Despite unhappiness and disappointments in India over the repeated US failure since 1981 to call Pakistan to account for its sponsorship of terrorism against India in an attempt to achieve its strategic objectives, a consensus has developed since the terrorist strikes of 9/11 that the Indo-US Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism as developed since 1981 should be kept sustained and further developed.
This is not a consensus reached consciously by all the political parties by discussing the advisability of it around a table. It has been reached unconsciously and in an unorganised manner in the wake of the fears caused by the traumatic experience of 9/11. Even the Indian Communists do not now question the advisability of Indo-US co-operation in Counter-Terrorism as was seen during the recent annual congress of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The congress saw a strong criticism of India's security co-operation with Israel as developed during the previous Government headed by Mr. Atal Behari Vajpaye and a demand for stopping it was made. However, one did not find a similar criticism and demand in respect of the on-going co-operation with the USA.
While the Indo-US Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism is thus based on a national consensus and will continue whichever party is in power in New Delhi, the USA's counter-terrorism co-operation with Pakistan is not based on such a political consensus. It is largely the result of the calculations of one individual, namely, Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf . The US cannot, therefore, be certain that this co-operation will continue in the same measure without any change after him. Large sections of Pakistan, particularly the religious parties, have been opposed to this co-operation.
During the second tenure of President Bush, the US will have three main national security objectives. First, to win the so-called war against international terrorism. It has only been partly won. The part still remaining to be won will be more difficult and complicated than the part already won in Afghanistan. Second, to denuclearise Iran and promote a regime change there, though not necessarily through military means as was done in Iraq. Third, to de-nuclearise North Korea.
For achieving the first two objectives, the co-operation of Pakistan would be vital. The US has been the primary beneficiary of its counter-terrorism co-operation with Pakistan and Islamabad has been only the secondary beneficiary. Its dependence on Pakistan will continue to be vital for preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland.
As against this, India and not the US has been the primary beneficiary of its counter-terrorism co-operation with the US--however limited it might be. This benefit for India has been in the form of training facilities for Indian counter-terrorism experts, the destruction of the training camps of the Pakistani jihadi organisations operating against India, which were located in Afghan territory, and the freezing of the funds of many of these organisations by Pakistan under US pressure.
However, its co-operation with India has not been as vital for the US for protecting its nationals and interests, whether in the US homeland or elsewhere, as its co-operation with Pakistan has been. This has been due to the fact that while there has been no act of jihadi terrorism mounted against the US from Indian territory after the kidnapping of an American tourist by the Al Faran in Jammu & Kashmir in 1995, practically all the post-1992 jihadi terrorist strikes against US nationals and interests had been planned and mounted from Pakistani-Afghan territory.
In the light of this, it is inevitable that where there is a conflict of interests between the USA's counter-terrorism policy requirements vis-a-vis Islamabad and those vis-à-vis New Delhi, the requirements relating to Pakistan would have primacy and would receive priority over those relating to India. It is, therefore, likely that the Indo-US co-operation in Counter-terrorism would not have much scope for any spectacular advance against the terrorism of today.
India should, therefore, focus on counter-terrorism co-operation with the US in meeting the likely threats from the terrorism of tomorrow and not the terrorism of today. The terrorism of tomorrow would have four components--maritime terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism, cyber terrorism and terrorism affecting energy security.
Future counter-terrorism strategies to deal with these new components would require a strong naval power, brain power and a high degree of skills relating to information technology (IT). India has all of them in much greater measure than any other Asian country. It also has ample experience in countering--often successfully--terrorism of various hues and valuable insights arising there from.
These assets, if further developed and used intelligently, could make India a valuable partner of the US in countering the terrorism of tomorrow and bring value-addition to the present co-operation. There is another aspect relating to counter-terrorism, which has not received adequate attention in India. This is the likely emergence of a homeland security industrial complex, comparable to the military industrial complex of the US, which held sway during the Cold War and contributed in some measure to the US economic prosperity.
As the war against terrorism is likely to continue in the short and medium terms, the technological requirements of homeland security would continue to assume increasing importance, with a corresponding increase in investments in research and development in this sector and for the creation of facilities for the production of the required equipment.
The US and India could mutually benefit by joining hands in the research, development and production of homeland security technologies and related equipment.
How India and the US could jointly play the leadership role in developing counter-terrorism strategies and capabilities for meeting the terrorism of tomorrow and in promoting the joint research, development and production of homeland security technologies and equipment? This is the question, which should engage the attention of the counter-terrorism experts of the two countries. A significant forward movement in this could help to overcome the disappointments and unhappiness arising from the unsatisfactory results of the present co-operation against the terrorism of today.
Note: This paper is based on the author's presentation entitled "Indo-US Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism--Past, Present & Future", made at the conference on "US-India Security Ties: Taking Stock", held under the aegis of US Army War College and India Studies Programme of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, April 21-23, 2005.
The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail:
[email protected].
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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