Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’: A Bridge Too Far

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The United States (US) President Donald Trump appears tacitly motivated by the ambition to position himself as the most consequential president in Washington’s history. The over 150 executive orders he has signed reflect a sweeping effort to reshape the US’ internal and external policy landscape. Despite judicial challenges to many of these directives, the scale and scope of Trump’s intended transformation across energy, fiscal, trade, and security policy domains remain unprecedented. Among these, his focus on revamping America’s national security stands out. Across four critical dimensions of security projection, Trump has introduced new initiatives: a proposed US$1 trillion military budget to boost the armed forces, measures aimed at ‘restoring’ US’ maritime dominance,  the announcement of a new sixth-generation fighter aircraft called F47, and the unveiling of a nationwide missile defence system referred to as the ‘Golden Dome.’ While these proposals are ambitious, most may be realised over time—except perhaps the Golden Dome project, which faces particular hurdles in terms of timely execution and the historical limitations of aerial defence in the US.

As missile technologies evolve rapidly regarding delivery mechanisms, precision, and speed, missile defence must advance in tandem. The quintessential character of missile defence lies in its ability to outpace offensive systems, making it a key metric in the strategic competition between the US and China.

As missile technologies evolve rapidly regarding delivery mechanisms, precision, and speed, missile defence must advance in tandem. The quintessential character of missile defence lies in its ability to outpace offensive systems, making it a key metric in the strategic competition between the US and China. Since hypersonic missiles are increasingly regarded as potential gamechangers, strengthening aerial defence to intercept them has become imperative in the broader framework of great power competition. With China and Russia potentially leading in the race for hypersonic missiles, the US faces mounting pressure to build an effective aerial defence shield around its homeland/perimeters. In this context,  one of the most consequential executive orders issued by President Donald Trump on 27 January 2025 calls to revive the decades-old missile defence project now rebranded as the ‘Golden Dome’. This initiative marks a contemporary iteration/avatar of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) introduced in former President Ronald Reagan’s era, aimed at providing the US with an impregnable shield of (ballistic) missile defence against targeting on military infrastructure and population centres.  

Historical Context

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty institutionalised the idea that offensive capabilities are costlier, and thus, limiting offensive arms would reduce the incentive to invest in defence systems. The US development of Anti-Satellite weapon (ASAT) capabilities in the late 1970s emerged as part of an action-reaction cycle of technological innovation in response to the erstwhile Soviet Union’s non-nuclear ASAT test. However, ASAT technology did not offer reassurance to US policymakers. Under former President Ford, the push for ASAT was driven by an intent to disable Soviet satellites in a wartime scenario, rather than simply matching Soviet capabilities. President Reagan’s quest for SDI—a version of the Missile Defence (MD) shield against ballistic vectors—eliminated the scope for any bilateral arms control talks with the former Soviet Union. This marked a phase of ‘remilitarisation’ of space technologies and outer space during the Cold War. 

The proposed Golden Dome aims to serve as a full-spectrum shield against the adversaries’ nature and capabilities, and is designed to neutralise ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and other advanced vectors from peer competitors, particularly China and Russia.

By the late 1980s, Soviet policymakers under Gorbachev abandoned plans for deploying active missile defence systems and instead focused on asymmetric countermeasures such as the ASAT technology. After the Cold War, US strategic attention shifted from Russia and China towards more unpredictable regional actors such as North Korea. Following North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile test, the US introduced the 1999 National Missile Defence (NMD) Act, laying the groundwork for funding capabilities against limited ballistic missile attacks, while also pursuing negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. The Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty sought to close vulnerabilities by integrating MD with nuclear deterrence, thereby strengthening the threat of retaliation. This move reinforced the idea that missile defence could help neutralise adversarial threats and aggression, and reduce the political coercion against the US and its allies. These capabilities materialised in the form of deploying ground- and sea-based interceptors aimed at addressing the limited Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats from rogue actors such as Iran and North Korea. The trend saw continuity during the Obama administration. 

In its first term, the Trump administration’s 2019 Missile Defence Review (MDR), intentionally omitted the term ‘ballistic’ to broaden the scope of counter-threat measures. It also introduced the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) to supplement the existing forty-four Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). The Biden administration’s 2022 MDR maintained this continuity, further funding NGIs within an integrated deterrence framework.

The development of missile defence technologies under successive administrations, coupled with an increasingly complex threat environment, has positioned President Trump to pursue a comprehensive missile defence agenda. The proposed Golden Dome aims to serve as a full-spectrum shield against the adversaries’ nature and capabilities, and is designed to neutralise ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and other advanced vectors from peer competitors, particularly China and Russia.

Challenges

The MD under the Golden Dome framework is intended to augment the speed, accuracy, and lethality of interception systems aimed at protecting both civilian population bases and critical infrastructure across the US homeland. Trump’s executive order outlines a dual approach: expanding the existing ground-based sensor network and developing multi-domain sensors across sea, air, and space to improve detection, classification, interception, and verification of threat neutralisation. The order highlights two key satellite programmes: the acceleration of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) and the development of Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA). Additionally, enhancing underlayer and terminal-phase intercept capabilities to defend against countervalue attacks is another important value addition. Together with supply chain components, these elements constitute the Golden Dome as a ‘system of systems’—a coordinated architecture aimed at neutralising advanced missile threats.  

At its core, the Golden Dome represents a quest for near-immunity and assured homeland security against adversarial attacks.. Since the Reagan era, the US has invested roughly US$250 billion in the MDA to develop these capabilities. An effective MD can offer two key advantages for the US grand strategy. First, it will increase the cost of offensive action for adversaries; second, it will impart greater confidence in signalling a preemptive strike against any adversary’s brinkmanship strategy. As a multi-layered and integrated network, the Golden Dome introduces operational complexity and strategic uncertainty for adversaries, acting as a deterrent. However, the real challenge for Golden Dome’s success in the future will hinge on its effective operationalisation, which is deeply dependent on technology and the continual evolution of systems. This technological reliance could also be its greatest vulnerability—especially in an era where military and space assets are increasingly dependent on the internet and Artificial Intelligence. Even in peacetime, maintaining such a US-wide missile defence would demand constant upgrades, significant financial resources, and agility. 

The realisation of the Golden Dome faces several challenges, including bureaucratic hurdles, high costs, and questions of technological feasibility. The US strategy of reducing vulnerability by bolstering its missile defence has already raised questions about the peaceful uses of the Outer Space Treaty.

The feasibility of the Golden Dome project—and the scale of its technological challenges—are reminiscent of the not-so-successful history of missile defence in the US. The project may likely outlast Trump’s presidential tenure, and given its enormous costs, it may place a sustained burden on the US annual defence budget for years. That said, the project could also serve as a diplomatic bargaining chip for Trump, particularly in the backdrop of his de-nuclearisation agenda to bring both Russia and China to the negotiating table to discuss the arms limitation problem. Furthermore, Trump could also ask his allies and partners to invest in the US if the Golden Dome is used to provide extended deterrence to their territories.  Notably, the US has already offered such a proposition to its neighbour and ally, Canada.

The realisation of the Golden Dome faces several challenges, including bureaucratic hurdles, high costs, and questions of technological feasibility. The US strategy of reducing vulnerability by bolstering its missile defence has already raised questions about the peaceful uses of the Outer Space Treaty. Ultimately, the modernisation of the American missile defence is likely to entrench Washington in a game of one-upmanship with its great power rivals - China and Russia. 

Vivek Mishra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• Great Power Dynamics
• Defence and Security
• US Foreign Policy
• Americas
• golden dome
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• golden dome missile defense shield
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