The United States is observing the timetable in Afghanistan even if no other party to the peace deal is. The US began withdrawing its troops on Monday despite a high surge in violence by ISIS and Taliban over the past week, no sign of an intra-Afghan dialogue, no release of Taliban prisoners and high drama in Kabul with both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah holding rival swearing-in ceremonies.
The so-called “reduction in violence” lasted only long enough for the Taliban to get the American signature on the deal, which by all measure is loaded in their favor and against the Kabul government. Political chaos is one way to describe the immediate aftermath of US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s dueling peace agreements with the Taliban and the Kabul government. Ghani’s swearing-in, attended by Khalilzad and other senior US officials, was rocked by several explosions even as he was speaking.
The US decision to start reducing troops against this background can only bolster the argument that it was always a “withdrawal agreement”, determined by President Donald Trump’s re-election campaign and not a peace deal. The Doha accord commits the US to reduce its troop strength from approximately 13,000 down to 8,600 in the next 135 days, which works well for campaign ads on bringing the troops home. A total US withdrawal from all military bases in Afghanistan is expected by May 2021.
The specificity of US commitments appears almost willful, especially against the vague commitments from the Taliban -- if one can even use the same word for the Taliban. Khalilzad’s brave words during the negotiations that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” must ring especially hollow in Kabul – he agreed to everything the Taliban demanded and nothing of what the Afghan government wanted. Two parallel realities seem to be in play, if you will – one of a faltering peace deal and US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the other of Washington where senior administration officials are busy putting the best shine on a pair of ragged shoes.
In the background briefings, US officials have promised that “if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops or if the Taliban show bad faith in the course of this negotiation.” But Taliban’s bad faith was already on fully display with more than 70 attacks being launched after signing the deal in Doha. Then came the biggest and the most convenient caveat from US administration officials: While they implied the US can halt its withdrawal, they quickly added that Trump has the prerogative as commander-in-chief to “make any decision that he feels appropriate”. It’s more than obvious that Trump made the decision some time back and Khalilzad was simply trying to get the terms of a peaceful withdrawal.
The painstaking explanations are nothing but window dressing to assuage the US Congress, where members might ask a few difficult questions. But they won’t ask too many because the consensus is to end the war. The only US demand with relatively strict conditions on the Taliban appears to their promise to cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organisations. A senior US official called it “a priority concern” and said the Taliban had agreed to take “very specific actions.” Apparently, the US will be able to “measure” those actions because a “monitoring and verification process” has been set up that includes military and intelligence officials. The later phase of US withdrawal will be contingent on progress by Taliban on cutting ties with terror groups.
But measuring the success of even that may be determined by the political need of the hour in Washington. US officials have always found ways to read and interpret intelligence reports in various ways to justify a certain course of action. Pakistan’s nuclear programme escaped sanctions for years because able bureaucrats read the intelligence differently until they didn’t.
This time around, Pakistan’s isolation and rehab happened in less than three years under the Trump Administration and that too under the aegis of Khalilzad. The wily former ambassador had repeatedly called for declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism until Trump appointed him special envoy to Afghanistan. Now senior US officials say they are convinced that Pakistan showed a “fundamental change” in attitude because it helped bring Taliban to the negotiating table. They believe the transformation happened because Trump decided to cut off military assistance to Pakistan and give them an ultimatum.
All one can say on the “magnificent delusions” about Pakistan is that this too shall pass and the cycle will continue. In the background briefings meant to explain the two “peace agreements,” US officials have worked hard to keep hope alive and the fiction that troop withdrawal is conditional on Taliban not behaving badly. If things hold somewhat until 3 Nov, when Americans go to vote, the parties can maintain the fiction that it was a “peace” deal. Those on the ground in Afghanistan know better.
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Seema Sirohi is a columnist based in Washington DC. She writes on US foreign policy in relation to South Asia. Seema has worked with several ...
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