On October 8, seismic fault-lines made a mockery of the ceasefire line that was drawn 56 years ago between the Indian and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This map delineation, which was renamed as the Line of Control after the 1971 Indo-Pak war, appears to have gone out of control, at least temporarily, by the fury of the massive earthquake that struck J&K and Northern Areas on that Black Saturday. Thousands have perished on either side, including many soldiers who were guarding the Line.
The remoteness and inaccessibility of the area where most people live, not in towns and villages but in far-flung hamlets scattered all over the mountains, is making relief operations difficult. The onset of winter, tension on account of long years of hostility along the LoC, and the continuing cross-border terrorism are adding to these difficulties.
On the Indian side, the Army, despite its own trauma, got down to round-the-clock rescue and relief work immediately. With or without equipment, determinedly, it reached the affected people to provide succour and aid. Its high sense of discipline and fortitude in trying circumstances was evident once again. After the initial earthquake shock, the state and Central machinery have also got down to relief work, with more and more NGOs pitching in to supplement their effort. It is hoped the media, which depicted the Army as the only image of hope and faith for the locals earlier, will monitor their efforts and give us a daily report card.
The situation in PoK, which saw greater devastation, has been more difficult. The relief work has been hampered due to extensive damage to the road network and Pakistan's limited rescue and relief capacity. Pakistan has had to appeal for international aid that has now started arriving. Foreign aid includes a NATO military element with medical and engineering equipment.
Soon after the earthquake, many political leaders and media persons started speculating if this tragedy could be turned into an opportunity to further soften the Line of Control and improve Indo-Pak relations. The suggestion, I believe, was based more on humanitarian sentiments than realpolitik. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promptly extended a helping hand to Pakistan. The Foreign Ministries and the Director-Generals of Military Operations of both nations touched base on this issue. Pakistan agreed to accept assistance but also mentioned the "sensitivities involved". That was not surprising. There is a ground rule of engagement with foreign countries in national security policies, "You can have sentiments for people of other country but you cannot look at the other country sentimentally."
For Pakistan, the "sensitivity" obviously is "India". Its Army, which dictates politics in that country on the basis of India being the only adversary and a continuous threat, cannot accept being perceived as unable to look after its nation or its people, particularly where India is concerned. It is part of a mindset. There is also the problem of its credibility with terrorist outfits that look up to the ISI and the Pakistan Army for guidance and support.
It is unfortunate that ever since the Indian Prime Minister made the aid offer, both countries have got engaged more in scoring diplomatic brownie points than speeding up relief assistance to their own people up to the LoC. Such a dialogue does little credit to India or Pakistan.
Pakistan's response to the Indian offer has been somewhat indifferent.
First, as if to score an immediate strategic point at the international level, there was a sudden increase in the terrorists' violence in J&K, which also made a mockery of the ceasefire announced earlier by Salahuddin, President of the United Jehad Council in PoK. On October 10, terrorists killed 12 men belonging to the minority community in Rajauri district. On October 11, Army personnel killed eight terrorists in yet another attempt at infiltration across the LoC in the Nowgam sector, not far from the earthquake hit areas. On October 18, terrorists targeted Dr Ghulam Nabi Lone, J&K's junior minister, and Mr M.Y. Tarigami, MLA, killing the former. This was the first such incident ever since Mufti Mohammed Sayeed took over as Chief Minister in 2002.
Second, the Indian Air Force planeloads with immediate relief aid were accepted, in a reversed Gujarat earthquake role. Third, although some local-level cooperation was already going on (a lost Indian Army jawan was promptly returned, and rescue helicopters on both sides were flying perilously close to the LoC, overlooking the laid down flying restrictions), there was strong Pakistan official reaction to a media report about some Indian Army personnel having crossed the LoC to help Pakistani soldiers near the Kaman post.
Not unexpectedly, Pakistan refused to allow Indian troops or helicopters into PoK territory for providing any relief aid. In a post-earthquake interview over the CNN, President Pervez Musharraf highlighted a possible Kashmir solution instead of relief assistance from India. When, despite Pakistan's indifferent response, India persisted with its offer of help and made a unilateral announcement to set up composite relief and rehabilitation points at three places along the LoC on October 21, Pakistan responded by announcing five such points - two more than India - on October 22. The brownie point scoring thus goes on!
What does the latest offer of opening cross-border assistance points on the LoC imply for the Indian troops?
With effect from October 25, Indian troops have made (a) arrangements to deliver relief materials and supplies for the quake-affected areas, (b) provide day and night medical facilities, (d) make arrangements for providing relief material, food, drinking water and temporary accommodation, and (d) allow people (of J&K) to meet relatives on either side.
It seems some people in Delhi have forgotten that the personnel deployed along the LoC are soldiers, whose primary job is to defend Indian territory and to check the continuing infiltration. They are not diplomats. So long as terrorists' violence and cross-border infiltration goes on, all cross-border activities would need to be looked at with suspicion. Security measures cannot be relaxed. And yet, if arrangements at the envisaged sites and the conduct of the troops do not come up to the expectations of the locals, or if there is any security-related incident, these troops are likely to be targeted by everyone, including the media. This delicate political exercise will require detailed operating procedures, briefings and re-orientation of mind, close supervision, and very high discipline. Such roles cannot be changed by pushing a button.
It is a tall political order at short notice. The stakes are high and failure, or lack of success, may cause a setback to the progress already made in India-Pakistan relations. It is hoped that some state, Home and External Affairs Ministry officials will also be deployed alongside troops at all these sites.
War, Clausewitz noted, is a continuation of politics by other means. What we are seeing in Indo-Pak security relations today is a continuing erosion of the dividing lines between war and politics. It is a testing time and a challenging task for the Indian Army.
The writer, a former Chief of Army Staff, is President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Source: The Tribune, Chandigarh, October 26, 2005.
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