Trump 2.0’s defence strategy is likely to be a continuation of his first term, pushing allies in Europe and East Asia to increase military expenditure, while diluting military regulations
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This article is part of the series, "Reignited agendas: Trump’s return and its global repercussions"
Donald Trump’s surprising yet decisive victory for a second non-consecutive presidential term will usher in some key changes in United States (US) defence policy, or rather, will continue the policies during his first term as President. Three key areas that will receive considerable attention under the defence policy of Trump 2.0 will be American alliances, “America First” and fewer restrictions on US forces’ battlefield tactics. Yet, the challenges which face the second Trump administration will be considerable.
Under Trump’s first term, US defence policy sought to revise age-old assumptions about Washington’s alliances. Among the key alliances targeted for change was America’s relationship with its European allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). European NATO members have been excoriated by Trump for not paying the mandatory 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence, as the terms of membership in the alliance require. This strained relationship with NATO will continue in Trump’s second term.
US alliance members in the Indo-Pacific are also likely to be subjected to considerable pressure during Trump’s second term with regards to military spending. Japan and South Korea will be required to spend more on defence, and for the hosting of American troops as demanded by Trump during his campaign. This is in addition to the Biden Administration securing an 8.3 percent increase in South Korea’s defence cost-sharing for US troops stationed on South Korean soil.
European NATO members have been excoriated by Trump for not paying the mandatory 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence, as the terms of membership in the alliance require.
The second Trump Administration is likely to push for more American weapons sales as a result of this pressure applied on European and Asian allies to increase military spending. Trump has threatened that, if countries do not meet their military spending targets, Washington will not be bound by the terms of the alliance, especially under Article 5 of NATO. Among the key casualties of America’s lessening support for NATO will be Ukraine. Although Kyiv is not a formal member of NATO, it is a beneficiary of the alliance’s military and economic aid in its ongoing war with the Russian Federation. Trump’s possible picks for national security positions include staunch critics of America’s open-ended aid to Ukraine. Pete Hegseth, who is to be the next Secretary of Defence, is a NATO-critic and an anti-China hawk, and Senator Marco Rubio, set to become the next Secretary of State, wants to build closer defence ties with India. Rubio sponsored a bill in the Senate in July 2024 that sought to elevate India to an ally on par with NATO, Japan, Israel and South Korea.
Connected to the future of Washington’s military alliances is also Trump’s “America First” strategy. “America First,” which was a feature of Trump’s first term, will inevitably see a revival in his second. It remains integral to his “Peace Through Strength” approach to defence. “Peace Through Strength” has some key elements. First, it is geared towards limiting American military involvement to a minimum in foreign conflicts. The second element of the America First strategy is Trump’s commitment to strengthening and staying ahead of American adversaries and near peer states such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The second Trump Administration’s national security and defence teams are likely to have key figures known for their tough positions on the PRC.
The second Trump Administration’s national security and defence teams are likely to have key figures known for their tough positions on the PRC. Maintaining competitive advantages in the military sphere through “full spectrum” force capabilities and “dominance” across the maritime, cyberspace, space, air and land domains will be a priority. America First will also extend to the US’s industrial defence, which would involve greater investment in native capabilities. Beyond beefing up American industrial defence capabilities—from conventional technologies to frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, quantum technology (QT), robotics and so on—the second Trump Administration will push for foreign military sales in a quest to boost the American military industrial complex by lifting restrictions on weapons sales to countries such as India. Still, his pursuit of “Peace through Strength” is not driven by a quest to start wars like several of his predecessors have done, but to use the power of military capabilities in support of American diplomacy.
Several officials at the Department of Defence (DoD) and the Pentagon during Trump’s first Administration welcomed the dilution of restrictions on the US military’s battlefield tactics where force had to be used with restraint, but under Trump’s first Administration, those restraints were removed. The relaxation of battlefield restrictions could also be extended to close allies of Washington, such as Israel. The US commitment and involvement in the ongoing Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine wars, which Trump will inherit from the Biden Administration, might change with a more military-oriented response.
The major challenge for Trump 2.0 will be his personal choices being in contestation with foreign policy amidst a changing geopolitical landscape. In terms of threat perception, Trump 2.0, in continuity with the National Security Strategy of 2017, will approach China as a strategic competitor and devote more military resources and strategic attention towards its threat. However, the rise of Russia as a revisionist actor in cooperation with China, along with Iran and North Korea, problematises Trump’s security calculus and the pursuit of his defence policy to mitigate the multi-front threat to the US’s interests and its allies.
The rise of Russia as a revisionist actor in cooperation with China, along with Iran and North Korea, problematises Trump’s security calculus and the pursuit of his defence policy to mitigate the multi-front threat to the US’s interests and its allies.
Unlike in his first tenure, it will remain a challenge for Trump to ensure that the US and its partners fulfil their commitment to the demands of the alliances in Europe and East Asia. This will be a continuation of the first Trump administration’s quest to prevent the US overstretching its capabilities and commitments without substantial contribution from Washington’s allies. Trump’s America First strategy to manage security, and his simultaneous push for allies to contribute to financing conflict-related expenditure, will remain another key challenge.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). He also coordinates the SSP activities. His work focuses on strategic issues in the ...
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