Pakistan describes its relationship with China as 'all-weather friendship' which is "deeper than the deepest sea and higher than the highest mountains'. And, the Gwadar Port in Baluchistan, of the many joint projects the two countries took up, was projected as a pillar of this relationship. But recent developments in the port project raise many questions about the nature of the bilateral relationship.
It was only in May this year that Pakistan Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar announced that China had "acceded to Pakistan's request to take over operations" of the Gwadar port as and when the 40-year lease with the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) expired or was terminated. But immediately, the Chinese, who had constructed the deep-water port and financed 80 per cent of the US $248 million initial investment, declined the offer. The Chinese refusal has significant implications as Pakistan has also requested the Chinese to develop a naval facility at Gwadar?
Gwadar port was first envisaged in the early nineties as a secondary port that would ease the pressure of the Karachi Port. At the same time, Gwadar was also meant to reduce the vulnerability of Pakistan being dependent on a single port for its maritime trade. This vulnerability was exposed during the 1971 'Bangladesh War' when the Indian Navy immobilised the Karachi Port. From time to time, labour strikes and communal riots in Karachi too have affected the port functioning. However, plans for the Gwadar port did not cross the blue-print stage till 2002.
The Gwadar port became operational in 2007 and the PSA took over the management, with a promise to invest US $ 525 million in port expansion. However, the PSA shelved the investment programme as Gwadar was handling far less traffic than what it was designed to do. It was also observed that Gwadar may not attract the required levels of traffic in the near future. The reason for Gwadar's below par performance was reported to be because of lack of infrastructure. There is not adequate warehousing facility. The port also lacks connectivity. Gwadar does not have a railhead, and work on the road to Ratodero (in the northern Sindh Province) is yet to be completed. Incidentally Karachi, the primary port of the country, is the only point that is connected to Gwadar, that too by road.
Gwadar, when conceived, would not only have been the second port of Pakistan but also a strategic asset. It is 180 km from the Straits of Hormuz and could become an important naval station to ensure the viability of international shipping and the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. In addition to this, Gwadar could act as a vital link to, and transit-point for Central Asia. At the time of planning, the port was also proposed to become another access-point to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the choke-point of Malacca Straits. Ships could dock in Gwadar, from where merchandise could be transported across land, crossing the Karakoram Highways, to Xinjiang in western China. The port could have also been a beacon light for Pakistan as its strategic location could have made it an important transhipment point at the expense of Dubai. Unfortunately, for Pakistan this has not been so, and it might only be in the distant future that such a proposition could fructify, if it all.
The inhospitable environment around is also responsible for Gwadar becoming a white elephant. Internal political and security issues have complicated the issue further. Baluchistan, where the port is situated, is unstable with ethnic turbulence in the province being one of the problems that Pakistan has been facing all these years. The rest of Pakistan has also been plagued by instability and militancy for a long time now. The terrain across is both difficult and unforgiving. The instability and differences in Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship are also a worry for Central Asian countries wanting to use Gwadar.
These factors become a disincentive for China to consider Gwadar as a secure port for international trade. On the other hand, the 3,000-km rail line between Kashgar (in Xinjiang, China) and Gwadar is estimated to cost $ 30 million per km in construction. The port at Kyauk Phyu in Myanmar with the 1950-km highway up to Kunming, the capital of China's Yunnan Province, would make better economic sense for Beijing rather than Gwadar. The Myanmarese port is also closer to the east coast of China, the hub of China's economic progress.
Another reason is that the Iranian port of Chabahar, which is 75 km to the west of Gwadar, could replace Gwadar as a the preferred port of call for Central Asia, which at present is used by India, for instance, to access both Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chabahar is well connected, and there exists a road and rail network that leads all the way to Afghanistan. For the Central Asian countries wanting to use Gwadar, their problems are compounded by the instability and differences in Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, not to forget their haunting anxieties about security.
Finally, Gwadar may not even figure highly in the "String of Pearls" proposition, propounded by some US strategic experts for China, though it was perceived to play a pivotal role for encircling India. For starters, Gwadar is yet to have a naval facility. As and when it gets one, it will send shock waves all across the Arabian Sea. The geostrategic location of Gwadar will become a concern not only for India but also to other countries in the region. China, a navy not of these waters, will be at the door-step of Iran. At same time Gwadar, given its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, could invite the apprehensions of Persian Gulf nations. In the context of the current US troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the anxieties in the Islamic world about continual pro-democracy troubles that have their roots elsewhere, any further entry of non-territorial players into the region would be wholly unwelcome. The emerging geo-strategic equations -- where the US and China are pitted against each other in theoretical terms, and the US which already has a strong political and military presence in the region -- proximity of Chinese naval presence in the immediate neighbourhood could make these nations more worrisome. The pressure on Pakistan could also be enormous on this score, especially following the terror attack on the Pakistan naval base of Mehran and targeting of American Orion aircraft and Chinese technicians.
For India, Gwadar would just be a logistical challenge if and when its navy were to engage the Pakistan military. What more, minus a Chinese naval presence, Pakistan would require additional naval assets to make Gwadar operational in military terms. Any diversion of existing assets from Karachi could weaken the latter's defence without providing anything in return. On the face of it, thus, Gwadar need not pose a significant military threat to India. Only naval presence of China would make the whole region uncomfortable. How the Arab nations would look at it - and how they would use their 'oil economy' to squeeze China out of the scene through political negotiations, would have to be seen. Gwadar might be the trigger that would unite the navies of the Arabian Sea region because of a perceived common threat perception. It may for these very reasons that the Chinese have declined the Pakistani offer. Gwadar at best will continue to generate a lot of waves but it is unlikely to turn into a tsunami.
(The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation)
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
