Author : Kabir Taneja

Originally Published India Today Published on Sep 27, 2024

Israel has conducted multiple airstrikes over the past week, with reports claiming the deaths of senior Hezbollah military leaders, including Ibrahim Aqil and Ibrahim Mohammed Qubaisi.

Israel-Lebanon front: A regional or limited war?

Image Source: Getty

As the war in Gaza continues, with Israeli hostages still held by Hamas, the fractious Israel-Lebanon border is showing signs of becoming a second front, with Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah and Israeli armed forces exchanging heavy fire. Israel has conducted multiple airstrikes over the past week, with reports claiming the deaths of senior Hezbollah military leaders, including Ibrahim Aqil and Ibrahim Mohammed Qubaisi. Earlier in July, another senior leader, Fuad Shukr, was also killed by a targeted Israeli strike in Beirut.

The opening of the Israel-Hezbollah front was neither entirely surprising nor unexpected. Soon after October 7 of last year, when Hamas carried out its horrific terror attack against Israel, the Palestinian group pushed for Hezbollah to target Israel from the north as Gaza became a fierce battleground. Since then, Hamas's capabilities have been significantly depleted. Its political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated during a visit to Iran, and its current chief, Yahya Sinwar, is missing in action. Meanwhile, over the past year, civilian casualties have skyrocketed in Gaza and are now also rising in southern Lebanon.

When Hamas carried out its horrific terror attack against Israel, the Palestinian group pushed for Hezbollah to target Israel from the north as Gaza became a fierce battleground.

It is important to remember that none of these fronts are new, and these battles, involving these very actors, have been fought many times over the decades.

'AXIS' UNDER STRAIN

Expectations of this conflict spilling over into a regional one remain palpable. The likes of Hamas and Hezbollah, known to enjoy patronage from Iran, would expect Tehran to not only back them but to formally engage Israel’s military, potentially drawing the country into a conventional war.

For Iran, both Hamas and Hezbollah are core components of its 'Axis of Resistance', which also includes the Houthis in Yemen, and other smaller groups peppered across Syria and Iraq. The question on many minds is: What is Iran’s red line? At what point does it intend to, if at all, engage Israel directly in aid of the so-called axis it backs?

Contrary to such expectations, Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has maintained a non-rhetorical stance, replacing expected rhetoric against Israel and the US with dangling a carrot instead: one of willingness to talk with the West, bettering ties, and talking about the nuclear deal once again. This is in contrast to Pezeshkian’s swearing-in two months ago, where he took on his new role amidst chants of “Death to America and Israel”.

CHALLENGES FOR ARAB WORLD

On the other side of the spectrum, the Arab world watches on nervously as the conflict presents them with multiple challenges. Saudi Arabia, till recently being goaded by the US to normalise relations with Israel — as done by some other Arab states such as the UAE and Bahrain by way of the Abraham Accords of 2020 — made it clear that it will not do so unless Palestine is recognised as an independent and sovereign state. While this has been a long-standing demand, Riyadh had dangled hope to normalise with Israel to try and sign a comprehensive security arrangement with the US; one as binding as those enjoyed by America’s Asian partners, Japan and South Korea.

Both these Arab powers are attempting to remain neutral in a conflict they increasingly see as one between Israel and Iran, and have developed working relations with Tehran to this aim.

Regionally, the likes of Saudi Arabia are trying to maintain two main postures. First, to make sure domestic discontent on the Gaza issue does not spiral. Second, to maintain their trajectories of economic diversification, moving away from oil, and becoming global business hubs. The UAE to a large extent has already achieved this, with its priority now, to manage its core security requirements which guarantees missiles not raining down on Dubai or Abu Dhabi.

Both these Arab powers are attempting to remain neutral in a conflict they increasingly see as one between Israel and Iran, and have developed working relations with Tehran to this aim. Egypt, which shares a direct border with Gaza, and has a lot of influence within Palestinian movements, is also careful to not make the problem of the Palestinian cause an Egyptian issue, but a Palestinian one. For this, Gaza plays a critical role.

IDEOLOGIES AT ODDS

Beyond the regional aspect, Arab powers, in fact, may not be completely miffed with Israel’s plans to de-fang Hamas and Hezbollah. A pertinent question which continues to be raised is what kind of Palestine would it be if a two-state solution is indeed mobilised? While such an outcome remains largely implausible as of today, a Hamas-led or Hamas-like organisation-led outcome would not change the situation much.

Extreme ideologues, both in Israel and Lebanon, have also come into political power via electoral processes.

The conflict would continue, with an accepted border but contesting ideologies in play. Extreme ideologues, both in Israel and Lebanon, have also come into political power via electoral processes. While in 2022, Hezbollah lost its majority in the Lebanese parliament, it still holds sway over political power in the country. In Israel, far-right parties such as Otzma Yehudit have gained traction, looking to fight ideological challenges with ideology itself.

Finally, a regional war as of today remains unlikely despite the threat perceptions being drawn. The Israel-Lebanon border will be in all likelihood a contained conflict. The biggest question remains what the political off-ramp for the likes of Hezbollah would be, and ultimately, what kind of long-term security Israel would aim towards beyond just setting a precedent of renewed deterrence?


This commentary originally appeared in India Today.

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Author

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...

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