Considerable attention is focused on the appointment of a new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) following the untimely death of the former CDS General Bipin Rawat. Some have averred that the bureaucracy is responsible for thwarting the appointment of the new CDS as it sees its power wane. Others have considered the CDS as an apex position in the military encompassing responsibilities that involve enforcing tri-service cooperation on operational matters, greater joint manship, joint training between the services, joint logistics, establishing priorities on acquisitions and very critically a single point of advice on matters military. This list is a substantial mandate for the CDS revealing why the position is significant and therefore requires priority attention. It is unclear whether the Modi government evaluated examples from countries around the world on the role the CDS performs or the American equivalent such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Having made a key decision when he first announced the establishment of the CDS in his Independence Day speech in 2019, the lethargic approach taken by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet leaves a very plausible conclusion open—the Modi government both lack conviction in its initial decision to appoint a CDS and treats the position negligibly. Indeed, the CDS’ position has so far not been enshrined in law, which would not just legalise its creation, but equally give it more institutional legitimacy, which again partially explains why the government has dithered in appointing a new CDS since General Rawat’s death. There are neither statutory nor legal requirements binding the Modi government to appoint a new CDS. This again creates a deep void and considerable uncertainty about the role of the CDS and the government’s expectations from the CDS. There are at least two implications that flow from the government’s unduly delayed decision to appoint a new CDS. Firstly, it expects a very pliable CDS and secondly, the nature of the tasks embodied in the CDS or more specifically the job description of the CDS will and does not lend itself to being a supplicant of the ruling dispensation.

Having made a key decision when he first announced the establishment of the CDS in his Independence Day speech in 2019, the lethargic approach taken by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet leaves a very plausible conclusion open—the Modi government both lack conviction in its initial decision to appoint a CDS and treats the position negligibly.

If the government assumes that it can have a very pliant CDS, it would be gravely mistaken because it risks politicising the position rendering the creation of the CDS job meaningless. Indeed, one of the accusations made against General Rawat was that he allowed himself to be far too politicised and even those sympathetic to the establishment of the CDS by the Modi government have been critical of the fact that he made statements on matters that were beyond the ambit of his mandate as CDS. Secondly, as noted earlier, the CDS serves as the source of single-point military advice to the government. This is derived from his years of military experience and equally from the counsel and recommendations of the three service chiefs. The government at its discretion can bypass the CDS and approach the service chiefs or corps commanders of the Indian Army and their equivalents in the other two services for counsel directly. The government can equally, at its discretion, invite the CDS to participate in discussions with key members of the Cabinet on critical national security and defence issues. However, just because the government appoints a CDS, it cannot expect him to be a complete supplicant on almost every matter relating to defence. Indeed, for the CDS not to render advice based on his professional competence, which, of course, is done in consultation with the service chiefs, would amount to a dereliction of duty. In a nutshell, the government will also be depriving itself of credible counsel, if it seeks recommendations that involve the CDS saying and doing everything the government wants. This could have deleterious consequences for military readiness, operational requirements, personnel issues or the procurement needs of the services. It would also defeat the purpose of establishing a CDS. Conversely, the government is free to reject a course of action the CDS proposes or recommends.

The government at its discretion can bypass the CDS and approach the service chiefs or corps commanders of the Indian Army and their equivalents in the other two services for counsel directly.

The relationship between the government and the CDS must be symbiotic or interdependent. Since the CDS’ encompasses a whole gamut of functional responsibilities covering joint manship for integrated operations to an advisory role to the Defence Minister as well as the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the government must recognise the constraints, pressures and challenges on the CDS. For instance, the CDS has a daunting challenge in fighting entrenched service parochialism stymieing reforms such as tri-service cooperation on doctrine, training, logistics and operations. Inter-service rivalry over acquisitions will require resolution through the CDS. CDS plays a key role in establishing priorities on capital acquisitions. On the other hand, for instance, the CDS too must draw attention specifically to the services of the fiscal constraints operating on the government, which is entirely possible in any given year, requiring revisions to their planned procurements and demands. Finally, the CDS helps improve the quality of advice on operational matters and the use of force. This is what makes the relationship between the CDS and the government symbiotic. To conclude, the Modi government should consider exploring legislation on the establishment of a CDS as exists along the lines in the United States of America (USA) in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986. However, the first step should be to create a law that requires the appointment of the CDS. Again, the United States furnishes sufficient guidance in this regard. The Modi government must ultimately take ownership of its reform measure on the establishment of the CDS.

• Defence and Security
• Indian Defence
• India
• CDS
• CJCS
• defence
• doctrine
• Logistics
• Modi
• operations
• training

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