The just-concluded round of India-Pakistan dialogue (July 27) was an opportunity for both the countries to articulate their positions on two critical challenges facing the region, terrorism and Afghanistan, and seek ways to address them as key stakeholders in the stability of South Asia.
The fact that the much-hyped meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, preceded by several other rounds of high-profile discussions, chose not to discuss these two important issues in any substantive manner shows a fundamental flaw in the process of dialogue itself. The talks are projected, and played, more as an opportunity for grandstanding rather than as a serious effort at establishing a working relationship between two adversarial nations.
The inordinately long joint statement issued at the end of the meeting in New Delhi is quite telling in what it does not say. It obviously does not make any mention of terrorism, particularly about the terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad which continue to exist, recruit and train terrorists to target India and India's interests, all with the state support. Cross-border terrorism, which till recently was the core issue of concern for India, seems to have been replaced by an overwhelming enthusiasm for cross-border trade.
But even on the cross-border trade, a close reading of the fine print in the joint statement reveals only perfunctory recommendations. There is hardly anything substantial there to indicate a more robust engagement on the trade and transit issues.
The decision to skirt the issue of terrorism in fact reveals how little both the countries have been able to achieve in terms of bridging the `trust deficit`. Terrorism today poses a serious threat to India as much as to Pakistan. While India's threat comes from Pak-sponsored terrorist groups, Pakistan is being targeted by groups which once owed their creation to the state's policy of using terror as a foreign policy instrument. There is no doubt a realisation within Pakistan about the duplicitous nature of the state policy, which Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao referred to recently, there is no visible sign of the state de-linking itself from terrorist groups like LeT or the Taliban.
There could only be three possible inferences that could be drawn from the state's alliance with terrorist groups in Pakistan. One, the state is incapable of tackling the terrorist networks. Two, the state is unwilling to do so. And third, the state is in some part incompetent and in some complicit. No matter which options you choose, it is imperative that both the countries must put terrorism and terrorist groups high on their agenda of their discussions. The fact that they are not doing so exposes an obdurate immaturity on the part of the negotiating teams. Or they are not sure how and where to go next?
Similar silence on Afghanistan is perhaps even more bewildering. Both the countries, in different ways, have considerable stake in the stability of Afghanistan. They also look at each other as key adversaries. It cannot be denied that the events in Afghanistan in the next three years will have an overwhelming influence on the region, and on the India-Pakistan relationship itself. India's position on Afghanistan is quite clear. India would like a neutral, stable Afghanistan. Pakistan views Afghanistan as an adversary at one level and on the other hand as a `strategic depth` against India. Both these positions leave Pakistan diametrically opposite to the Indian position on Afghanistan. A openly conflicting position on Afghanistan will render a dialogue in New Delhi or Islamabad about peace in the region meaningless and futile.
If the counter-argument is that India and Pakistan must engage in talks `for the sake of talking`, it is a facile one. Negotiations are best at means to an end and cannot be an end in itself. Such engagements are prone to have a short shelf life and deepen suspicions about each other's intentions. Likewise, there is little substance in the argument that as long as there are talks, chances of a conflict between the two countries remain slim. This gives an undue advantage and power to terrorist groups like LeT to shape and disrupt events in the subcontinent.
Both the countries must therefore get down to the serious business of addressing the two most pressing challenges facing the region and chart out a course of negotiations over substantive issues like Afghanistan, terrorism and economic progress. The temptation to fritter away opportunities of serious negotiations for photo-ops must be resisted. Both India and Pakistan must seize the tiny but visible speck of opportunity to take the long, hard road to reconciliation in the next two to three years.
Wilson John is Senior Fellow, ORF.
The just-concluded round of India-Pakistan dialogue (July 27) was an opportunity for both the countries to articulate their positions on two critical challenges facing the region, terrorism and Afghanistan, and seek ways to address them as key stakeholders in the stability of South Asia.
The fact that the much-hyped meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, preceded by several other rounds of high-profile discussions, chose not to discuss these two important issues in any substantive manner shows a fundamental flaw in the process of dialogue itself. The talks are projected, and played, more as an opportunity for grandstanding rather than as a serious effort at establishing a working relationship between two adversarial nations.
The inordinately long joint statement issued at the end of the meeting in New Delhi is quite telling in what it does not say. It obviously does not make any mention of terrorism, particularly about the terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad which continue to exist, recruit and train terrorists to target India and India's interests, all with the state support. Cross-border terrorism, which till recently was the core issue of concern for India, seems to have been replaced by an overwhelming enthusiasm for cross-border trade.
But even on the cross-border trade, a close reading of the fine print in the joint statement reveals only perfunctory recommendations. There is hardly anything substantial there to indicate a more robust engagement on the trade and transit issues.
The decision to skirt the issue of terrorism in fact reveals how little both the countries have been able to achieve in terms of bridging the `trust deficit`. Terrorism today poses a serious threat to India as much as to Pakistan. While India's threat comes from Pak-sponsored terrorist groups, Pakistan is being targeted by groups which once owed their creation to the state's policy of using terror as a foreign policy instrument. There is no doubt a realisation within Pakistan about the duplicitous nature of the state policy, which Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao referred to recently, there is no visible sign of the state de-linking itself from terrorist groups like LeT or the Taliban.
There could only be three possible inferences that could be drawn from the state's alliance with terrorist groups in Pakistan. One, the state is incapable of tackling the terrorist networks. Two, the state is unwilling to do so. And third, the state is in some part incompetent and in some complicit. No matter which options you choose, it is imperative that both the countries must put terrorism and terrorist groups high on their agenda of their discussions. The fact that they are not doing so exposes an obdurate immaturity on the part of the negotiating teams. Or they are not sure how and where to go next?
Similar silence on Afghanistan is perhaps even more bewildering. Both the countries, in different ways, have considerable stake in the stability of Afghanistan. They also look at each other as key adversaries. It cannot be denied that the events in Afghanistan in the next three years will have an overwhelming influence on the region, and on the India-Pakistan relationship itself. India's position on Afghanistan is quite clear. India would like a neutral, stable Afghanistan. Pakistan views Afghanistan as an adversary at one level and on the other hand as a `strategic depth` against India. Both these positions leave Pakistan diametrically opposite to the Indian position on Afghanistan. A openly conflicting position on Afghanistan will render a dialogue in New Delhi or Islamabad about peace in the region meaningless and futile.
If the counter-argument is that India and Pakistan must engage in talks `for the sake of talking`, it is a facile one. Negotiations are best at means to an end and cannot be an end in itself. Such engagements are prone to have a short shelf life and deepen suspicions about each other's intentions. Likewise, there is little substance in the argument that as long as there are talks, chances of a conflict between the two countries remain slim. This gives an undue advantage and power to terrorist groups like LeT to shape and disrupt events in the subcontinent.
Both the countries must therefore get down to the serious business of addressing the two most pressing challenges facing the region and chart out a course of negotiations over substantive issues like Afghanistan, terrorism and economic progress. The temptation to fritter away opportunities of serious negotiations for photo-ops must be resisted. Both India and Pakistan must seize the tiny but visible speck of opportunity to take the long, hard road to reconciliation in the next two to three years.
Wilson John is Senior Fellow, ORF.
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