Tragic Charm of ‘Digital Colonisation’ on Fragile States

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The global satellite communications sector is projected to grow at a rate of 4 percent from US$133 billion in 2023 to reach US$218 billion by 2035. This growth is largely from newly emerging sub-sectors, which include receivers, terminals and satcom chips, in-flight and maritime connectivity, consumer and business broadband, cellular backhaul and satellite radio - mostly stimulated by the shift of global telecommunications from terrestrial fifth generation (5G) to space-based sixth generation (6G) standards. It is but natural that stable polities, both developed and developing economies, where the rule of law prevails and states that are conscious about national and international security, are naturally endowed to become responsible end-users of this growing sector. However, when certain factions within politically and economically fragile states—whether the ruling establishment or opposition, vested commercial entities, or civil society—express eagerness for such satellite communications systems, especially at a time when civil unrest is brewing within them, it is an unsettling development.

Oftentimes, conflict-ridden and fragile states have either patchy and surveilled internet connectivity or none at all. These internet-denied areas are as good as internet-unconnected areas, and therefore, what Starlink or its contemporaries offer—low-latency, high-bandwidth internet coverage—comes across as an attractive option for factions in brittle states. Factions interested in being custodians of such services very well know - that they are not in control of the data generated; that their nation would lose on telecom, internet and digital sovereignty; that they would not be able to regulate the telecom services and would give space to several other non-state actors to use them for various licit and illicit ends; and that in the absence of peace, orderliness and rule of law, such services would prove to be bane more than boon for these vulnerable economies.

Satellite-based internet requires specialised maintenance, technical and service payments, which demand continuous economic commitments and financial burden for economically underdeveloped states.

Fragile states are those where the average monthly income in rural areas is less than US$100 to 150. On the face of it, such economically vulnerable countries are perhaps seeking satellite-based internet for equitable growth, economic progress and eliminating poverty. The networks do not come cheap, but either at steep financial and political costs, or both. The costs of Starlink-like infrastructure remain extremely expensive in fragile states. However, such satellite internet terminals cost approximately US$500 to 600 per unit, with monthly subscription fees ranging from US$50 to 150. This monthly service fee is significantly higher than the average household income. Satellite-based internet requires specialised maintenance, technical and service payments, which demand continuous economic commitments and financial burden for economically underdeveloped states.

Several economically underdeveloped states would add higher charges or additional taxes to generate more tax revenue, or as part of clientelistic corruption and elite capture. This added burden exacerbates the existing digital divide rather than addressing digital inequalities. The fundamental mismatch between satellite internet pricing and local economic conditions creates systemic exclusion that undermines development objectives. This affordability gap is not merely a temporary market imperfection but a structural feature that persists irrespective of deployment scale or technological improvement.

Last-mile connectivity offered by satellite companies is also being exploited in grey zones, even in countries where the services are not officially available or offered. Recently, the United States (US) Senator from New Hampshire, Maggie Hassan, inquired about how much revenue Starlink has earned from smuggled Starlink terminals used for telephone and online fraud in Myanmar. Earlier in 2025, India repatriated over 500 of its citizens kidnapped into forced crime by cyber-scammers from the Myawaddy cyber-scam compounds. These compounds, operated by transnational organised crime groups, were found to be using Starlink terminals, making use of the Roam Unlimited services that offer internet connections for two months across Southeast Asia.

External and internal debt in Bangladesh continues to rise, with nearly US$100 billion owed to countries such as China, Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

What are the odds that organised crime in Sudan, Yemen, and Bangladesh read the same textbook as those in Myawaddy, especially since all these countries have now formally commenced Starlink services? The conflict in Yemen has eroded the government’s revenue base, putting it under financial duress. A funding conflict has redirected vital funds away from healthcare and education. External and internal debt in Bangladesh continues to rise, with nearly US$100 billion owed to countries such as China, Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The oil-dependent Sudan hangs in the balance of economic collapse. A lack of government funds is resulting in a scarcity of government-provided services. Basic services are crumbling, and investing in costly satellite infrastructure reflects a misallocation of scarce resources. Some of these countries’ participation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt distress programmes underscores their limited fiscal space, making expensive satellite investments economically questionable. The ongoing financial commitments required for satellite internet compete directly with debt servicing obligations and essential public services.

When factions from fragile states promote satellite internet services, they tend to circumvent competitive bidding processes through emergency procurement procedures or direct negotiations. This bypassing of formal procurement mechanisms reduces transparency, increases costs, and eliminates opportunities for domestic capacity building. The urgency narrative surrounding digital connectivity allows governments to avoid rigorous cost-benefit analysis and public scrutiny of major infrastructure investments. In Bangladesh, Starlink’s entry has been facilitated by indirect agreements and expedited procedures due to a political emergency following the government’s takeover by an interim government led by a non-elected advisor who himself owned a telecom business. However, such rapid approvals have raised concerns about evading stringent cost-benefit analyses and procurement transparency. They have also sparked doubts about whether service providers have underlying technopolitical agendas. Digital modernisation serves as a way to accumulate social capital, associated with cutting-edge technology, which is vital to international positioning and domestic legitimacy. For leaders of vulnerable economies, satellite internet investments serve as powerful symbols of technological modernity and progress. The ability to showcase satellite internet at international forums creates a demonstration effect, prioritising international image over domestic development. Similar to this sentiment, developing countries often engage in a phenomenon called ‘technological leapfrogging’ wherein they bypass preliminary stages of technology development to implement state-of-the-art technology. It offers a compelling development shortcut, allowing states to skip legacy infrastructure and move straight to advanced innovations such as satellite infrastructure. However, in practical implementation, the country risks the hyperbole of technosolutionism. Social and political dimensions also hold significant importance in the adoption of modern technologies. Elite preferences often override financially viable domestic needs, particularly in states where they wield significant political power. In the case of fragile states, if elite preference points towards digital sophistication, decision-makers can become insulated from the outcomes of their irrational economic decisions.

Digital modernisation serves as a way to accumulate social capital, associated with cutting-edge technology, which is vital to international positioning and domestic legitimacy.

When the procurement of satellite infrastructure bypasses formal mechanisms, it risks unregulated satellite terminals. These unregulated devices could facilitate extra-sovereign espionage, enable unauthorised communication by hostile groups, and provide foreign entities with surveillance capabilities, thereby worsening security challenges. Despite official bans and threats of severe sanctions by ruling factions such as the Houthis or the Junta, who do not enjoy favourable popular opinion globally, contesting underground networks have emerged to facilitate access, with social media groups serving as support systems for acquiring and using Starlink discreetly.

Satellite internet has become a tool for geopolitical influence instead of providing development assistance. Suppose countries fail to instil peace, law and order. In that case, citizens will increasingly turn to Starlink-like communication systems, increasing dependence on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure and potentially ceding control over data to external actors. Connectivity has the potential to be weaponised as a tool for external control and surveillance, which is essentially a form of new-age colonisation.

Chaitanya Giri is a Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Observer Research Foundation. 

Tara Chawla is an Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

• Cyber and Technology
• Connectivity
• India
• conflict ridden fragile states
• digital colonialism
• digital modernisation
• fragile states
• satellite communications sector
• satellite communications sector market size
• satellite internet

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