Author : Sanjeet Kashyap

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Aug 02, 2024

Instead of worrying over the potential impact of the Ukraine war on the Taiwan scenario, a focus on power and interests can be a better approach for the US to bolster its credibility

US credibility dilemma: Hyphenating Taiwan and Ukraine may be a false paradigm

The concern with the credibility of its military commitment has remained a mainstay of American foreign policymakers and analysts in the post-World War II years. The costly military interventions in Korea and Vietnam during the Cold War were explicitly justified in the name of reinforcing the United States (US) credibility in front of allies and adversaries alike. The logic also resurfaced in the cases of the post-Cold War string of humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and military engagement in the Middle East. As great power competition is back in vogue and the US faces two formidable challengers on the Eurasian landmass, a vigorous debate has ensued over the allocation of military resources, the extent of commitment to allies and partners, and the display of resolve.

The US credibility on the line in Ukraine

The credibility debate is animated by the twin challenge of helping Ukraine confront Russia in Europe and protecting Taiwan against China in East Asia. For some analysts and politicians, the two theatres are interlinked, and the US aid to Ukraine will help deter a future invasion of Taiwan. The logic undergirding the confident pronouncements on the future of Taiwan hinging on what happens in Ukraine involves the old trope of sending signals about the US reputation for resolve. If the US is able to help safeguard Ukraine, the argument goes, it will send a clear signal about the US capability and willingness to come to Taiwan’s aid, complicating Xi’s calculation on attacking Taiwan. On the contrary, a failure on the US's part to not check Russia’s aggression will embolden Xi Jinping and unsettle the allies. On this account, the costs to the American treasury of supporting Ukraine are justified in terms of not only preserving a democratic partner and weakening a revanchist adversary but also bolstering American credibility. 

The credibility debate is animated by the twin challenge of helping Ukraine confront Russia in Europe and protecting Taiwan against China in East Asia.

However, this obsession with taking costly actions to maintain one's own reputation for resolve ignores the relational nature of reputation. Further, the belief that one’s past actions in a crisis shape the actor’s credibility in the future warrants closer examination. To be sure, the latest third generation of academic literature on credibility in IR underscores the importance of reputation for resolve as a crucial variable shaping the adversary’s belief in an actor’s statements or implicit commitment. However, it is not merely the American reputation for resolve in Ukraine that would shape Xi Jinping’s perception of the US credibility. Equally important, if not more, determinants of the US credibility in the eyes of an adversary like China would be the latter’s assessment of current US capability and stake in the issue at hand. 

The calculus theory of assessing credibility

As Dartmouth Professor Daryl G Press underscores in his book on calculating credibility, during high-stake militarycrises, leaders assess the credibility of an adversary not based on its record of showing resolve but based on its relevant military capability and interests at stake in the crisis. The underlying cognitive psychological explanation for the focus on the current calculus of power and interests in assessing credibility lies in the exceptional nature of military conflicts. In normal situations, policymakers can rely on heuristic shortcuts like historical analogy in making decisions by relying on past actions to draw inferences. A high-stakes situation like a military crisis, on the other hand, warrants a more systematic and careful assessment of the adversary’s credibility. In an anarchic international environment, leaders can’t afford to make costly mistakes in misreading the credibility of the adversary threat. The past conduct of the adversary might not be the most reliable guide since the adversary might behave differently this time, in no less measure due to learnings from the event.

Both the specific aspect of the adversary's capability relevant to the crisis and its level of interest at stake in the crisis are relevant determinants of the credibility of its commitment. Intuitively, the ability to carry out the threat at a low cost in a case where stakes are high would bolster the belief that a state would follow up on its commitment. Crucially, for the Press, it is not only power that matters in assessing credibility but also the interests at stake. A powerful state might retreat if its spurious interest is at stake, and even weaker nations can carry out threats if their vital interests are involved.

What does the current calculus theory of credibility imply for the US reputation for resolve in a Taiwan contingency scenario? First and foremost, it is not the US assessment of its credibility that will be definitive. Rather, the Chinese assessment of US credibility over Taiwan as an adversary will shape its calculus on attacking Taiwan. Second, US actions in a distinct theatre in Ukraine won’t matter much as a signal of its resolve. For a situation as difficult and different as the fate of Taiwan and, consequently, the East Asian regional order, it makes little sense for Beijing to assess the credibility of American commitment to aid Taiwan solely or even primarily based on its in Ukraine. Instead, China will assess the US' credibility in the case of a Taiwan contingency based on the latter’s power and interests.    

Measuring the US credibility in the Taiwan contingency 

The implication of the current calculus theory for a US strategy concerned with sending credible signals in favour of defending Taiwan is twofold. First, relative to China, the US needs to enhance its military capability relevant to the maritime theatre in East Asia. Second, it has to explicitly and consistently specify its level of interest in the Taiwan crisis scenario to clarify its extent of involvement. 

The implication of the current calculus theory for a US strategy concerned with sending credible signals in favour of defending Taiwan is twofold.

In terms of power calculations, even though the unipolar interlude is over, the structural foundation of US power remains strong. However, the specific naval aspect of US military power relevant in a Taiwan Strait crisis poses a cause for concern. As a RAND report outlines, currently, both the US and Taiwanese war preparedness remain at sub-optimal levels. On the other hand, despite its recent naval modernisation efforts, China will face a daunting challenge in mounting a successful amphibious operation. It is also possible to inflict costly damage on an invading Chinese force with a cheap, asymmetrical array of weapons. To send clear signals of resolve, thus, the US would do well to focus its attention on bolstering its naval, aerial, and ISR capabilities by allocating more funds, revitalising the defence industrial base, and developing cheaper, asymmetrical A2/AD capability. Also, insofar as the US is sending ammunition to Ukraine, which would also be relevant for Taiwan, its focus on the European theatre will erode its credibility in the eyes of China, as its ability to support Taiwan erodes in the short run, at least.

Further, when it comes to the US interest, does the US have a vital stake in Taiwan warranting a near certain and high degree of commitment to its defence? China’s success in controlling Taiwan would jeopardise the American ally Japan’s economy and enable its power projection in the Pacific Ocean. The fall of Taiwan, while the US stands on the sideline or is unable to prevent it despite best efforts, might induce bandwagoning behaviour on the part of other Asian states. The resultant shift in the East Asian order would allow China to reshape the rules of the game in its favour. Consequently, the Chinese control over the dynamic East Asian economic sphere would be detrimental to US prosperity. In a successful invasion scenario, the potential for China to gain control over the Taiwanese semiconductor industry also can’t be overlooked. Thus, it can be convincingly argued that Taiwan would most certainly constitute an important interest and probably even a vital interest for the US.

Conclusion

The assessment of American credibility in terms of its power and interest in the case of Taiwan presents a mixed picture. The US would do well to urgently bolster its maritime and aerial capability to shift Beijing’s calculus about its power more firmly in a manner that makes its commitment to Taiwan look credible. In this context, either a quick resolution of the war in Ukraine or a significant increase in European aid to Ukraine could also help free up both the US’ material resources and diplomatic attention. 

The US would do well to urgently bolster its maritime and aerial capability to shift Beijing’s calculus about its power more firmly in a manner that makes its commitment to Taiwan look credible.

Further, the US stake in Taiwan is significant enough to warrant a high degree of support, a point that Beijing must have noted. However, public statements by US policymakers that fuel the fears of abandonment or weaken the commitment risk sending misleading signals about the US stake in a manner that will unduly embolden China. The US, thus, would also do well to be consistent in outlining its stake in Taiwan. To sum up, instead of obsessing over the potential impact of the Ukraine war on the Taiwan scenario, a focus on power and interests can be a better approach for the US to bolster its credibility. 


Sanjeet Kashyap is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

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