Originally Published 2010-11-02 00:00:00 Published on Nov 02, 2010
The existence of an embedded financial network of militant organisations in Bangladesh will seriously undermine the global effort to neutralise global terrorist networks entrenched in the region.
Financing the radicals
The existence of an embedded financial network of militant organisations in Bangladesh will seriously undermine the global effort to neutralise global terrorist networks entrenched in the region. Bangladesh is today home to global terrorist groups like Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI) and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) which are closely aligned with al Qaida. These groups operate in close coordination with global crime syndicates like the D company and local insurgent and extremist groups. What makes the existence of such a financial network in a fledgling democracy like Bangladesh a serious threat to the region’s stability is the incapability of the law enforcement agencies to stem the tide of funds flowing in from illegal sources to fuel terrorist and extremist groups and tendencies in the country. Extremist and militant organisations in Bangladesh, like elsewhere, acquire funds from various sources. Some reports claim that major funding for these organisations come from the illegal trade of products like small arms, narcotics and foreign currencies. The country’s close proximity with India has also made it an ideal transit for smuggling of fake currencies and other contraband items. The terror-criminal networks operating from Bangladesh have a considerable stake in this operation. These groups also generate considerable funds from illegal cross-border trade. The illegal trade between India and Bangladesh is estimated to be at least double the legal trade—over $2 billion. These transactions have generated a massive amount of black money in the country, encouraging various methods of money laundering indulged in by both legitimate and illegitimate businesses and groups. Money laundering has become a consistent source of funding for terrorist and militant groups. Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) chief Saidur Rahman in his confessional statement revealed that his organisation used to get Taka 50,000 monthly from an Indian money launderer. The situation become even more complex because of the close association these militant and extremist groups have with the Bangladeshi Diaspora. Of a large number of Bangladeshis living abroad, mostly in UK, a small section had been helping these groups with money and support. It is suspected that part of the foreign remittances from the Bangaldeshi workers living in Gulf and other countries could be part of the terrorist financial pipeline. JMB was reported to have around 3000 active sympathisers across the globe who donated part of their earnings to the militant cause. There were instances where money raised for charity were diverted for terrorist activities. In March 2009, a mini ordnance factory was discovered inside a madrasa complex in remote Southern Bangladesh. The madrasa was run by a UK- based NGO Green Crescent registered with UK’s Charity Commission. Later, the NGO’s head Dr. Faisal Mostafa, a British citizen of Bangladeshi, was arrested for his links with militant organisations. Green Crescent used to collect money in the name of running charitable organisations like hospitals and orphanages in countries like Bangladesh. The case of Green Crescent also revealed the extent of funding the terrorist groups raised in the name of NGOs. Bangladesh has an extensive network of NGOs. There are around 50,997 NGOs registered with Ministry of Social Welfare and nearly 1 lakh NGOs are registered with the Department of Cooperative; the office of Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms has 9,031 NGOs on its register, the Micro-credit Regulatory Authority another 329 NGOs to run micro-credit and Department of Women Affairs 15,325 NGOs. The actual number of NGOs, in fact, could be much higher than the government records. According to reports, nearly 23000 NGOs registered with the Social Welfare Department were either inactive or have failed to submit reports of expenditure to the government. The fear is that some of these organisations might have diverted the government aid to militants. Besides, some of the foreign NGOs like Revivial of Islamic Heritage (RIHS) have long been suspected to be linked to militant causes. There are speculations that some of the local NGOs might be working as front organisations for radical Islamist groups. An important aspect of militancy in Bangladesh has been the deep and entrenched links between militant organisations and religion-based political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) which run huge businesses. JI has considerable business interest in sectors like finance, education, pharmaceutical, diagnostic, trade and commerce, transport, real estate, media, Information technology and NGO. The party is estimated to earn around $ 200 million yearly as revenue from these businesses. The profit earned by JI is equivalent to that of 1.5 percent of Bangladesh’s annual national investment, 2.1 percent of private sector invest in the country, 3.3 percent of the government annual revenue collections, 3.7 percent of the export of the country, 6 percent of government annual development budget, 12 percent of internal resources of the annual development budget of the government. Prof. Abul Barkat, a noted economist, said JI ran ‘a economy within a economy. Analysts like Prof Barkat, who have studies the financial empires of JI and other parties, believe that institutions run by JIt not only benefited the party economically but also gave it a political clout. The workers of these organisations are dedicated party members who are committed to the cause and hence services provided by these organisations are comparatively better than the government-run institutions. This is one of the reasons why the party has been able to portray itself as an alternative to the government. JI spends nearly 10-12 percent of the revenue for party activities and as payment of salaries to its workers. What makes JI’s financial empire a cause of worry is the group’s links to terrorist and extremist groups. Although JI has denied any such links, investigations have clearly found that the party’s overt and covert support to terrorist groups like HuJI and JMB. For instance, JMB leader Bangla Bhai, executed in 2007, was a member of Islami Chhatra Samaj, JI’s militant student wing. Saidur Rahman, the current chief of JMB, was one of JI’s district chiefs. Not surprisingly, both JMB and JI share the objective of transforming Bangladesh into a Shariah state. Prof. Barkat argues that the militancy in Bangladesh is only a part of the politico-economic model which the fundamentalists in Bangladesh are using to attain state power. The following diagram displays the politico-economic organisational model of religious fundamentalism. Source: “Economics of Fundamentalism and the Growth of Political Islam in Bangaldesh” by Abul Barkat at www.secularvoiceof Bangaldesh.org/article%20by%20Abul%20Barkat.htm, accessed on September 20 2010. There is a strong belief in Bangladesh that the growth of JI’s financial empire will pose a a major challenge to the government in countering extremist activities. The possibility of JI’s financial empire controlling substantial segment of Bangladesh economy cannot be discounted. This can severely impact the current government’s determined campaign to root out the scourge of terrorism from the country. Source: “Economics of Fundamentalism and the Growth of Political Islam in Bangaldesh” by Abul Barkat at www.secularvoiceof Bangaldesh.org/article%20by%20Abul%20Barkat.htm, accessed on September 20 2010. The Sheikh Hasina government is not unaware of the enormity of the challenge posed by the entrenched financial interest of the militant groups and their supporters in the country. A determined and extensive counter-terrorism strategy has been put in place. Security and intelligence agencies have been empowered to pursue the strategic goals. These counter-terrorism measures have been complimented with educational reforms, a close coordination with neighbouring countries as well as the international community and firm handling of militant political parties and leaders. For instance, in April this year, about 3000 NGOs suspected to be linked to militant causes and groups were banned. Likewise, plans are also afoot to rehaul the money laws of the country to bring down the financial network run by extremist groups. These steps may not be enough to restrict the growth of militancy in the country. Experts believe that the country lacked both trained manpower and intelligence capability to interdict the vast illegal financial network run by transnational terrorist and criminal networks. Bangladesh today needs international community’s help, both in terms of resources and capability, in dealing with this problem which has the potential of undoing the hard-earned gains of global effort on stemming the tide of terrorism. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee is Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
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Joyeeta Bhattacharjee

Joyeeta Bhattacharjee

Joyeeta Bhattacharjee (1975 2021) was Senior Fellow with ORF. She specialised in Indias neighbourhood policy the eastern arch: Bangladeshs domestic politics and foreign policy: border ...

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