The BRTS falls between two stools. It monopolises rare road space and heavily congests non-BRTS lanes.
Last week, thirteen years after its inauguration and over ₹10,000 million of investment, the Pune Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS) was delivered the ‘coup de grace’ by the local authorities, throwing open the BRTS corridors to all vehicles. This marked the virtual death of the BRTS. One standout reason was the frequent traffic snarls caused by the metro construction. Even more significant was the inability to populate the BRTS corridor with sufficient number of buses and the failure to catalyse a commuter shift from cars to buses.
Following from the example in Pune, this article wishes to investigate the future viability of BRTS as a city’s public transportation mode. The BRTS example was picked up from Curitiba, Brazil, where it was implemented by its dynamic Mayor Architect, Jaime Lerner. Following its success in Curitiba, it was popularised by the Mayor in other parts of the world. He received special admiration from Indian cities and he spoke on the subject in several Indian towns and recommended the BRTS.
The problem with the BRTS lies in the design, in discipline and in its struggle to meet demands.
This was also handpicked by the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India for replication. Under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), financial aid was given to ULBs around the country to go in for this mode of public transport. Several cities gave the system a try. Ahmedabad seems to be running a reasonably efficient BRTS. Delhi tried it but later decided to abandon it. Pune and Pimpri Chinchwad also gave it a fair try, but have now abandoned it. In all, about two dozen Indian cities have initiated the BRTS on their roads.
The problem with the BRTS lies in the design, in discipline and in its struggle to meet demands. Cities that ran the BRTS selected the road space for exclusive bus use that lay on either side of the road centre. This was to avoid the several uses made of the lanes next to the footpaths. Para transit vehicles stop in these lanes for dropping and picking up passengers. Commercial vehicles use them for delivery and transport of goods. Additionally, these lanes get used for parking and even hawking. To avoid all these complications, the closest lane on either side of the median was chosen. However, this meant that bus passengers must cross half the road to reach the bus lane, putting passengers at risk of being knocked down by running vehicles. This was sought to be solved by having traffic signals for passenger-crossings wherever entry to the central lane was designed. This led to the slow-down of vehicular traffic outside the BRTS lanes.
With the number of buses dwindling and the bus service running into larger and larger losses, their passenger bases have also gotten eroded. All this has resulted in a vicious circle of smaller fleets, fewer passengers and larger losses.
Protecting right of way from recalcitrant vehicle owners has been another difficulty. Cars and two-wheelers have been utterly guilty of invading the BRTS space and many cities have had to employ BRTS wardens to protect the right of way and fine offenders. This has added unnecessary expenses to the BRTS operations.
An even more significant problem is the financial plight of most ULBs that finance the BRTS. Over the years, municipal bodies have found their finances progressively decline. The ones that run a bus service have been under tremendous stress to replenish their ageing fleets. With the number of buses dwindling and the bus service running into larger and larger losses, their passenger bases have also gotten eroded. All this has resulted in a vicious circle of smaller fleets, fewer passengers and larger losses.
Five years ago, the Brihanmumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST) had a fleet size of 4,200 buses. This fleet size has come down to 3,337 buses with an annual depletion rate of 150-200 buses. The Pune Mahanagar Parivahan Mahamandal Limited (PMPML) currently owns 1370 buses and hires 584 contractor-owned buses. This fleet size has not stemmed the fall in customers that came down by about 55,000 during 2018-19. Trip cancellations and bus breakdowns have been the key reasons. Its operational losses have also been mounting. They rose from around ₹994 million in 2013 -14 to ₹2046 million in 2017-18. The organisation is in need of at least 1,000 buses to revive itself.
While cities that went for the BRTS were initially provided capital to invest in new buses, this introductory central assistance no longer exists.
In a situation of this kind, the BRTS ends up in serving none of its objectives and making mobility in the cities a greater casualty. Most Indian cities are underprovided in terms of road space. Standards prescribed in the Delhi Master Plan 2021 demand around 18 percent of the geographical area of a city under roads. However, barring a handful of cities such as Delhi, most cities are make to do with 8 to 10 percent. Some part of this space is taken up by footpaths and at least one lane on either side of the road is used for parking. That leaves not more than two lanes on either side of the wider roads in cities for moving vehicular traffic. Each lane in such a situation must be used to its optimum capacity to move vehicles and people. The reason of priority provided to the BRTS was that it was due to its ability to wean passengers away from private vehicles to buses, since it would provide faster service at an affordable cost. Additionally, the lane reserved for the BRTS would move many times more people than private vehicles.
This, however, is only feasible if the bus fleets keep pace with the mounting population. This unfortunately has not happened. While cities that went for the BRTS were initially provided capital to invest in new buses, this introductory central assistance no longer exists. ULBs are now on their own and are struggling to buy new buses. In the western part of the country the BRTS is run by autonomous undertakings of the ULBs. They are constantly asking their parent ULBs to provide subsidies to stay afloat and many times, the ULBs are not willing to oblige. Given the increasing fiscal stress faced by cities, exacerbated by GST, which has subsumed many of their revenue streams, there is little likelihood that the ULBs would continue to bail them out and the bus systems will be unable to meet the replenishment and expansion goals of their ageing fleets.
In the cited background, the BRTS falls between two stools. It monopolises rare road space and heavily congests non-BRTS lanes. A decently efficient road lane that transports people by cars is able to carry about 1000 persons per hour on a stretch of road, taking an average of two persons travelling per car. In the same time frame, the BRTS should be able to transport at least 2000 persons per hour. This would mean that at an average of 40 persons per bus, 50 buses should be deployed in the same time frame on the same road stretch. If it does not, the BRTS becomes an impediment to mobility rather than a catalyst. In a nutshell, the BRTS, in the Indian ULB context, tends to under-mobilise reserved lanes, over-congest general lanes and drive roads towards failure. In that case, it is much wiser not to cordon off lanes for the BRTS and run a normal bus service.
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Dr. Ramanath Jha is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai. He works on urbanisation — urban sustainability, urban governance and urban planning. Dr. Jha belongs ...
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