In forming a coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir following the 2014 assembly elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) resolved to reconcile Ikey points of divergence through a common minimum programme (CMP). Amongst the key issues dividing their constituents was the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). While PDP representatives vowed during the election season to work towards the provision’s revocation from the state as a whole, the BJP suggested it would allow the army to decide on the law’s continuation. Reconciling these positions in the CMP, the coalition partners offered to “examine the need for de-notifying ‘disturbed areas’.” In other words, the parties resolved to consider removing the ‘disturbed areas’ tag from relatively peaceful parts of the state. Since AFSPA is only in force in an area so long as it features in the ‘disturbed areas’ list, the CMP essentially offers to fulfill a prerequisite for AFSPA’s phased withdrawal from parts of the state. Towards this end, the BJP and the PDP will have to ask: Which ‘disturbed areas’ in Jammu and Kashmir are genuinely disturbed, and where is such designation less relevant?

This essay examines the extent, nature, and distribution of militancy linked disturbance in Jammu and Kashmir, as expressed through data covering the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. It is important to note at the outset that this is an exercise of potentially limited practical utility. For one, there is no guarantee that the BJP-PDP combine will act on its stated intention to reassess conditions in the state’s ‘disturbed areas.’ Its resolution could merely represent a political tactic meant to enable coalition formation, without initiating any meaningful movement on the issue. Even if the parties do proceed to explore AFSPA’s phased withdrawal, deliberations will inevitably be guided by factors beyond the state of militancy over the past five years. In deciding for or against AFSPA, the security establishment is also likely to consider future projections, asking whether patterns of disturbance in the state might change in the near- to mid-term. For instance, some observers have expressed concern that a decreased demand for battle-hardened fighters west of the Durand Line in Afghanistan might prompt an invigorated militant campaign east of the Line of Control.

To the extent that deliberations on AFSPA’s phased withdrawal are informed by observable militant violence, however, this article conveys how such disturbance is expressed. It begins by introducing the data informing its analysis. It then explores the extent of militant violence across Jammu and Kashmir, showing that the ‘disturbed areas’ label presently applies to districts characterised by widely varied levels of militancy. The next section asks whether low levels of militant violence are a prerequisite for AFSPA’s withdrawal, or if removal of ‘disturbed areas’ status can be considered in some districts affected by higher levels of militancy. The article then looks at the intra-district distribution of militant violence, analysing the suitability of a disaggregated approach that distinguishes between disturbed and undisturbed areas within a particular district. The final section outlines some of the factors complicating de-notification, even of Jammu and Kashmir’s least disturbed districts.

• Domestic Politics and Governance
• India

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