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Six months into Trump’s presidency, US retrenchment and Europe’s stepped-up aid fail to break Ukraine’s battlefield deadlock.
Image Source: Nyantanan/via Getty Images
The talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump since February ostensibly altered the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. A key feature of this development is evident in the current US policy to disentangle itself from the conflict by asking Europe to step up in assisting Ukrainian efforts to defend itself. The positive upturn in US-Russia relations, reflected in the multiple rounds of talks, has resulted in the partial normalisation of ties. Following the talks, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine reconvened in Istanbul, three years after the first peace summit. Notably, unlike the previous peace summit, which culminated in both sides jointly authoring a communique, the current talks have yet to produce any meaningful progress towards a ceasefire, as their respective demands have remained unchanged. With further rounds of talks scheduled and a fundamental contradiction in how both sides perceive their security interests, the prospects of ending the war this year remain remote. So far, diplomacy has followed a pattern of one step forward, two steps back.
Both sides have ramped up the use of uncrewed aviation systems, i.e. drones, in 2025. President Putin called for the increased production of drones in April this year.
Russia controls more than 19 percent of Ukrainian territory. By May 2025, the Russian military reclaimed territories it had lost in Ukraine’s Kursk offensive the previous year. Since then, Russian forces have pushed beyond Kursk, entering the region of Sumy (see Figure 1.2) in the southeast, with the aim of creating a security buffer. In the same month, Russian forces launched their summer offensive, where incremental gains were reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and the Zaporizhzhia regions. In June, Russian forces gained control of an additional 566 square kilometres. According to reports, from June 2024 to May 2025, Russian forces gained only 1 percent of Ukrainian territory. Russian forces have massively increased their presence along the line of conflict, forcing Ukrainian forces to spread out, and thereby exploiting the gaps along the lines. Despite the upward trajectory of Russia’s advance in Ukraine, the battlefield has not radically changed since last year.
Figure 1: Assessed Control of Terrain around Donetsk and Luhansk as of 06 July 2024 and 06 July 2025

(Figure 1.1: Donetsk, 6 July, 2024) (Figure 1.2: Donetsk, 6 July, 2025)

(Figure 1.3: Luhansk, 6 July, 2024) (Figure 1.4: Luhansk, 6 July, 2025)
Figure 2: Assessed Control of Terrain around Kursk as of 12 August 2024, and 05 July 2025

(Figure 2.1) (Figure 2.2)
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Further, both sides have ramped up the use of uncrewed aviation systems, i.e. drones, in 2025. President Putin called for the increased production of drones in April this year. Last year, more than 1.5 million drones were produced, which was deemed to be insufficient. Moscow’s drone production capabilities have significantly improved. Monthly drone production in Russia has increased: in May 2025, Russia produced 17 percent more drones than in previous months. Conversely, Ukrainian forces have undergone an adaptation. In a move to improve efficiency and adapt to the requirements of modern warfare, a new command umbrella was created by the Ukrainian Unmanned Drone System Force, which aims to unite the branch with other drone units in the Ukrainian military.
A key leverage Russia holds is the territory it controls in Ukraine, not to mention the ability to sustain a prolonged military operation while ensuring domestic macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, sanctions relief is a carrot for gaining certain concessions from Russia.
Since Trump took office, the number of drones fired has increased by two times. Russia reportedly launched more than 5,300 drone attacks against Ukraine in June 2025 alone. A key difference reflected in the drone operations is that Russian forces have had an advantage in the volumes of cheaper strike systems, allowing them flexibility in strike capabilities. Meanwhile, military analysts argue that Ukraine has better strike capabilities, i.e., dynamic targeting, precision targeting, and integration. The potency of the drone units has been higher than that of infantry and artillery operations. This can be reflected in the recent Ukrainian attacks on Russian airbases in Saratov, Murmansk, Ryazan, Ivanovo, Amur Oblast, and Irkutsk Oblast, which, according to estimates, destroyed seven TU-95 MS strategic bombers (capable of carrying nuclear weapons), an A-50 early warning and control aircraft, and an unspecified number of Tu-22 M3 long-range bombers.
These attacks do not impact Russia’s capabilities in the Ukraine campaign, but will certainly impact Russia’s long-range aviation capabilities, as it will take a decade to rebuild the lost assets.
Even with ongoing talks, the commitment to bringing the war to a negotiated settlement remains low. The military aid pledged under former US President Joe Biden continues to buttress the Ukrainian armed forces. At present, the Trump administration is uninterested in announcing a significant aid package to Ukraine. Meanwhile, as American aid to Ukraine has reduced, European states have pledged more aid to Ukraine. In March and April 2025 alone, European countries allocated US$12.2 billion for military aid and $11.5 billion for humanitarian aid. In contrast, between February 2022 and January 2025, the EU and UK pledged a mere US$13 billion and US$9 billion for military aid, respectively. This sudden increase, along with NATO countries agreeing to step up military spending to 5 percent of their GDPs by 2035, reiterates Europe’s commitment to countering the perceived Russian threat. Even with increasing European support, Kyiv will be impacted by the drop in American military aid. Recently, the Pentagon halted the shipments of the MIM-104 patriot missile systems and the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, citing issues of falling stockpile volumes. The Patriot missile system, though limited in number in the Ukrainian arsenal, is instrumental in intercepting Russian ballistic missile attacks. Another area in which Ukraine will be impacted is the limited access to American satellite intelligence, which the European allies cannot match. However, talks are on for outsourcing these systems and technologies via Europe, but this transition is easier said than done.
Ukraine has better strike capabilities, i.e., dynamic targeting, precision targeting, and integration. The potency of the drone units has been higher than that of infantry and artillery operations.
With European nations footing the bill, Ukraine will be able to sustain its defence in the short to medium term, but it will be nowhere close to the support Kyiv received under the Biden administration. Even as Washington’s involvement recedes in the conflict, Trump, on multiple occasions, has expressed his displeasure with the sluggish pace of negotiations taking place and has threatened to impose additional sanctions on Moscow. However, the two sides have been unable to reach an agreement during the two rounds of talks. A key leverage Russia holds is the territory it controls in Ukraine, not to mention the ability to sustain a prolonged military operation while ensuring domestic macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, sanctions relief is a carrot for gaining certain concessions from Russia. Interestingly, the prospect of sanctions relief is not a pull factor for Russia to make concessions, despite being hit by more than 29,000 sanctions. The Russian economy has absorbed the shocks of these punitive measures and has built a degree of resilience. Additionally, Moscow is cognisant of the complexity of getting sanctions revoked; US sanctions would require congressional assent, which is difficult considering that the Republicans have a narrow majority in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the EU continues to announce sanctions packages against Russia. Thus, neither side has found convergent points at the negotiating table. That said, the negotiations so far have produced a few agreements, which are evidenced by the release of a substantial number of prisoners of war from both sides, and refraining from attacking ships in the Black Sea.
Table 1.1 Important Sections of the Memoranda Presented
| Russian Memorandum | Ukrainian Memorandum |
| Ukrainian withdrawal from the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia and the international legal recognition of these territories and Crimea as Russian territory. | Complete and unconditional ceasefire as a prerequisite for the start of peace talks. |
| Ban on redeployment of troops, and cessation of mobilisation and foreign aid. | Unconditional return of all deported and displaced children, and exchange of POWs. |
| Beginning of demobilisation, and the exclusion of the military presence of third countries. | Involvement of the international community to conclude and guarantee the implementation of a peace agreement. |
| Renunciation of ‘sabotage’ and ‘subversive’ activities against Russia. | Ukraine does not recognise Russia’s territorial gains since 2014. Any territorial negotiations are conditional upon a complete ceasefire. |
| Creation of a bilateral ceasefire monitoring and control centre. | Phased lifting of sanctions with a ‘snapback’ mechanism in case of violations. |
| The lifting of martial law in Ukraine and the announcement of fresh elections. | Frozen Russian assets to be redirected towards Ukraine’s reconstruction or to be unfrozen upon the payment of reparations. |
| Ukraine must constitutionally remain neutral and cannot join any alliances. | 30 days’ ceasefire with the possibility of extension, creating a monitoring mechanism led by the US and third countries. |
| Lifting of sanctions against Russia. | War to end based on international law, restoring territorial integrity, preserving sovereign choice over foreign policy and holding Russia accountable for the destruction of civilian infrastructure and war crimes. |
| Ensuring the rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and lifting restrictions on the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. | |
| Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations, including gas transit, transport, and other communications. |
In the second round of talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, both sides exchanged their respective memoranda (see table 1.1), which were ultimately rejected by both parties. While Putin has expressed readiness for a third round of negotiations, it remains unlikely that an agreement will be reached anytime soon. The EU and UK’s increasing commitment to the defence of Ukraine, alongside Moscow’s continued territorial gains, further complicates the situation as the latter can elicit a soft recalibration of America’s position against Russia by the expedition of military supplies for Ukraine via European countries. Still, the fact that Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have reconvened after more than three years is notable in itself. That said, the battlefield realities tell a different story. Without a real ceasefire in place, any deal made at the table is unlikely to last.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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