The immediate concerted European response in the aftermath of Madrid blasts on March 11, 2004 was the creation of the post of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, who would directly work under the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. In fact, the idea of effective counter-terror coordination and intelligence sharing, in the form of a European intelligence agency without police powers was actually proposed by Austria and seconded by some smaller European countries, at an urgent meeting of EU Interior Ministers on March 19, 2004.
But the five major European countries, Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy, have summarily rejected the idea of a CIA-type European intelligence agency, which, as envisaged, would collect intelligence and disseminate among the national services. While Britain's contention was that taking action on the measures already agreed upon is more important than raising a new institution, the German argument was that raising a separate intelligence agency at the level of EU would lead to duplication of jobs and may clash with the existing organisation Europol. However, Germany did not rule out the possibility of such an institution in the distant future. Nevertheless, the post of a Counter-Terror Coordinator was formally finalised by the urgent European Council Summit on Terrorism on March 25-26 in Brussels.
The summit adopted its Declaration on Combating Terrorism, in which it decided, amongst others, to commemorate March 11 as the European Day for the victims of terrorism and urge the member and acceding states to follow the Solidarity Clause in the draft constitution for Europe. The Solidarity Clause contained in Article 42 of the EU draft constitution defined that all the member and acceding countries should act jointly if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack. It further affirmed that EU countries should mobilize all instruments, including military resources, to prevent terrorist attacks, to protect democratic institutions and to assist a member state upon request.
But the most interesting measure was the appointment of Gijs de Vries, the former Deputy Minister for the Interior of the Netherlands and a former Member of European Parliament, as the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Right from the beginning the appointment of Gijs de Vries has raised some eyebrows in public and in the administration. It was said that he does not possess enough experience in intelligence, is politically inconsequential and represents one of the smallest countries in Europe. On the other hand, the public perception was that mere creation of this post would not serve the European counter-terrorism strategy better. The European media has remained very critical about on-going European counter-terrorism measures. Criticising the Europol as a non-functioning organisation so far, Der Spiegel, said the office of a counter-terrorism coordinator is a symbolic one.
Apart from the personality and administrative experience of de Vries, some more important issues may evoke queries regarding the post of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, which are:
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What would be the actual mandate of the Coordinator?
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How much power would he have?
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Would intelligence agencies of the entire present and acceding EU countries be bound to share information with him?
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If an individual nation or a block of nations would not cooperate, could the Coordinator or the EU High Representative for Foreign & Security Policy insist on compliance?
Doubts about the functioning of the Coordinator arose at the outset of the taking over when de Vries, himself conceded that his role is restricted; and, unless he has the same power as the member states in terms of control over police and other law-enforcement agencies, his office cannot work effectively.
In this situation, the present tasks and future challenges of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator would certainly be Herculean. The constraints he faces are that: (i) The EU has a limited responsibility on terrorism and combating terrorism remains under the purview of national governments, (ii) Without having the necessary cooperation, he would not be able to have the entire picture, which would make it difficult to assess a pan-European threat perception; (iii) Major European countries and their agencies have cooperation amongst themselves on case-by-case basis while bypassing the office of the Coordinator. The EU Coordinator's task would be more daunting from May 2004 when 10 new members join the EU. Enlargement of the organisation will expand frontiers, but also bring in new complexities and latent threats. Any future Madrid-type attacks within the EU would lead to severe criticism (mainly from public) against his office, as already apprehended by some experts. In this regard, European majors may have to reckon with the indispensability of a concerted European action as already underscored in the European Security Strategy. If this is not achieved, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Office would be a lame duck.
Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay is an Associate Fellow with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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