At first glance, the July 18 India-US joint statement promises a giant leap forward in bilateral relations and a paradigm shift in the US policy towards India. The agreement undoubtedly is a testimony to the growing trust and meaningful strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington.
By one stroke of the pen the US seems to have made good its commitment to transform its relationship with India and help it "become a major world power". The US has recognised India "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" that should be given the "same benefits and advantages as other such states", thereby marking an end to the Cold War ideology of containing India.
The agreement will end India's nuclear isolation and satisfactorily address its energy needs, which is vital for its economic growth. The US has promised to seek the congressional approval to modify its domestic laws and policies and also to "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India" to facilitate supply of nuclear fuel.
India will now be able to explore the possibility of obtaining nuclear reactors in the international market. Besides, New Delhi can also aspire to be a part of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the G-4 advanced reactor programme group.
By acknowledging India as a "responsible" nuclear power, the deal completes the process of "de-hyphenating" India and Pakistan in the US foreign policy calculus.
The joint statement signifies that the global partnership between India and the US has evolved to satisfactory levels and now "stands on its own". This suggests a momentous "point of departure" for the US foreign policy, "not just in South Asia but worldwide." In the face of obstacles that seemed intractable just a few years back, this is a meaningful step forward. A lot, however, depends upon the successful implementation of this accord that for the moment seems to be more of a roadmap to further cooperation between India and the US.
Also, before euphoric illusions of India's "special" status overtake, it will be prudent to analyse the reasons behind this apparent change of heart on the part of the world's sole superpower. Has there really been a change of heart or is it statecraft at play? Given the international situation, the latter seems more plausible. Here, it is important to keep in mind that the US foreign policy recognises only its interests as supreme. History has shown that nothing comes without a price from America. Therefore, what does the US expect in return from India? What has been promised? What are the pitfalls that we must be prepared for? What are the long-term implications for India? And, what should India's responses be?
On closer scrutiny, the text of the joint statement reveals some ambiguities and leaves a lot unsaid. While India has been called a "responsible state", it is obviously not responsible enough to be recognised as a full nuclear weapons State until certain laws are changed. A senior US Embassy official in New Delhi admitted that the passing of the WMD bill by the government of India last month contributed largely to the concessions that have been granted to India. Consequently, like all other NSG regime countries, India too has agreed to comply with IAEA guidelines that include identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities, signing and abiding by the additional protocol of the IAEA, placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, placing a moratorium on nuclear tests and collaborating with the US towards the successful conclusion of the FMCT. But it also means that India will have to give proof of good behaviour in the future as well, leaving scope for pressure from its powerful ally.
For its part, while the George W Bush government has promised to "work" for the requisite Congressional legislation in support of India and exert diplomatic pressure on the NSG regime states, there are bound to be hurdles. NSG laws will have to be suitably modified before other nations resume their nuclear trade with India. Would all of them be willing to fall in line? Bush can only promise but cannot guarantee about its smooth sailing. Also, how does the US government hope to overcome resistance of its own anti-proliferation lobbies like the one headed by the influential Republican Senator, Mr Richard Lugar, who also chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
India will need to evolve its own responses through national consensus to make the US deliver on the promises made. The India caucus and other influential lobby groups can play a vital role as there seems to be a definite economic motive behind the US move. Doubts have also been expressed about the sale of conventional weapons to the tune of $6 billion that India has had to agree to. While some weapons are crucial to India's own modernisation needs, India should not get into the trap of supporting US interests like regime change through military means at the cost of its own regional interests.
The author is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
Source: The Pioneer, New Delhi, July 24, 2005.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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