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India’s planned investment in the Shillong–Silchar corridor is emblematic of efforts aimed at reducing dependence on Bangladesh, bolstering ties with Myanmar, and repositioning the Northeast in its regional diplomacy.
Image Source: Getty
Geographical contiguity between states necessitates a degree of governance complementarity to optimally utilise shared resources, capitalise on mutual opportunities, and address transboundary challenges. Yet, diplomacy remains a strategic choice rather than a geographical inevitability. In adverse geopolitical conditions, seeking alternatives beyond immediate neighbours becomes imperative. India's recent decision to develop the ‘Shillong-Silchar Corridor’ in its landlocked Northeast exemplifies such strategic recalibration. On 30th April, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved a proposal for the development, maintenance and management of a 166.80 km greenfield high-speed corridor from Mawlyngkhung in Meghalaya to Panchgram in Assam, on a hybrid annuity mode (involving government and private sector funding), at a total cost of INR 22,864 crore. It encompasses the construction of 19 major bridges, 153 minor bridges, 326 culverts, 22 underpasses, 26 overpasses, and 34 viaducts. Of the entire corridor, 144.80 km will be in Meghalaya, and 22 km will be in Assam. It is expected to be completed by 2030.
Yet, diplomacy remains a strategic choice rather than a geographical inevitability. In adverse geopolitical conditions, seeking alternatives beyond immediate neighbours becomes imperative.
Among multiple objectives, the project is expected to reduce the travel time between Shillong and Silchar from an estimated 8.5 hours to 5 hours. Passing through the coal and cement producing areas of Meghalaya, it is also expected to spur industrial development in the state. Traversing the challenging terrain of Ri Bhoi, East Khasi Hills, West Jaintia Hills, and East Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya, as well as the Cachar district in Assam, the corridor is envisioned to enhance inter-city connectivity between Guwahati, Shillong, and Silchar. This will reduce congestion on the National Highway 6, aligning with the PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan, launched in 2021 to provide multimodal connectivity infrastructure to various economic zones. As such, the corridor will facilitate tourism, one of the mainstays of the Northeast’s economy, given its proximity to the Guwahati, Shillong, and Silchar airports, as well as existing railway networks (See Map 1). Beyond improving intra-Northeast connectivity, the corridor holds the strategic potential to link this landlocked region to the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar. This prospect is diplomatically significant given the current geopolitical scenario, as it allows New Delhi to circumvent Bangladesh and provide the Northeast with maritime access for overseas trade and connectivity.
Map 1: Shillong-Silchar Corridor Connecting to the Kaladan Project
Source: Map by Jaya Thakur, Independent Researcher
For so long, Bangladesh has been considered the most convenient, if not inevitable, transit to link the Northeast with the Bay of Bengal, due to its geographical position and the history of partition. In 1947, the present-day territory of Bangladesh was carved from India’s eastern territories as East Pakistan, leaving the Northeastern territories landlocked. Positioned between Northeast India and the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh shares the world’s fifth-longest international border of 4,096.7 km with India, of which 1,879 km adjoins the Northeastern states of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Mizoram. Bangladesh thus offers the shortest geographical routes to connect these states with the sea. Accordingly, India has actively sought access to Bangladesh’s seaports of Chattogram and Mongla to reactivate the pre-partition conduits for maritime commerce. While such collaborative ventures were largely successful in the last decade under the amicable partnership between India and the former Awami League administration in Bangladesh, the regime change in Dhaka last August has raised questions about New Delhi’s continued reliance on the country to fulfil its Northeast aspirations.
Using a third country as a bargaining chip in bilateral negotiations is politically questionable, and Yunus’s comment disregards India’s strategic sensitivities concerning China.
In recent months, several developments have impacted the New Delhi-Dhaka relationship, particularly after Bangladesh reportedly invited Chinese investment to develop an airbase at Lalmonirhat—located near India’s strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor, which connects the Northeast to the rest of the country. The Northeast has a history of insurgencies, and the border dispute with China in Arunachal Pradesh further complicates matters. Naturally, New Delhi is cautious of the security situation in this region. Matters came to a head following Bangladesh Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s controversial comment about the Northeast during his first state visit to Beijing in late March. He remarked, “The seven states of eastern India, known as the Seven Sisters, are a landlocked region. They have no direct access to the ocean. We are the only guardians of the ocean for this entire region. This opens up a huge opportunity. It could become an extension of the Chinese economy...” Using a third country as a bargaining chip in bilateral negotiations is politically questionable, and Yunus’s comment disregards India’s strategic sensitivities concerning China. It also highlights the geographical constraints of the Northeast to Bangladesh’s advantage, overlooking Dhaka’s reliance on this region for its transit trade and connectivity with Nepal, Bhutan, and India.
In response, India revoked Bangladesh’s transhipment facility to export goods to third countries via Indian land customs stations, ports, and airports. New Delhi’s action appeared to serve two key diplomatic objectives: to make the interim government realise the Northeast’s value as a critical hinterland and transit territory for Bangladesh, as its other transhipment facilities remain terminated; and to reiterate India’s commitment towards its eastern neighbours, as restricting transit trade through the Northeast would have affected Nepal and Bhutan as well.
India’s decision to develop the Shillong–Silchar corridor represents a strategic extension of its broader diplomatic recalibration in the region. On the one hand, the initiative reflects New Delhi's intent to reduce its reliance on Bangladesh, given the recent political volatility in Dhaka that has raised concerns about the stability of its investment climate and the new administration's perceived insensitivity to India's strategic imperatives. On the other hand, the project simultaneously opens avenues for enhanced engagement with Myanmar through the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), thereby reinforcing alternative connectivity routes to the Bay of Bengal. In doing so, it challenges the assertion made by Yunus regarding the Northeast’s dependence on Bangladesh, while advancing India’s efforts to deepen ties with Myanmar—an increasingly significant partner in its Act East strategy.
India has long aimed to reinvigorate its Northeast by laying down diversified connectivity pathways, especially via two flagship projects involving Myanmar, with which it shares a 1,643-km-long border across Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. The India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway and the KMMTTP are poised to transform the region’s links with Southeast Asia. Among these, the Kaladan project—connecting Sittwe Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Paletwa via the Kaladan River and onward to Zorinpui in Mizoram by road—is especially significant to India’s Act East Policy. It provides a direct maritime outlet for the landlocked Northeast, facilitating greater trade, movement, and regional integration.
Operationalised in May 2023, the Sittwe Port has since handled over 150 vessels carrying relief materials, cement, machinery, and equipment. India formally acquired operating rights to the port in April 2024. However, the project is currently stalled due to escalating conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army continues to fight the junta forces. The unrest underscores the vulnerability of infrastructure investments in volatile regions. However, India has remained diplomatically and developmentally engaged, reflecting its long-term commitment to this crucial route.
While the maritime leg of the Kaladan project is operational, completing the remaining 110 km road section is vital to fully realising its multimodal potential. Construction projects face delays due to rugged terrain, land compensation issues, inter-agency coordination gaps, and persistent security threats, particularly following the 2021 coup. The construction work is being overseen by the Indian Railway Construction International Limited (Ircon International), along with local contractors from Myanmar. However, the volatile security situation in Myanmar makes timely completion uncertain despite a contract timeline of over three years.
The integrated corridor will allow cargo to travel by sea from Kolkata to Sittwe, then inland to Paletwa, overland to Zorinpui, and onward via road or rail through Mizoram and Silchar to the broader Northeast.
Considering the larger picture, the convergence of the Shillong–Silchar corridor with the Kaladan project could be a game changer, offering a seamless overland route from Meghalaya and Assam to Sittwe via Mizoram. The integrated corridor will allow cargo to travel by sea from Kolkata to Sittwe, then inland to Paletwa, overland to Zorinpui, and onward via road or rail through Mizoram and Silchar to the broader Northeast. (See Map 1) This strategy underscores India's intention to incorporate strategic roadblocks into its regional connectivity framework, thereby ensuring flexibility and manoeuvrability amid evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Moreover, reinvigorating ties with Myanmar through such infrastructure cooperation allows India to counterbalance China’s deepening regional influence, particularly through initiatives like the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The operationalisation of the Kaladan route is thus both a connectivity and strategic imperative, signalling to neighbours and global competitors that India is prepared to act decisively to secure and advance its national interests.
By investing in the Shillong–Silchar and Kaladan corridors, India is not only rebutting Yunus’s assertion about the Northeast’s dependency on Bangladesh but also repositioning the region as a gateway—rather than a periphery—in its evolving Indo-Pacific strategy.
In conflict-prone zones, connectivity projects often become securitised, overshadowing their intended developmental and commercial functions.
However, volatility in Bangladesh and Myanmar can disrupt the construction of these alternative routes, complicating regional integration efforts. In conflict-prone zones, connectivity projects often become securitised, overshadowing their intended developmental and commercial functions. However, these efforts hinge not just on the security environment but on prioritising local community development as well. Empowering local stakeholders, ensuring inclusive benefits, and fostering trust in such projects can mitigate conflict risks and enhance resilience. The Kaladan project, therefore, must evolve beyond strategic calculus to become a platform for meaningful community integration and prosperity.
Ultimately, India’s twin focus on the Shillong–Silchar corridor and the Kaladan project reflects a recalibrated strategy that not only addresses emerging geopolitical challenges but also reinstates the Northeast as a pivotal node in India’s Act East and Indo-Pacific ambitions.
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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