The situation in Afghanistan is grim. There is a tendency to confuse random acts of violence with the instability caused by the the Taliban or the neo-Taliban. An analysis of the violent incidents in Afghanistan in the past few years has revealed that more than two-thirds of the violence has been related to land, resources or power-politics, pointing towards unequal sharing of power at the sub-national level. There are two aspects to the whole situation in Afghanistan. From the international angle, there are multiple agendas like counter insurgency, counter terrorism, drugs and narcotics, state building, democratization and development. All these are not complementary; in fact, many of these work against each other. From the national angle, there is instability, insecurity, and Talibanisation, the result of a fractured political process. Poor governance and inadequate reconstruction have led to rising instability, alienated the population, and led to a booming opium industry. Thus, the grim situation in Afghanistan essentially points towards a lack of legitimacy of the State. The statement,“Karzai is the mayor of Kabul”, conveys the reality.
The State is seen as legitimate when the people see it as providing them the basic services. Basic services not only include health, education, sanitation etc., in which the Kabul government has done well, but also governance,
security and essential elements of justice backed by the feeling of inclusion, the sense of, ‘I am a part of the state’.
The Taliban rule disintegrated very fast. When the
Northern Alliance walked into Kabul, it was too fast for anyone to come to grips with, leaving the process of state formation incomplete. Normal post conflict settlements call for some sort of meeting of minds between different parties to the conflict but in the case of Afghanistan post 9/11, it was missing. Today there is a lot of criticism that the consequent process should have included the Taliban. It is easier said than done. It was unlikely that just after 9/11, the Americans would have sat with the Taliban or that the Northern Alliance would have talked to the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban did not exist as a structured unit in December 2001.
The second crucial fact is that initially it was the Northern Alliance that dominated the country, but gradually Hamid Karzai managed to marginalise it considerably. Now, many people who were earlier marginalised are in positions of power. This transition did not help in the evolution of a democratic polity. For instance, elections are held to the National Assembly and even to provincial councils, but without any statute or rule as to what these elected bodies are meant to do.
At different levels of the government, the old politics of patronage and networking, not only remains but is flourishing. Thus, the warlords, commanders and militias have become much stronger than what they were in the past. While in principle there is a formal structure of State in place, the informal structures have become much stronger, a clear indication that the State-building process remains flawed. This is the reason why the State is not seen as a legitimate entity.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
