorism noted, it is, thus, the politicians' lust for power that, in a way, contributes to the continued presence of the Naxalites 30 . In one instance, the local Member of the Legislative Assembly, in Warangal district, Andhra Pradesh, went and paid 'homage' to a slain Naxalite leader, Polam Sudarshan Reddy 'Rama Krishna' 'RK'. The MLA's husband had links with the slain rebel leader, as media reports claimed, and both had helped one another in various ways. RK was a member of the North Telengana Special Zone Committee, the Committee that oversees the PWG's activities in its flagship guerrilla zone and which it showcases to the world as it greatest success.
In another instance, a group of village-level leaders were held by the police, in late 2001, for helping the Naxalites in their plot to blow up the Kataram police station, in Karimnagar district. 31 The Naxalite plot intended to blow up the police station ahead of its inaugural in February 2002. Kataram is a model police station specially built to withstand an armed attack and is said to be among the largest police stations in Asia. The arrested political leaders befriended the local police and visited the police station repeatedly. In the process, they had memorized the architecture of the police station and passed on the information to the Naxalites.
In yet another incident, a local level leader was arrested for assisting the PWG rebels. The leader, Nanam Rajareddy, who represents Mall4apur Zilla Praja Parishad Territorial Constituency in Karimanagr Zilla Praja Parishad, was held on September 18, 2003 night. Reportedly, his links with the rebels were 15 years old. He had, in the past, provided shelter to the Karimangar district committee secretary of the PWG, Nelakonda Rajitha 'Padma', and other leaders and cadres. He was further involved in arranging logistics for the Naxalites, including clothing, medicine and explosives. In the past, he had reportedly used the Naxalites against his rivals. The links between the Naxalites and political leaders are, thus, active. The Naxalites, of course, make deals. The political leaders maintain association with the Naxalites as much for their physical security as for their professional survival.
External Linkages
The Naxalites have fraternal ties among themselves in India and with other groups in some other parts of the world. Broadly, these could be classified as internal, regional and extra-regional. The internal ties are more in terms of defining regions of activities, where by through a range of informal understandings the various Naxalite groups have divided the 'turf' among themselves.
It is the external linkages that are, indeed, worrying for more than one reason. To explain, the Maoist insurgents of Nepal, who have been waging a 'people's war' since 1996 and whose chief demand is turning the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal into a Republic, have been making a relentless effort to bring closer the PWG and the MCC. A further consolidation of these ties would, thus, strengthen the Left-wing extremist movement in India and emerge as a grave threat to its internal security.
Furthermore, the Nepalese insurgents and a few other India-based Left-wing extremist groups are members a broad front known as the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). At a meeting in 2001, 11 extreme Left-wing groups belonging to India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka announced the formation of CCOPMPOSA. 32 . The objective of founding CCOMPOSA is to "coordinate and consolidate the unity among Maoist parties and organizations in South Asia"… as well as to "Lend mutual assistance and exchange experiences and deepen bilateral and multilateral relations amongst Maoist forces in the sub-continent" 33 . The insurgents are working with a well thought out strategy of unifying the Left-wing extremist groups in the region. They have achieved some success in that direction. For instance, between the inaugural meeting and the second annual meeting held in the year 2002, another Maoist outfit of Bangladesh joined hands with CCOMPOSA member and was formally admitted into the grouping at the second annual meeting. Further, the Nepalese insurgents have played a significant and crucial role in the emergence of another Maoist party in the sub-continent, the Communist Party of Bhutan--Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. 34
Besides, the Nepalese Maoists and the PWG are working towards forming what is known as a 'revolutionary corridor' (RC) stretching between Nepal and extending deep into India, to end somewhere in the Dandakaranya forests in central India. 35 Some analysts have suggested that the corridor might actually stretch further south. Indian official sources, too, have not ruled out the idea. Through creating a corridor, the Indian and Nepalese insurgents hope to build a 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ) in a vast swath of land and work towards gaining unquestioned sway over the area. The RC would help the insurg
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