The story doing the rounds in Delhi is that in another exhibition of generosity, India is about to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachen Glacier) in the interest of peace, but without securing the country's strategic interests. <br /> <br /> Search for peace is indisputably desirable but to try and attain it through magnanimity will only trump realism. Peace is usually possible when there is so much mutual trust that agreements are a natural corollary, or when one of the antagonists is so totally vanquished that the victor can make him sign practically anything, or if both the antagonists are completely exhausted and there is a realisation that the only answer is peace. <br /> <br /> In the India-Pakistan context, the level of distrust remains very high despite the efforts of some nostalgic dream merchants. Pakistan has not called an unequivocal and permanent end to using its jehadist weapon in India. Worse, it is spreading its use to the rest of India. There is also collusion with Bangladeshi jehadists. <br /> <br /> It was this distrust of Pakistan's intentions that led the Indian Army to occupy the Saltoro Ridge in 1984. Saltoro was attained by our soldiers after considerable sacrifice and at huge costs to the nation. One of the spins currently given to support calls for withdrawal is that the expenses and the loss of life are unbearable. Neither is correct. The army claims it is now down to zero weather- and terrain-related casualty. An expenditure of Rs 2 crore a day out of a budget of Rs 80,000 crore is small change. To give up territory just because there is no habitation there or it is expensive is to let sacrifices go in vain and keep yourself open to repeat intrusions later. <br /> <br /> The lay of the land is such that any vacation of this territory without iron-clad guarantees would enable Pakistan to occupy the ridge with comparative ease. Reoccupation by Indian forces would then be virtually impossible and we would have to open another front elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine how this could be achieved as international pressure on India not to retaliate would be immediate and massive. We all know how much pressure was brought upon us following the attack on Indi an Parliament on December 13, 2001. <br /> <br /> The Indian Army had climbed to the Saltoro Ridge for a distinctly military objective. This was to cut off Pakistan's access to areas that would enable it to reach the Karakoram Pass and link with China and be able to threaten Ladakh; the Saltoro Ridge provided Indian forces with strategic heights looking into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. Strategic advantage cannot be given up for some obscure short-term political advantage without a document to establish one's credentials. Withdrawal from the Saltoro heights without any exchange of authenticated documents and carefully delineated positions would be the height of all follies, tantamount to retreat. <br /> <br /> Pakistan's unwillingness to sign any document that authenticates the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) could only mean that it would seek to break it at first dawn. There is neither a change of heart nor intentions. Kargil 1999 was the latest military attempt to alter the ground position in Kashmir and particularly to negate the advantage India had in Saltoro. <br /> <br /> India has the dubious distinction of being the only country to give up strategic advantages repeatedly. In 1948, when the Pakistani forces were retreating, we did not secure Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli or Skardu. In 1966, we gave up Haji Pir, through which infiltrators keep coming into the Kashmir Valley even today. In 1972, we gave up territory and 93,000 PoWs for an agreement that Pakistan never intended to observe. <br /> <br /> Are we now about to repeat more of this sorry history? One is afraid that this may be so. The problem is that we seem to be eager to give up strategic advantage for short-term political gains and to look good internationally. There is little reason for India to accept an unfavourable arrangement today when our position is much stronger than in the Nineties. It is logical to ask if we are now willing to accept this unfair arrangement with a regime that has not given up its primary goal of creating caliphates in India. <br /> <br /> There were times between 1989 and 1992 when it appeared that a settlement on the Saltoro issue was about to be clinched. By then, the Pakistan army was getting ready to redeploy its jehadi army, demobilised from the Afghan theatre to the Kashmir front, and an agreement on Saltoro did not fit into the scheme of things. Boastful Pakistani diplomats even claimed that they would have an 'agreement' favourable to Pakistan on Kashmir by 1991. Frustration at the ability of the Indian-State to withstand this ruthless campaign led to the Kargil misadventure in 1999. But by mid-2001, Musharraf had bounced back post-Agra, only to be deflated by an angry America in September 2001. <br /> <br /> It is an insecure Musharraf who has to keep reminding Pakistanis that he is the boss when he proclaims all corps commanders are his boys, and the rest of the world that he is no Bush poodle. Washington continues to champion Musharraf as the indis pensable frontline ally and wants to give something to Musharraf so that he can transfer troops facing India to do battle in Pakistan's turbulent west. But these troop transfers have to be done in an atmosphere of triumph for Musharraf, when he can claim that he got the Indians out of Siachen. Caeser must return to Rome in glory. <br /> <br /> It is only then that Musharraf hopes his troops will fight other Muslims in revolt in Waziristan and Balochistan. The US has a requirement to keep Musharraf in position. After all, he heads Pakistan's strongest, best equipped and financially endowed political party - the Pakistan army. But that is not our requirement. India is not obliged to let Musharraf continue in perpetuity. Any concession to him now will ensure him a life beyond 2007. And beyond 2007, even Bush does not care; his time will have begun to run out. One can understand American anxiety to reward their favourite in their askewed global war on terror and secure Pakistani help to tackle Iran but one cannot understand India's anxiety to please the Americans. <br /> <br /> The only way it would not be perceived as a retreat would be if the Pakistanis first agreed to delineate the AGPL in the Siachen sector, which is a part of the large Saltoro Ridge, authenticate this on maps that would then be signed and exchanged by commanders of the two countries. Pakistan would then project the AGPL in all its maps, making the AGPL an extension of the LoC from Point NJ-9842. After this, the two countries would work out the ground rules for demilitarisation. Only after this has been worked out will there be discussion on redeployment and demilitarisation of this sector. Anything short of this will be a sell-out. <br /> <br /> Nothing need be agreed to furtively. There is no need to have deals signed in a hurry under the cloak of darkness. We need to debate this openly, and in our Parliament, without the inane recourse to disruptions and walkouts that negate any debate. We are all stakeholders in the peace process but we need to know why we are agreeing to retreat. One does not become a war-mongering cold warrior simply because one wants doubts cleared. Patriotism is not the right of only peaceniks. <br /> <br /> </font> <font size="2" class="greytext1"> <em>The author is Advisor to Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. <br /> <br /> Source: The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 11, 2006 <br /> </em> <br /> <br /> <br /> <em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.</em> <br />
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