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Antara Ghosal Singh, “China-India Rapprochement: A Reality Check,” ORF Issue Brief No. 822, Observer Research Foundation, August 2025.
India-China relations have been showing signs of improvement since 2024 as both sides occasionally send out positive signals. These include Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling for an "urgent" solution to the border stalemate in a magazine interview in April 2024; and China deputing a new ambassador to India after an 18-month gap. On 21 October, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the areas of Depsang and Demchok, which led to the final disengagement of troops from all the hotspots of 2020.[a]
This culminated in the 23 October meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Kazan Summit. High-level exchanges between India and China have gained momentum since. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on various occasions during this time,[1] to discuss steps towards the normalisation of bilateral ties. In November, the defence ministers of the two countries held formal talks during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Laos.
On 18 December 2024, the 23rd Meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China was held in Beijing, the first between the two sides in five years. In January this year, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Beijing after the resumption of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister-level dialogue mechanism between India and China.[2] In the following months, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, and China’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sun Weidong, held successive meetings with their counterparts. In mid-July, EAM Jaishankar made his first trip to China in five years to attend an SCO meeting.[3] There is also news about PM Modi’s potential visit to China in the coming months for the SCO leaders’ summit.[4]
Given the positive momentum in high-level bilateral exchanges in the past few months, there is cautious optimism in certain quarters that the China-India dynamic is heading towards some kind of rapprochement. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi summarised it thus: “dance of elephant and dragon…the only right choice for India and China.”[5] PM Modi reciprocated by saying that differences with China are “as natural as in a family,” and that these can be addressed through dialogue and cooperation. It is in the backdrop of these developments that this brief surveys China’s domestic discourse on India so as to accurately gauge how close both sides are to a possible rapprochement, if at all.
There have been discussions within China’s strategic community about the border patrolling agreement, which was concluded in 2024. Although the actual agreement has not been made public in either country, the overall assessment and public sentiment on the issue is noteworthy.
Chinese observers have noted that since the Galwan clash of 2020, India has consistently demanded that the Chinese army withdraw to the position before April 2020 and restore India's patrol rights in the disputed area. From that perspective, this agreement, they argued, can be said to be in partial satisfaction of India's longstanding demands. Therefore, for India, this agreement is clearly a “diplomatic victory”,[6] as after four years of confrontation, the country has finally restored its patrol rights in the disputed area and no longer has to face a border conflict. On the other hand, China agreeing to withdraw some of its outposts and return to the status quo before 2020 may be seen as a concession of sorts by some, but it is in fact an exchange for stability on the border and the normalisation of relations between the two countries. These same Chinese analysts also argue that China, through this gesture, has shown a certain degree of flexibility on the border issue, exhibiting its willingness to promote the overall development of bilateral relations.[7]
Other Chinese observers, however, note that China has not suffered any loss in this agreement because it has nothing to do with sovereignty demarcation. Instead, it temporarily puts aside the territorial dispute to prioritise China’s larger strategic objectives, including its rivalry with the United States (US). An article in the South Asian Research Newsletter, a Weibo account run by Mao Keji, a prominent Chinese researcher on South Asia associated with China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)—also pointed out that the initiative is still in China’s hand, as the core strategy has been to blur the actual control line and not involve the issue of sovereignty. The agreement simply means that two years after achieving disengagement in four places with "non-patrolled buffer zones", two more places, “as demanded by the Indian side”, were disengaged in the form of "cross-patrolled buffer zones".[8] Meanwhile, the issue of border sovereignty has been handed over to the meeting mechanism of special representatives on border issues, which has been restarted after a gap of five years.[9]
It further added that resolving the patrolling issue in the border areas, which will not affect the respective positions on the issue of territorial sovereignty, can make more room for manoeuvre in economic and trade exchanges and international cooperation between India and China. In other words, they assert that China has not really made any concession on the territorial or boundary issue; it has only re-shaped the rules of engagement, and that is the basis of progress in bilateral negotiations.[10]
However, there seems to be a consensus within Chinese strategic circles that although the agreement has eased tensions on the border temporarily, China-India differences are structural.[11] First, the two sides have very different positions on border demarcation issues, which remains the root cause of distrust. Second, India's rise as an economic and military power in recent years has made the relationship particularly competitive, adding an extra layer of uncertainty to bilateral relations.[12]
Therefore, despite the positive developments, Chinese observers believe that the two countries' military and civilian construction on the border will not stop. The two sides that lack trust will never shun their battlefield capabilities and border fortifications.[13] Looking at past experiences, they argue, no matter how the relationship between the two countries changes, border conflicts or confrontations are unlikely to cease.[14]
A survey of Chinese-language literature reveals how the country is seeking guarantees from India in exchange for the border deal. Local media coverage of the bilateral border patrolling agreement makes claims of commitments supposedly made by India in exchange for the agreement, which are not mentioned in Indian official communications. These assertions provide a glimpse into various Chinese demands vis-à-vis India.
For example, reports in Chinese media[15] claim that India has made three commitments to China in exchange for the deal: 1) to not attack or declare war on each other; 2) to not allow its territory, ports, and airspace to be used for attacks or hostile actions; and 3) to not support any terrorist and separatist activities that endanger China.[16]
After the 23rd border representatives meeting, Chinese state media claimed that the two sides had reached a six-point consensus, as follows:[17]
Some of these points were reflected in MEA statements—[18] such as the agreement on cross-border cooperation, such as resuming the Kailash yatra for Indian pilgrims, data sharing on transboundary rivers, and border trade. Others do not find mention: the Chinese claims of mutual agreement on the border issue not affecting the development of China-India relations; the return of 1988-era dynamics; or consensus on a mutually acceptable package solution to the border issue under the 2005 Agreement. India, therefore, has distanced itself from the six-point consensus.[19]
Overall, China seems to have two key demands from India:[20]
Many Chinese scholars are of the view that if these demands are not met, the Sino-Indian relationship will continue to be unstable.[21] While some Chinese scholars attribute this dynamic to the uncertainty emanating from the United States,[22] others connect it to the acumen of the political class in both India and China.[23] However, most in Beijing welcomed the easing of tensions at the LAC, even as a temporary development.[24] As for the future, they say the Chinese government is “to take one step at a time”, thereby keeping its options open.[25]
Much has been written about the complementarities between Indian and Chinese economies: India needs Chinese capital and technology, and China needs India’s market. In an ideal situation, a strong business dynamic should have served as a ballast stone, providing stability to bilateral relations and reducing the significance of the disputed border for both countries. However, the current situation is far from ideal. On one hand, given the overcapacity in China’s domestic market, there is anxiety among Chinese businesses that if they do not explore markets overseas, they will be “out of business.”[26] On the other hand, China’s access to global export markets is shrinking under the impact of intensifying great-power competition, making India a critical market for Chinese businesses.
For example, while discussing the China-US trade war, many Chinese observers[27] opine that President Donald Trump is better prepared than the last time, when his tariff policy directly led to price increases that American consumers had to shoulder, while Chinese companies switched to markets such as Vietnam and Mexico to re-export to the US market. As a result, the US did not gain much of an advantage in the first round of the tariff war.
This time, Chinese scholars note,[28] Trump might have learned his lesson well. As soon as he took office, he struck Mexico and Canada at the same time. This resulted in Canada and China experiencing friction in trade, and China and Mexico could likely expect the same in the future. Chinese enterprises that were previously enthusiastic about moving to Vietnam are now in a fix, as they are unsure of how Vietnam’s future policies would be impacted by Trump’s tariffs. In other words, China’s path of “roundabout trade”[29] to the US/Western market seems to have encountered serious obstacles.
Looking at the major markets in the world, Chinese commentators like Hu Chuncai, retail expert and founder of Shanghai Shangyi Consulting, lament that most developing countries, such as the Southeast Asian market, are export-driven economies dependent on the US and the West. While the European market is large, it may already be saturated. In this case, the allure of the Indian market is self-explanatory.
For India, the Chinese side notes, although China is an important source of capital and technology, it is not necessarily the only one. As India’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) surpassed that of five other nations in the past 10 years (Japan, Britain, France, Brazil, Italy, and Russia) and is pegged to become the third largest economy by 2028, China Inc seems increasingly convinced that going forward, India will become one of the only three independent “big markets”[30] of the world, with market size and development opportunities far ahead of other countries. Analysts note that it is only in the Indian market that local companies are weak, and the momentum of consumption upgrade is the most certain. Faced with such a large market, any company in the world would want a share of the Indian pie.[31],[32]
In other words, China realises that domestic businesses have little choice but to enter the India market on India’s conditions shortly (requiring the industrial chain to be transferred, local people to be appointed as executives, local suppliers to be designated, and taxes and visas to be strictly checked). This will contribute to the development of India's manufacturing industry as a competitor to Chinese manufacturing—a fact that worries the Chinese side.
This makes the disputed border a cornerstone of China’s India policy, aimed at creating leverage in its negotiations with India. It explains why, despite the positive turn in bilateral ties, Beijing is not backing down from its aggressive border campaign of announcing new counties in the Aksai Chin region and unveiling its plans to develop the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river.[33]
China, on one hand, is pressing for “a return of China and India to the consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries in 1988,”[c] where India cooperates with China in creating “an atmosphere and conditions conducive to a reasonable and rational resolution of the border issue” by opening up its market and removing all restrictions against Chinese enterprises (as explained in previous sections). On the other hand, it is vigilant against any substantial industrial cooperation between India and the US/West, while also actively guiding Chinese capital and technology to avoid India through negative publicity, export control, and other measures.
A new report by the Shanghai Institute of Strategic Studies (SIIS) has noted that weak trade ties between India and the US and the West, a lack of industrial cooperation, and the slow pace of relevant negotiations are factors that weaken ‘Make in India’ as a competitor to ‘Made in China’. From that perspective, China is keeping a close eye on India’s trade negotiations with the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU), which they believe can have a far-reaching impact on the global supply chain and geo-economic landscape.[34] Early this year, the India-US Joint Statement mentioned the doubling of bilateral trade to US$500 billion by 2030, followed by Vice President JD Vance’s high-profile India visit,[35] ringing alarm bells in Beijing. The Chinese side also notes with concern that in just four years (from 2020 to 2024), the number of iPhones manufactured in India increased 14 times while China’s share of Apple’s global manufacturing is in decline, from 100 percent in previous years to a projected 50 percent in the near future.
At a time when US-China trade friction has emerged as a long-term trend and ‘de-risking’ has become a key word in the US’s and Western countries' policies toward China, the latter fears that if the negotiations between India and these countries materialise, the latter has potentially taken a step closer to becoming the "next world factory" and the US/West would be further consolidating its economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region.[36]
Despite talks of resuming direct flights, more people-to-people exchanges, and trade between China and India at the official level, the domestic discourse in China revolves around the denial of Chinese capital and technology to India. There seems to be a consensus in Chinese strategic circles that the government must restrain domestic companies from investing or establishing a complete industrial chain in India. Accordingly, there is an ongoing campaign projecting India as the “graveyard for foreign enterprises”[37] or “ a walled fortress”,[38] and urging Chinese enterprises to not set up units in India or participate in the ‘Make in India’ initiative. Those who still dared to do so are to be heckled as “traitors” and “enemy collaborators” who are endangering national security for “petty gains”.[39]
On the other hand, export control to India enjoys huge public support within China. For example, right after the border agreement, a commentary in the South Asia Studies Newsletter made a case for export control against India under an October 2024 regulation.[40] It argued that India is a long-term strategic competitor that will continue to compete with China in the future for foreign investment, technology, and market share.[41] It warned against India attracting global supply chains transferred from China to promote its own industrialisation and economic development, and then seeking to solve the border issue after strengthening its capabilities.[42]
It advocated: 1) strict scrutiny on the export of dual-use items whose end-users or end-uses may involve India; 2) provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction for potentially sensitive export activities involving India; and 3) incorporating exports to India, particularly in the fields of new energy, semiconductor manufacturing, and blast furnace equipment in the temporary or long-term control list.[43]
There were reports early this year about how China had barred its employees from travelling to Foxconn’s iPhone factories in India, while those already stationed there have been recalled.[44] Shipments of specialised manufacturing equipment for making iPhones bound for India were also halted. China’s export restrictions on German tunnel-boring machines to India have also been widely reported. There has also been news about Chinese automakers being officially prohibited from investing in India and thereby retaining their core technologies.[45] Meanwhile, China’s rare-earth curbs have further complicated matters for Indian industries. The latest outrage is about domestic enterprises investing in India’s steel sector.[46] The case that has spurred heated debate in Chinese strategic circles is the China Minmetals Corporation collaborating with Tata Steel in building a blast furnace with an annual output of 4.375 million tons. The argument is the same: that Chinese enterprises are jeopardising their own interests by aiding India’s manufacturing industry.[47]
Although the positive momentum in India-China ties has garnered appreciation mostly from China’s official circles,[48] discontent is brewing among sections of the strategic community about “India not doing enough to substantially improve China-India ties.”[49] For example, Lan Jianxue, director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the China Institute of International Studies reacted to PM Modi’s positive remarks with a statement that partly said, “India needs to do more than just talks to improve relations with China.”[50] He listed issues—the delay in resumption of direct flights, lack of measures towards lifting of restrictions on Chinese investments, visa denial for Chinese executives, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) cancelling contracts for the procurement of 400 drones—to argue that “India is still verbally improving Sino-Indian relations, but there are few effective follow-up measures, as if it is waiting for a more favourable time.”
Some Chinese commentators are also of the view that the Chinese government does not need to play mellow before India, seeking “to restore friendship”; rather it should approach the “game with India” from a position of strength.[51] China is, after all, the only country with all industrial sectors; it has the most complete industrial system in the world and is the only one that can provide almost all the products of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to the world.
India and China reaching an agreement last October, ending the military stalemate at the LAC since 2020, is indeed an impressive feat. At the same time, however, the stalemate in their core positioning continues as it is. Beijing insists India must not “put border friction at the centre of the relationship and allow the rest of the ties to go forward”, while India highlights “the criticality of maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas for realising the full potential of the relationship.”
Looked closely, it all boils down to this grand bargain between China and India, where manufacturing superpower China demands greater access to India, largely as a dumping market, while using the disputed border, South Asia, and export control as its key bargaining chips. Meanwhile, emerging power India treads with caution on core economic issues like reviewing Chinese investment and resuming direct flights, while pushing China for a solution to the border demarcation. India’s own economic progress and the ongoing global pushback against China’s trade policies seem to be working in India’s favour. While it might be too early to predict which side will back down first, one can conclude for now that when it comes to their bilateral ties, just like the saying, the more things change, the more they stay the same.
[a] In June 2020, there was a deadly clash between Indian and Chinese military at the Galwan Valley, in the Ladakh region.
[b] In 2005, India and China reached an agreement on “the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question”. See: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+Political+Parameters+and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+Boundary+Question
[c] Wang Shida, executive director and researcher of the South Asian Institute of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) interpreted the developments during the 23rd special representatives' meeting on December, 2024, as the return of China and India to the consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries in 1988.
[1] Rezaul H Laskar, “Jaishankar, Wang Yi Discuss Steps to Normalise Ties, Resume Kailash Pilgrimage,” The Hindustan Times, February 21, 2025,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/jaishankar-wang-yi-discuss-steps-to-normalise-ties-resume-kailash-pilgrimage-101740146970636.html
[2] “The Meeting of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister Mechanism between China and India Held in Beijing,” MFA, PRC, January 25, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202501/t20250128_11547408.html
[3] “S Jaishankar Attends SCO Meet in China, Calls for Open Dialogue to Sustain Ties,” India Today, July 14, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/jaishankar-sco-meet-india-china-relation-han-zheng-foreign-ministers-meeting-beijing-2755334-2025-07-14
[4] “PM Modi Likely to Visit Japan and China in August-September,” The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/pm-modi-likely-to-visit-japan-and-china-in-august-september/articleshow/122526766.cms?from=mdr
[5] Keshav Padmanabhan, “Dance of Elephant, Dragon is the Only Right Choice for India and China, Says Chinese FM Wang Yi,” The Print, March 7, 2025, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/dance-of-elephant-dragon-is-the-only-right-choice-for-india-and-china-says-chinese-fm-wang-yi/2538377/
[6] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed explanation with multiple pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?),” South Asian Research Newsletter, October 27, 2024, https://browser.qq.com/mobile/news?doc_id=899671e649668852
[7] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[8] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[9] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[10] Lin Minwang, “中印关系“重启”后需看到的现实 (The Reality We Need to See After the "Restart" of China-India Relations),” Baijiahao, November 22, 2024, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1816373935211454398&wfr=spider&for=pc
[11] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[12] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[13] ““多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[14] “多图详解：这几天中印边境撤军什么进度了？勿忘印性 (Detailed Explanation with Multiple Pictures: What is the Progress of the Withdrawal of Troops from the Sino-Indian Border in Recent Days?)”
[15] “中印谈妥了，莫迪作出3项承诺，就等中国投资，反对党骂“卖国 (China and India have Reached an Agreement. Modi Made Three Promises and is Waiting for Chinese Investment. The Opposition Party Called Him a "Traitor),” Baijiahao, October 26, 2024, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1813943675052951069&wfr=spider&for=pc
[16] “吃了4年苦头后，印度同意结束中印军事对峙，对华做出3大承 (After Four Years of Suffering, India Agreed to End the Sino-Indian Military Standoff and Made Three Major Commitments to China),” Baijiahao, October 22, 2024, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1813592166942367516&wfr=spider&for=pc
[17] Zhang Yuying and Liu Caiyu, “23rd Meeting of Special Representatives for China-India Boundary Question Reaches Six Points of Consensus,” Global Times, December 18, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202412/1325333.shtml
[18] “23rd Meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China,” MEA, December 18, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38805/23d_Meeting_of_the_Special_Representatives_of_India_and_China
[19] Keshav Padmanabhan, “India Distances Itself from ‘Six-point Consensus’ in China Readout on Doval-Wang Talks,” The Print, December 20, 2024, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-distances-itself-from-six-point-consensus-in-china-readout-on-doval-wang-talks/2413706/
[20] “中印边境问题达成协议，两个实质问题未解决，印度信守承诺成关键, (China and India Reached an Agreement on the Border Issue, but Two Substantive Issues Were Not Resolved. India's Commitment is the Key),” Baijiahao, October 10, 2024, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1813794460216992758&wfr=spider&for=pc
[21] “中印边境问题达成协议，两个实质问题未解决，印度信守承诺成关键, (China and India Reached an Agreement on the Border Issue, but Two Substantive Issues Were Not Resolved. India's Commitment is the Key)”
[22] Lin Minwang, “大外交｜中印关系现回暖势头，专家： “后劲”有待观察，积极氛围令人乐观, Great Diplomacy | China-India Relations Are Showing Signs of Recovery, Experts: “The Stamina Remains to be Seen,” IIS, October 10, 2024, https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/a6/02/c6893a697858/page.htm
[23] “China-India Relations Usher in Positive Signals: President Xi and Modi Hold Their First Bilateral Meeting in Five Years in Kazan,” JFdaily, October 23, 2024, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=810355
[24] "中印边境问题达成协议，两个实质问题未解决，印度信守承诺成关键, (China and India Reached an Agreement on the Border Issue, But Two Substantive Issues Were Not Resolved. India's Commitment is the Key)”
[25] “中印边境问题达成协议，两个实质问题未解决，印度信守承诺成关键, (China and India Reached an Agreement on the Border Issue, But Two Substantive Issues Were Not Resolved. India's Commitment is the Key)”
[26] “中企出海要突破“三道围墙”，印度就是“瓮城” (Chinese Companies Going Overseas Need to Break Through the "Three Walls", India is the "Walled City"),” Guancha.com, March 10, https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309405142600649932955
[27] Hu Chuncai, “沃尔玛想把关税成本转嫁到中国人头上，我们绝对不能答应 (Walmart Wants to Pass the Tariff costs on to the Chinese Producers, we Absolutely Cannot Agree to This),” Guancha.com, March 14, 2025,
https://www.guancha.cn/huchuncai/2025_03_14_768375_s.shtml
[28] Hu Chuncai, “沃尔玛想把关税成本转嫁到中国人头上，我们绝对不能答应” (Walmart Wants to Pass the Tariff Costs on to the Chinese, We Absolutely Cannot Agree to This)”
[29] Hu Chuncai, “沃尔玛想把关税成本转嫁到中国人头上，我们绝对不能答应” (Walmart Wants to Pass the Tariff Costs on to the Chinese, We Absolutely Cannot Agree to This)”
[30] “唯心主义赢学”赢麻了，但我们不能就此看低印度的潜力 (“Idealism Wins "But We Cannot Underestimate India's Potential), Guancha.com, June 4, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/chenjing/2025_06_04_778125_s.shtml
[31] “中国企业投资印度是资敌叛国，还是为了养活并发展自己？(Are Chinese Companies Investing in India Aiding the Enemy and Committing Treason, or are They Investing in India to Feed and Develop Themselves?),” Baijiahao, November 9, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1782052067081349153&wfr=spider&for=p,
[32] “中国企业投资印度是资敌叛国，还是为了养活并发展自己？ (Are Chinese Companies Investing in India Aiding the Enemy and Committing Treason, or Are They Investing in India to Feed and Develop Themselves?)”; Chen Jing, “唯心主义赢学”赢麻了，但我们不能就此看低印度的潜力
(Idealism Wins Reality" But We Cannot Underestimate India's Potential),” Guancha.com, June 4, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/chenjing/2025_06_04_778125_s.shtml
[33] “India Protests China’s Creation of Two New Counties in Aksai Chin, Objects to Brahmaputra Dam Proposal,” January 3, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Jan/03/india-protests-chinas-creation-of-two-new-counties-in-aksai-chin-objects-brahmaputra-dam-proposal
[34] “美欧英拟通过贸易协定在印度建供应链 (The US, Europe and the UK Plan to Build Supply Chains in India Through Trade Agreements),” Sohu, April 30, 2025, https://business.sohu.com/a/890808268_121726405
[35] Antara Ghosal Singh, “Contextualising the Churn in South Asia: A Chinese Perspective,” Observer Research Foundation, May 6, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/contextualising-the-churn-in-south-asia-a-chinese-perspective
[36] “印美关税协议近成形，全球产业链将迎新一轮洗牌 (The India-US Tariff Agreement is Almost Finalized. Will the Global Industrial Chain Usher in a New Round of Reshuffle?),” Baijiahao, July 5, 2025, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1836775826855427996&wfr=spider&for=pc
[37] “外企坟场：印度的奖杯，重点收割外企，挣1元罚100 (Graveyard for Foreign Enterprises: Indian Premium, Focusing on Harvesting Foreign Enterprises, Earning 1 yuan and Being Fined 100 yuan),” Bilibilli, July 12, 2025, https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1zMMQz7EoZ/
[38] “中企出海要突破“三道围墙”，印度就是“瓮城” (Chinese Companies Going Overseas Need to Break Through the "Three Walls", India is the "Walled City),” Guancha.com, March 10, https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309405142600649932955
[39] Antara Ghosal Singh, “To Stay or To Go: Decoding Chinese Enterprises’ ‘India Dilemma’,” Observer Research Foundation, May 20, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/to-stay-or-to-go-decoding-chinese-enterprises-india-dilemma
[40] “中印关系缓和，为何仍需加强对印“两用物项”出口管制？, (As China-India Relations Ease, Why Is It Still Necessary to Strengthen Export Controls on “Dual-use Items” to India?),” South Asia Newsletter, October 24, 2025, https://www.163.com/dy/article/JFCPQ7SS05569D8L.html
[41] “中印关系缓和，为何仍需加强对印“两用物项”出口管制？, (As China-India Relations Ease, Why Is It Still Necessary to Strengthen Export Controls on “Dual-use Items” to India?)”
[42] “中印关系缓和，为何仍需加强对印“两用物项”出口管制？, (As China-India Relations Ease, Why Is It Still Necessary to Strengthen Export Controls on “Dual-use Items” to India?)”
[43] “中印关系缓和，为何仍需加强对印“两用物项”出口管制？, (As China-India Relations Ease, Why Is It Still Necessary to Strengthen Export Controls on “Dual-use Items” to India?)”
[44] Atul Kumar, “China’s Export Denial Strategy Against India: A National Security Challenge,” February 11, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-export-denial-strategy-against-india-a-national-security-challenge
[45] “China Directs its Carmakers Not to Make Auto-related Investments in India,” Money Control, September 12, 2024, https://www.moneycontrol.com/automobile/china-directs-its-carmakers-not-to-make-auto-related-investments-in-india-article-12820062.html
[46] M J Arun, “China's Rare-earth Curbs Hit Indian Auto Industry,” India Today, June 17, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/chinas-rare-earth-curbs-hit-indian-auto-industry-2742085-2025-06-17
[47] 援建印度遭背刺，中企为何搬石砸脚？(Why did Chinese Companies Shoot Themselves in the Foot, When They Were Already Stabbed in the Back for Aiding India?),” Baijiahao, March 19, 2025, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1827027479445163459&wfr=spider&for=pc
[48] “China Welcomes PM Comments on ‘Normalcy’ at Border After Meeting with Xi,” The Hindu, March 17, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-appreciates-pm-modis-positive-remarks-on-sino-india-ties/article69339863.ece
[49] Antara Ghosal Singh, “Optimism Shines Through Galwan Gloom as Rajnath Singh Reaches China,” Observer Research Foundation, June 27, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/optimism-shines-through-galwan-gloom-as-rajnath-singh-reaches-china
[50]Lan Jianxue, “ 改善对华关系，印度说到更需做到,” Huanqiushibao, March 18, 2025, https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/de583b/4LuEb4zHTUY
[51] Chen Jing, “ 连汽车都有绝对优势了，中国在全球贸易中该如何定位？ (Now that China Has an Absolute Advantage Even in Automobiles, How Should It Position Itself in Global Trade?),” Guancha.com, February 11, 2022, https://www.guancha.cn/chenjing/2025_02_11_764660.shtml
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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