This article is part of the series — What to Expect from International Relations in 2021.
Much of the first two decades of the 21
st century have been shaped by the ever-growing competition between the US and China. In Asia, this competition is rapidly transforming into a fast-paced rivalry between the two major powers. The consequences of great power politics and competition are not one but many, with most of it having a bearing on small and middle powers of the region. The growing US-China rivalry has exposed middle and small powers to dilemmas in foreign, security, and economic fronts since most of them are deeply linked with either or both of the great powers. The resultant concerns on the part of the middle power capitals have been amply echoed by their respective leaders stating that they would not like to choose between Washington and Beijing. In order to avoid this dilemma, numerous middle powers are trying to swim away from both the major powers and display more autonomy in their foreign and economic policies. This is driven by their decision to not let either of the great powers steer their foreign policy priorities and choices. However, this is easier said than done. Economic and trade dependence on China on one hand and strategic dependence on the US on the other has pushed several middle powers to deep dilemmas. From South Korea to Australia, these concerns loom large over the policymaking circles of middle powers with no quick solutions in sight.
True, middle powers are more vulnerable to sudden changes in the international system, but it is equally justified to say that middle powers have more stakes in their regional orders as well as in the international order.
However, it would be unfair to argue that middle powers have no say in influencing their respective regional orders and also making a contribution in setting the trends in the international order. True, middle powers are more vulnerable to sudden changes in the international system but it is equally justified to say that middle powers have more stakes in their regional orders as well as in the international order. Compared to small powers, who neither have great stakes nor great interests, middle powers try to benefit from both status quo and the revisionist powers. The hedging strategy has been their most preferred modus operandi. Not committing to either of the two or more major powers has its own good and evil sides. In fluid strategic situations, middle powers tend to thrive more provided they are able to play their cards well.
The changing strategic dynamics and the COVID-19 pandemic have also led to the possibility of middle powers playing a more defined role. The contribution of middle powers in shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific order is of critical importance. While the inclusion of India, a rising major power, at the international high-table and synergising the Indian and Pacific oceans have been one of the drivers of the Indo-Pacific construct, restraining China’s ever-aggressive postures has been another significant motive behind it.
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a suitable example of even smaller ASEAN member states putting their energy together in trying to fit into the rapidly changing world.
Middle powers such as Australia and Indonesia have been keen in supporting the Indo-Pacific order. Similarly, South Korea and New Zealand are also gradually shedding inhibitions in joining the US, India, Japan and the rest in supporting a rules-based, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. Moreover, some of the European countries have also embraced the Indo-Pacific and came out with their own visions and strategy documents explaining their interests, objectives and concerns. What may also be characterised as a good example of the middle power playing a greater role is the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) issuing its own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a suitable example of even smaller ASEAN member states putting their energy together in trying to fit into the rapidly changing world.
The US administration under Donald Trump was not invested enough in Asia beyond India, Japan, Australia, and the Korean Peninsula, and thereby, led the countries to bolster their ties with one another in the region. However, that seems to be changing with a revitalised approach of the forthcoming Biden administration. What may be witnessed in the times to come is further engagement and cooperation among middle powers, and at the same time, middle powers playing a greater role in stabilising the changing international order.
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