On 27 October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Arakan Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, launched “Operation 1027”. The trio of ethnic-minority-led rebel groups in the north of eastern Myanmar's Shan state. The two-month-long operation has led to massive territorial losses in the province bordering Myanmar's largest trade and development partner, the People's Republic of China. On 1 November 2023, the Junta spokesman Zaw Min Tun accepted the Myanmar military's defeat in several sectors in the Shan state, including the crucial border town of Chinshwehaw.
The two-month-long operation has led to massive territorial losses in the province bordering Myanmar's largest trade and development partner, the People's Republic of China.
In response to the growing humanitarian crisis and recent developments that have harmed China's trade interests in Myanmar, on 25 November 2023, the Chinese military announced the initiation of “combat training activities” along the Myanmar border. The drill continued until 28 November 2023 and tested Southern Theatre Command's rapid manoeuvrability, border sealing and fire strike capabilities. The recent military drills reflect China's growing concern regarding the intensification of conflict in the Shan state in Myanmar, but at the same time, one needs to understand the dual implications of Operation 1027 for China.
Dual implications of Operation 1027
Since the launch of Operation 1027, the Triple Alliance have taken over several border gate towns that have significantly harmed both Myanmar and China's trade and development interests. Shan State is crucial to China's geoeconomic ambition called the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is part of the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The project comprises a series of oil and gas pipelines, roads, and rail projects connecting Yunnan to the seaport city of Kyaukpyu in the Rakhine State. The ethnic minorities resented the violation of their land rights which was a result of China's collaboration with the Junta to implement these projects. China has invested US$113 million in Myanmar since the return of the Junta in 2021, which faces significant risks.
Since the insurgent alliance has taken over the border towns, the 770 km oil pipeline network that begins in the deep-sea port of Kyaukphy in Rakhine, which used to transport Russian oil to China's Yunnan, has faced several attacks. Operation 1027's success has led to the loss of crucial territory that facilitated 40 percent of the China-Myanmar bilateral border trade. The announcement of Yunnan military drills after the takeover of Chinshwehaw by insurgents was not only meant to deter the growing insurgency in the border but also to test its own preparedness and prevent the repetition of a large-scale humanitarian crisis that happened in 2015, when Myanmar military intensified counter-insurgency operations along the border.
Operation 1027's success has led to the loss of crucial territory that facilitated 40 percent of the China-Myanmar bilateral border trade.
The 2015 operations involved the alleged bombing by the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) on the Chinese side of the border which led to strong reactions from China, including stern warnings of a “decisive response”. The insurgency’s operations led to the massive displacement of tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese living in the Kokang region of Myanmar. To avoid the emergence of a similar situation in 2023, the Yunnan drills tested the preparedness of the People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA) Southern Theatre Command (STC) and to some extent, deter the rebel groups from further harming Chinese interests in the region. However, it is quite clear that the deterrence factor did not work as three days after the onset of drills, the TBA took control of the Kyin San Kyawt border gate, a major trading point for Myanmar to import electronics, machinery, agricultural tools, and consumer products. It is also part of the large 105-mile Trade Zone used by Myanmar to export its agricultural produce to China. Following the takeover of the Kyin San Kyawt border gate, the rebels burnt 120 trucks out of the 258-vehicle convoy bringing goods from China.
The above instances might create a picture that Operation 1027 has been detrimental to Chinese interests in Myanmar, but there is another angle to it. China has been known to exert significant influence over the insurgent groups operating along the borders. Despite that, China did not wield that influence during the initial stages of the ongoing crisis, because China was frustrated with the Junta's Border Guard Forces (BGF) and its inability to crack down on the illegal telecom fraudsters and gambling organisations operating along the border, scamming thousands of Chinese nationals.
Since May 2023, China had sent clear signals to the Junta leadership that it was unacceptable to the Chinese side that the BGF was tacitly supporting the forced-labour scam syndicates in Myanmar and not looking into the range of illegal activities carried out by them. Instead of paying heed to China's warnings, the BGF continued its support to the fraudsters in the Kokang region.
China had sent clear signals to the Junta leadership that it was unacceptable to the Chinese side that the BGF was tacitly supporting the forced-labour scam syndicates in Myanmar and not looking into the range of illegal activities carried out by them.
Frustrated by the Junta's stance, China started acting unilaterally in Myanmar's autonomous regions of Wa and Mong La areas in Northern Shan. China's iron hand led to the expulsion of 1,207 individuals involved in scamming activities from the Wa region to China. In the Wa region, officials raided more than 40 scam compounds. Beijing used not only its hard power but also its soft power resources to create pressure on the Junta. Chinese officials encouraged filmmakers to make films like "No More Beats" and "Lost in the Stars" to defame the Junta and create an image that showcased the Myanmar scammer gangs as a threat to entire Southeast Asia.
Moreover, at the onset of Operation 1027, the TBA justified their onslaught by stating that one of the prime objectives of their mission was to dislodge the BGF-supported scammers in the border region, which they termed as Min Aung Hlaing's “Drug Army”. These incidents led to an impression among the Junta loyalists that China had tacitly supported the insurgency in the North, leading to widespread anti-China protests in Yangon and Naypyidaw.
China in damage-control mode
Operation 1027 did serve China's interest in the initial stages by dislodging the BGF and the scammer gangs supported by Hlaing's loyal BGF members, but the intensification of conflict in the latter half of November has significantly threatened China's lucrative trade and investments in the region. Moreover, the cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations has led to a massive humanitarian crisis, with refugees fleeing and trying to cross the China-Myanmar border. Hence, in recent weeks, China has been in damage control mode by trying to mediate between warring parties to resolve the ongoing crisis.
In the first week of December, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi met Myanmar's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Than Swe in Beijing and expressed hope that Myanmar's government would act steadfastly to promote national reconciliation and resolve the ongoing crisis. Post this meeting, China mediated talks between the Junta and the warring groups and expressed hope for a swift resolution.
The cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations has led to a massive humanitarian crisis, with refugees fleeing and trying to cross the China-Myanmar border.
However, after the Chinese expressed hope, the TBA came up with their own statement where they made it clear that Mission 1027's ultimate aim was to dislodge the Junta, and they would not compromise with their aims. There was no mention of the peace talks in their statement. Hence, it remains to be seen whether China's dual influence on the Junta and the insurgent groups would actually work in resolving the crisis or whether China shot itself in the foot by not acting steadfastly at the beginning of the crisis.
Dev Jyoti is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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