Introduction

Southeast Asia’s cultural diversity, economic potential, and geopolitical weight have made it a focal point for global players seeking both influence and economic gains. As leading Indo-Pacific economies, India and China are actively investing in the region to secure their positions in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia provides access to vital trade routes and holds immense potential for economic growth. Both India and China have deepened diplomatic ties and channelled investments into regional infrastructures to solidify their foothold and advance their strategic interests.

In South and Southeast Asia, infrastructure initiatives encompassing roads, communication networks, and trade hubs accentuate the intersection of political dynamics and cultural legacies stemming from colonial histories and present-day geopolitical contexts.^[a] In the context of Myanmar and Thailand, infrastructure becomes a tool for state control, strategic expansion, and regional alignments.

Assessing China’s and India’s infrastructure investments in Myanmar and Thailand is important for understanding Southeast Asia’s evolving strategic dynamics. As regional powers, the infrastructural investments being made by India and China are not just economic but also political. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seeks to connect its southern provinces to Southeast Asia through a network of roads, railways, and ports, with Myanmar and Thailand playing pivotal roles. India, meanwhile, through initiatives like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH) launched in 2002, and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) of 2008 aims to develop its northeastern region and strengthen connectivity with Southeast Asia. Monitoring these investments reveals how both powers are shaping the region’s economic and political landscape. Large-scale investments can alter the socio-political landscape, especially in regions affected by ethnic conflict or insurgency.

The rest of this paper examines the political dynamics around infrastructure projects in the region, emphasising their broader geopolitical implications. It analyses how both India and China engage with the ASEAN to further their strategic and economic objectives; and underlines the challenges and opportunities associated with their infrastructure projects in the region.

The Political Dynamics of Infrastructure Projects

Road networks play a key role in facilitating global trade and driving regional development, complementing maritime routes and enhancing last-mile connectivity for air and rail logistics in certain sectors. They provide access to remote regions, boost economic and social progress, and support the movement of goods and people. Roads also generate employment opportunities, stimulate local economies, and enable cost-effective delivery, especially for smaller shipments and shorter distances.

Unlike maritime or air routes, road infrastructure is more adaptable and widely accessible. It enables the swift movement of aid during times of crisis, enhancing disaster resilience. Roads also bridge economic gaps by connecting urban centres with rural areas, promoting inclusive development. Furthermore, land connectivity projects are often permanent, serving purposes beyond trade—such as fostering cross-border people-to-people exchanges.

From a strategic perspective, transnational road networks influence international relations, transcending their logistical function to shape geopolitical dynamics. These projects require active local participation in their development and upkeep, as they span diverse regions and communities, ensuring their long-term viability.

Countries with sophisticated infrastructure often gain political leverage—securing support on global issues, access to natural resources, and alignment on political matters. Recognising these multifaceted dimensions is essential when navigating land infrastructure and connectivity projects.

As both India and China expand their infrastructure dimension, Beijing strategically leverages Southeast Asia’s geostrategic location to access the Indian Ocean and integrate regional economies with its own. Through railways, roads, and energy pipelines, China is seeking to strengthen its economic footprint, secure access to key maritime routes, and deepen ties with regional governments.

India also recognises the transformative potential of infrastructure connectivity initiatives in Southeast Asia. Delays in project implementation, however, often hinder its ability to match China’s pace and scale. Nevertheless, India remains a key player, leveraging its growing economic and geopolitical stature. Its efforts, driven by the Act East Policy launched in 2014, go beyond countering China’s influence and aim to enhance economic integration, regional stability, and historical and cultural ties with its eastern neighbours. With its strategic ambitions and deeper engagement, India continues to shape Southeast Asia’s connectivity landscape.

The Importance of ASEAN for India and China

India

The early 1990s witnessed political and economic changes framed by globalisation and deeper economic integration. It was during this era when international competition intensified, spurring a new wave of regionalism, with regional groupings emerging based on proximity, economic complementarity, and shared objectives. In response, India recalibrated its foreign policy to safeguard territorial integrity, ensure regional stability, and foster a favourable economic environment.^[1]

In South Asia, regional cooperation efforts under South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) initiatives like SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) sought to boost trade but faced hurdles, including the India-Pakistan dispute and Pakistan’s reluctance to ratify agreements. The Soviet Union’s collapse disrupted India’s trade and diplomatic support, exposing it to global pressures on issues like disarmament and Kashmir. The Gulf crisis further highlighted the need to diversify energy sources, leading India to explore partnerships in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.

The economic rise of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’^[b] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), coupled with India's domestic liberalisation push and aspirations for a UN Security Council seat, underscored the importance of deepening ties with East and Southeast Asia.^[2] This shift reflected India’s strategic pivot to capitalise on emerging opportunities in the region. Since 2014, this has evolved into the more assertive ‘Act East’ policy. India’s liberalised economic approach towards Southeast Asia emphasises the importance of forging stronger linkages with the dynamic ASEAN region.

India’s engagement with ASEAN occurred in stages—beginning as a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and achieving full dialogue partner status in 1995.^[3]

In 1996, India further strengthened its ties by becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

^[4] These institutional steps laid the foundation for a more comprehensive and structured inter-regional cooperation.

The ASEAN-India Summit-level meetings, initiated in 2002, played a pivotal role in enhancing the nature and dynamics of the relationship. A milestone came in 2004 with the signing of the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Shared Prosperity.^[5] ASEAN is a key economic partner for India, ranking as its fourth-largest trading partner. In 2021-22, trade value reached US$110.4 billion, with India exporting US$42.327 billion and importing US$68.07 billion—crossing the US$100-billion mark for the first time.^[6] In 2022-23, trade rose to US$131.5 billion, constituting 11.3 percent of India’s total global trade.^[7]

India’s engagement with ASEAN transcends the bilateral and regional levels. Alongside its collaboration through ASEAN, India actively participates in sub-regional initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), launched in 1997, and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) of 2000. Initially perceived as an alternative approach due to challenges in multilateral engagement with ASEAN, these initiatives—especially with Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries, for instance, Myanmar and Thailand—are now recognised as integral to India’s strategy.

The Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) nations, including Thailand, have gained increased attention within the ASEAN region in recent years due to their promising economic potential. India is actively cultivating closer ties with these nations, primarily driven by their proximity to its northeastern states and their strategic location. The CLMV region’s steady economic growth and macroeconomic stability make it attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI). India sees opportunities to leverage the advantages of abundant cheap labour, liberal trade, and FDI policies within these nations.

China

Historically, China engaged with Southeast Asian nations bilaterally, viewing ASEAN as a grouping of states rather than a bloc. However, with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980s and the growth of China’s global ambitions, Beijing began to recognise the strategic importance of strengthening ties with its neighbours. This led to its first notable step towards institutional engagement with ASEAN as a collective.

In 1991, ASEAN and China commenced a dialogue, leading to China attaining the status of a full dialogue partner in 1996.^[8] During the 1997 financial crisis, China built trust with Southeast Asian nations by refraining from devaluing its global currency and contributing to financial relief aid through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while addressing humanitarian needs.

ASEAN-China relations reached new heights following the endorsement of the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity at the 7^th ASEAN-China Summit in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia. Since then, both entities have implemented three action plans for 2005-2010, 2011-2015, and 2016-2020. The latest action plan for 2021-2025 was adopted by their foreign ministers in November 2020, followed by an annexe added in August 2022.^[9] China has also been an active participant in ASEAN-led institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus One with China, ASEAN Plus Three with China, Japan, and South Korea, and the East Asia Summit.

ASEAN and China signed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in 2002, realised in January 2010 and upgraded in 2015, with the protocol taking effect in July 2016. In 2021, the 10^th anniversary of ACFTA saw leaders launch negotiations for its further upgrade at the 25^th ASEAN-China Summit. The second round of the ASEAN-China FTA 3.0 negotiations occurred in April 2023. The ACFTA has strengthened economic ties, with China becoming ASEAN's largest trading partner since 2009, and vice versa, since 2020. In 2022, trade volume reached US$722 billion, making China ASEAN's largest trading partner for 14 consecutive years. Chinese FDI in ASEAN amounted to US$15.4 billion in 2022, comprising 6.9 percent of total FDI inflows to ASEAN. Furthermore, China's involvement in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, signed in November 2020, underscores its commitment to regional economic cooperation.^[10]

ASEAN and China have agreed to align priorities in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and China’s BRI. A Joint Statement between ASEAN and China on Further Deepening the Cooperation on Infrastructure Connectivity was issued at the 20^th ASEAN-China Summit in November 2017. Further, the 22^nd ASEAN-China Summit on 3 November 2019 adopted the ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Synergising the MPAC 2025 and the BRI.^[11]

China’s relationship with Myanmar and Thailand represents an important aspect of its broader Southeast Asian foreign policy. Southeast Asia, particularly the Mekong region, has long been acknowledged as a sphere of Chinese influence, with the shared Mekong River underscoring the geographical proximity. These nations are emerging forces within ASEAN and the broader Asian context. Various initiatives, encompassing infrastructure development, deep-sea port construction, and road building, have been implemented in the region.

China’s and India’s Infrastructure Projects in Southeast Asia

This section explores ongoing initiatives spearheaded by India and China in Southeast Asia. It examines ambitious connectivity corridors and environmental initiatives, emphasising their strategic importance and the geopolitical undercurrents shaping these endeavours.

Infrastructure Investments by China

Myanmar

Myanmar holds strategic importance for China due to its abundant resources, favourable geographic position along the Bay of Bengal, and shared land border, which facilitates cost-effective overland oil transport to Beijing. From 1988 to June 2019, approved Chinese investment in Myanmar exceeded US$25 billion, representing nearly 26 percent of the total FDI.^[12] Since the coup in 2021 till 2023, Myanmar has received US$ 3 billion in FDI from China.^[13] In 2024, China remains Myanmar’s major trading partner and third-largest foreign investor, after Singapore and Thailand, leading numerous infrastructure projects, particularly under the rubric of the BRI.^[14]

China has remained a dominant player in Myanmar since 1988. Myanmar’s transformation into a semi-military regime in 2010, followed by economic liberalisation and political reforms in 2011, encouraged a diversification of foreign partnerships beyond China. Western nations, including the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and Canada, re-engaged with the country after decades of sanctions. The US lifted most restrictions between 2012 and 2016, allowing companies like Coca-Cola, General Electric, Chevron, and Ford to invest in manufacturing, energy, and financial services.^[15] The EU granted Myanmar Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status in 2013, boosting investment in energy (TotalEnergies), telecommunications (Norway’s Telenor), and garment manufacturing.^[16] The UK also expanded its presence, with British firms investing in oil and gas (Shell), finance, and retail, while Australia and Canada had smaller stakes in mining, infrastructure, and financial services.

Meanwhile, Japan, Singapore, and other Asian economies also became key players in Myanmar’s growth. Japan, through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), financed infrastructure projects such as the Thilawa Special Economic Zone and urban development initiatives in Yangon, while also investing in banking and telecommunications. Singapore emerged as one of Myanmar’s largest investors, focusing on real estate, finance, and hospitality. Thailand maintained its dominance in the energy sector, especially in natural gas extraction, while South Korea invested in telecommunications and light manufacturing.^[17]

Table 1: Projects Revived Under CMEC Post-Coup

Name	Total Investment	Location	Status
Mee Lin Gyaing LNG	US$2.5 billion	Ayeyarwady region	Currently in the early stages of design[18]
Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KPSEZ)	US$1.5 billion	Kyaukphyu township, Rakhine state	EIA and survey ongoing; March 2025 talks held to expedite implementation.[19]
New Yangon City project	US$1.5 billion	Yangon	Planning stage[20]
Chinshwehaw CBECZ	–	Northern Shan state	Stalled at the moment[21]
Kanpiketi CBECZ	US$22.4 million	Northern Kachin state’s Special Region	MoU to be signed[22]
Kyaukphyu Power Plant	US$180 million	Kyaukphyu Township, Rakhine state	Completed in 2023[23]
Kyaukphyu deep sea port	US$1.3 billion	Kyaukpyu township	Ongoing[24]
Muse – Mandalay Railway	US$8.9 billion	Mandalay	Preparatory stage[25]
Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse Expressway	US$820 million[26]		Currently stalled[27]
Kyaukphyu-Naypyidaw Highway projects	US$2,153,800		Planning stage, currently stalled[28]
Muse-Ruili Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zones (CBECZ)			Planning[29]
Mandalay Myotha Industrial Project	US$500 million[30]		Completed
Mandalay-Kyauk Phyu Railway			Survey conducted[31]

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources  

Beijing maintained its relations with Myanmar by entering into various projects. Public criticism of Chinese-led projects, particularly over environmental and social concerns, has long been an obstacle.^[32] The suspension of the Myitsone dam by Myanmar’s military-backed USDP government in 2011 due to public opposition exemplified growing resistance to Chinese investments. This sentiment influenced other Chinese projects, as many in Myanmar criticised the lack of transparency and adverse community impacts.^[33] Similarly, the Letpadaung copper mine also faced criticism from the local population over environmental concerns, unsatisfactory compensation, and resettlement processes, prompting the formation of an review committee.

After the National League for Democracy (NLD) took power in 2015, public scepticism over Chinese loans and fears of debt traps intensified, influenced by global cases like Sri Lanka’s 2017 lease of Hambantota Port to China.^[34] In response, the NLD renegotiated key projects, including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), securing more favourable terms such as phased development and reduced Myanmar government capital investment.^[35]

In response to growing resistance, Chinese companies began to change their tactics to gain local support. The Letpadaung copper mine is a key example. Myanmar Wanbao Mining Copper Limited^[c] initially operated through institutions and business partners closely linked to Myanmar’s long-standing military junta.^[36]  However, during the country’s democratic opening after 2011, as local societal actors gained influence and backing from governing institutions, Wanbao shifted its approach to accommodate local demands.^[37] This eventually led to the acceptance of the project, and in 2017, it was placed under the BRI.

While these approaches boosted public confidence in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a significant part of the BRI, ongoing armed conflicts in regions like Rakhine and Kokang posed threats to infrastructure projects, including the Kyaukphyu port and the Kunming-Mandalay railway. China attempted to mitigate these risks by mediating with Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) near the border, aligning its peace-building efforts with securing CMEC projects. This strategy, combined with Aung San Suu Kyi’s domestic popularity, helped maintain a balance between public concerns and Chinese interests. The 2021 coup and subsequent civil unrest disrupted this equilibrium, forcing China to reconsider its approach to Myanmar and its various actors, adding new complexities to CMEC’s future.

Before the coup, Myanmar had sought to diversify its partnerships, collaborating with India, Japan, and the US to balance its stakes. However, the coup and the junta’s refusal to engage with international peace efforts exacerbated the conflict and led to widespread backlash. The military has continued to label opposition groups as terrorists and has shown little interest in holding negotiations. In 2021, ASEAN broke with its long-standing non-interference policy, citing Myanmar’s violation of the ASEAN Charter on rule of law and governance. However, efforts to implement the 2021 Five-Point Consensus—which calls for an end to violence, inclusive dialogue, and humanitarian assistance—remain unheeded, revealing the limitations of regional responses. This brought the nation closer to China, which continued engaging with the military regime.

After Myanmar's 2021 coup, the State Administrative Council (SAC)—the junta’s governing body—approved CMEC projects initiated or planned under the previous government, including the US$2.5-billion Mee Lin Gyaing power initiative (see Table 1). However, escalating political unrest soon disrupted progress. Anti-China sentiment grew due to Beijing’s perceived support for the SAC, particularly after China shielded the junta at the UNSC. This led to attacks on Chinese interests, such as factories in Yangon and the Tagaung Taung nickel-processing plant in 2021.^[38]

The National Unity Government (NUG)—a shadow government consisting of NLD leaders and new members—declared a ‘People’s Defensive War’, further escalating security threats to CMEC projects. In response, China pursued alternatives like the Chongqing-Lincang-Mandalay transport network and the Guangxi-Yangon maritime route. Both faced challenges, including conflict disruptions and inefficiency.^[39] Amid Myanmar’s instability, securing reliable security guarantees remains critical for CMEC's viability.

Prior to Operation 1027, launched by EAOs in October 2023, the SAC controlled most of Myanmar, backed by strong military power. Despite security concerns, China continued to rely on the SAC for the CMEC, which became crucial as Myanmar’s post-coup economic situation worsened. However, limited cooperation marked the relationship, especially as China faced challenges from rising cybercrime in SAC-controlled border areas in the Kokang region, Shan State.^[40]

Despite repeated pressure from Beijing, the SAC’s inability to curb these issues prompted China to seek partnerships with EAOs, especially the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a key member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance

^[d] that launched Operation 1027. According to public statements, the operation aimed to curb the growing cases of online gambling and fraud networks along the China-Myanmar border, target criminal syndicates and junta-linked militias, and challenge military rule.^[41] While China’s involvement in the operation remains unclear, analysts are of the view that it may have tacitly supported it in exchange for returning scam perpetrators to China.^[42] Following the operation, China adopted a more proactive role, facilitating peace talks between the SAC and EAOs to enhance control over strategic border crossings.

This change prompted the NUG to adjust its stance, releasing a 10-point policy to engage China, including guarantees for Chinese projects like the Tagaung Taung nickel plant.^[43] Since April 2024, the military has actively sought China's intervention to regain lost territories, making strategic overtures such as proposing the revival of the long-stalled Myitsone Dam project, designating Chinese New Year a public holiday, and sending former President Thein Sein to Beijing for the 70^th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—actions that garnered positive attention in Chinese media. In response, China recalibrated its stance, resulting in heightened diplomatic engagement with the SAC.^[44] A key development was Min Aung Hlaing's visit to Yunnan in November 2024 for a two-day GMS Summit, where reports suggest the junta committed to resume the New Yangon City project and expedite the Muse-Mandalay railway line, both backed by Beijing.

Figure 1: Chinese Projects in the Arakan Army (AA)-controlled Rakhine

Source: ISP-Myanmar^[45]

With China’s growing involvement, Myanmar's security landscape remains volatile. While CMEC projects are not immediately threatened, they continue to face risks due to shifting territorial control and conflict dynamics (see Figure 1).^[e]

Thailand

Thailand’s growing economy and rich natural resources have attracted Chinese investments, cultural exchanges, and immigration. Despite its increasing engagement with China, Thailand remains a close US ally, supporting its policy in Southeast Asia and playing a role in securing control over the Strait of Malacca. This balancing act between the two powers highlights Thailand’s strategic importance in the region.

The expanding ties between Bangkok and Beijing, spanning political, economic, cultural, and other domains, were formalised in the 'Joint Communiqué on a Plan of Cooperation for the Twenty-First Century,' signed in 1999 by Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiasuan.^[46] Following the 1997 financial crisis, Thailand sought to enhance cooperation with China—part of a broader strategy to diversify foreign policy and strengthen economic ties with key global players. In 2007, a strategic cooperation framework was established through a joint action plan covering 15 areas to deepen bilateral engagement. As a result, this collaboration has spanned trade, investment, agriculture, and tourism, with China surpassing Japan as Thailand’s largest investor.^[47]

Table 2: China’s Infrastructure Projects in Thailand

Project Name	Sector	Total Investment	Current Status
Bangkok–Nong Khai High-Speed Rail (Thai–Chinese HSR)	Transportation (Rail)	US$4.92 billion[48]	Ongoing – Under construction Phase 1 – Bangkok–Nakhon Ratchasima, 251 km expected to start operation in 2027; Phase 2 approved on 4 February 2025[49]
High-Speed Rail Linking Three Airports (Don Mueang–Suvarnabhumi–U-Tapao)	Transportation (Rail)	US$6.563 billion[50]	Ongoing – Implementation in PPP;[51] delayed, construction expected to begin in April 2025[52]

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources 

Compared to Malaysia and Indonesia, Thailand’s participation in the BRI has been more limited, with fewer large-scale projects (see Table 2). The flagship BRI project in Thailand is the High-Speed Rail (HSR) network, launched in 2017, linking Bangkok to Nong Khai in the northeast.^[53] While negotiations for the railway began in 2014, the project faced delays due to design, funding, and technical challenges. In 2016, Thailand opted to self-finance its US$5.32-billion share, citing concerns over high interest rates and potential debt risks associated with Chinese financing.^[54] China continues to provide technical expertise. Construction of the initial phase, connecting Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima, has begun, with plans for completion by 2027. The second phase, extending to Nong Khai, is expected to be completed by 2030, eventually linking to the Laos-China railway in Vientiane and further to Kunming in China (see Figure 2).^[55]

Figure 2: High-Speed Railway

Source: CGTN^[56]

While prioritising regional connectivity within ASEAN, Thailand also focuses on its long-term strategy to become a logistics and trade hub in Southeast Asia. Central to this vision is the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), launched in 2017 to promote infrastructure development, technological innovation, and special economic zones in Chonburi, Rayong, and Chachoengsao. The EEC aims to enhance connectivity across air, land, and sea through high-speed rail lines, motorways, and port projects. Chinese investment plays a key role, funding initiatives such as rail links, port expansions, and airport developments.

While boosting regional connectivity, these developments also facilitate deeper Chinese economic expansion into Thailand. Large state-owned Chinese enterprises (SOEs) are collaborating with Thai conglomerates such as the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) to develop critical infrastructure.^[57] Although this cooperation supports development, it often marginalises local small and medium-sized businesses, which struggle to compete with the scale and resources of these large ventures. As Chinese investment has expanded from manufacturing into real estate and agriculture, concerns have grown over land acquisitions and the potential displacement of local communities. This trend reflects broader regional issues, where Chinese investment in Southeast Asia is raising questions about the long-term impact on local economies and societies.

Thai foreign policy is often described as pragmatic, able to adapt and rooted in a strategic culture aimed at safeguarding national interests. This tradition of balancing external interests while preserving independence is evident in Thailand’s responsiveness to shifting power dynamics. Despite pressure from Washington and Beijing, Bangkok makes independent decisions to advance its interests and maintain sovereignty, avoiding alignment with either power.

While Thailand engages with China on infrastructure projects, it maintains leverage by rejecting proposals that jeopardise costs or sovereignty. Regulatory frameworks and robust security measures further ensure balanced foreign engagement. For instance, Thailand's Land Bridge project, slated to be launched either in 2025 or 2026, aims to connect the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand via deep-sea ports in Ranong and Chumphon and a 90-km transport corridor. Estimated at US$28 billion, the project includes ports, rail infrastructure, and logistics hubs. Thailand is not negotiating solely with China; it has invited interest from other countries, such as Japan, the US, India, and the UAE.^[58] Chinese state-owned enterprises in shipping, construction, and port management have shown keen interest, though no official commitments have been announced, as discussions and feasibility assessments continue. As Thailand seeks economic viability, it will continue to engage with multiple international players to maintain its strategic balance and ensure long-term stability. 

India’s Infrastructure Projects

Myanmar

Myanmar occupies an important position in India’s geopolitical aspirations, anchoring both the Act East Policy and the Neighbourhood First Initiative, launched in 2008. Its role extends beyond facilitating the development of India’s Northeast, serving as a vital connection between India and Southeast Asia through key infrastructure endeavours. These projects include the KMMTTP and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH), launched in 2008 and 2002, respectively (see Table 3), which aim to boost regional connectivity and economic cooperation between India and Southeast Asia. Upon completion, these projects are anticipated to generate employment and foster development in regions long affected by insurgency. Myanmar thus stands as a linchpin in India’s broader regional integration and development vision.

The Chin and Sagaing regions face challenges attracting investment due to transportation difficulties and the absence of essential infrastructure, such as a reliable power supply. This has impeded economic growth in these areas. 

Table 3: India’s Connectivity Projects in Myanmar and Thailand

Name	Year of Inception	Cost (in US$)	Region covered	Status
Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project	2008	US$484 million[59]	Will connect Kolkata port to Sittwe port in Myanmar’s Rakhine state; link Sittwe port to Paletwa along the Kaladan river, and finally connect Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India/ Myanmar border by road	River component Completed: Road component: Ongoing
India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral highway project	2002	US$170 billion[60]	Will connect Moreh (Manipur, India) to Mae Sot (Thailand) via Myanmar.	Ongoing

Source: Authors’ own, using open-source information

Since Myanmar’s opening in 2011, both the quasi-military and the subsequent democratic governments in 2015 have acknowledged the importance of enhancing regional connectivity. A 2016 Asian Development Bank (ADB) report recommended increasing transport investment from 1-1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 3-4 percent. The proposed strategy involves raising additional finance through concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs). This comprehensive approach aims to overcome infrastructure challenges and promote regional economic development.

Figure 3: The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project

Source: Prabir De (2023)^[f],[61]

The KMMTTP encompasses a 158-km waterways segment along the Kaladan River, stretching from Sittwe Port to Paletwa in Myanmar, and a 109-km road segment from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram, which remains under construction at the time of writing (see Figure 3).^[62] Sittwe Port became operational on 9 May 2023, with the first shipment docking successfully. India has secured operational rights for the port, and India Ports Global Ltd. (IPGL) will manage it under the same model used for domestic Indian ports, starting 6 April 2024. However, operations are currently suspended due to ongoing ethnic strife within Rakhine state.^[63]

Moreover, completing the 109-km road section is crucial for leveraging the multimodal component of the Kaladan project. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup, progress was hindered by poor coordination among border agencies, the rugged terrain, land compensation disputes, and security concerns due to regional insurgency. In 2019, the Arakan Army (AA) abducted Indian workers, a powerful EAO, while working on the Kaladan inland waterway. Although they were released after negotiations with the Myanmar government, work on the road section has continued to be hindered.

Post-coup in February 2021 and Operation 1027, work has come to a standstill due to increasing security concerns. Ethnic armed forces, aiming to capture the whole of Rakhine and Chin states, have launched repeated attacks near construction sites. With these regions now under the control of the AA and Chin Defence Forces, constant fighting and airstrikes have severely impacted connectivity infrastructure. Even newly appointed subcontractors have been unable to work.^[64]

Thailand

India’s relationship with Thailand is vital due to the countries’ shared historical, cultural, and economic ties, as well as their strategic positions in the Indo-Pacific region. Thailand serves as a gateway for India’s Act East Policy, enhancing regional connectivity via initiatives like the IMT-TH. Economically, Thailand is a key trade partner, and stronger ties can bolster India’s engagement with ASEAN, promoting regional integration and economic growth. Strategically, collaboration enhances maritime security and counters transnational threats in the Bay of Bengal and the broader Indo-Pacific. Additionally, robust people-to-people connections, cultural exchanges, and shared goals for regional peace further underscore the partnership’s importance.

The IMT-TH, envisioned as an East-West corridor connecting India’s Northeast with Myanmar and Thailand, remains the same. Strategically, it serves as a key land route facilitating connectivity and economic cooperation between India, Myanmar, and Thailand, later joining Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos (see Figure 4).^[65] Bangladesh has also expressed interest in joining the corridor, which is expected to boost trade and people-to-people ties once operational.

Several segments of the IMT-TH alignment have been completed or are undergoing upgrades. Key developments include the construction of a bypass road connecting Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Thailand, and a second friendship bridge between Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Upgrades are also underway on the Kalewa-Monywa road, while Japan is assisting in building a new bridge in Bago, and the ADB is supporting improvements to the Bago-Kyaikto Road in Myanmar.

Figure 4: The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (with Proposed Extensions)

Source: RIS^[g],[66]

The replacement of 69 bridges along the Tamu–Kyigone–Kalewa road remains a pressing issue. Persistent delays since 2015 led to the termination of the original contract in 2018 due to poor performance. While new contractors have been appointed and work on the first bridge between Moreh (India) and Tamu (Myanmar) is expected to resume, the broader project is stalled amid technical revisions and ongoing security concerns.^[67] Similarly, construction on the Yar Gyi road section—marked by steep gradients and sharp curves—has reached only 25 percent completion. Myanmar’s Trade Minister has noted that converting the 121.8 km-segment between Kalewa and Yar Gyi into a four-lane motorway will take longer than expected, with environmental, political, and security issues causing delays.^[68]

The ongoing war among ethnic groups and the junta continues to cast uncertainty over the completion of key connectivity projects due to security concerns. On another front, India aims to bolster its role in the regional energy sector by enhancing power transmission links with Myanmar and Thailand. These efforts align with India’s Act East Policy and the International Solar Alliance’s One World One Sun One Grid initiative, launched in 2018. However, challenges such as high subsea cable costs, fluctuating raw material prices, and geopolitical tensions, especially within Myanmar—pose obstacles to progress.^[69]

Meanwhile, India has not explicitly indicated direct involvement in the Land Bridge Project. However, its regional investments prioritise infrastructure linking Southeast Asia and India, such as the IMT-TH, focusing more on enhancing road connectivity to support broader trade and geopolitical goals. This contrasts with China’s direct involvement in regional infrastructure projects like the Land Bridge, which is expected to launch in 2025 or 2026.

Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainability

While India’s and China’s infrastructure projects have the potential for regional integration and economic growth, they face various hurdles.

China and India in Myanmar's Evolving Conflict

Myanmar’s investment climate remains volatile due to ongoing conflict between pro-democracy groups, EAOs, and the military, which escalated after the February 2021 coup. Operation 1027, spearheaded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, has placed pressure on the junta, halting numerous infrastructure projects, including the IMT-TH corridor and the Kaladan project—both crucial to India’s connectivity ambitions.

Similarly, major CMEC initiatives, including the strategic Kyaukphyu port and supporting infrastructure,^[h] face considerable delays.

Unlike Western nations that have imposed formal sanctions, China employs a more nuanced strategy to protect its investments. One approach has been the implementation of economic pressure tactics, including the ‘Five Cuts’^[i] strategy, which restricts financial and resource flows to targeted groups to undermine their operational capacity. In response to Operation 1027, China has closed borders and imposed sanctions on Kokang forces in Lashio and EAOs like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), seeking to limit their growing military and economic influence along key trade routes.^[70] With several Chinese investment sites now under EAO and PDF control, Beijing views these developments as threats to its economic and strategic interests. By maintaining relationships with both EAOs and the military regime using its carrot-and-stick approach,^[j] China aims to protect its infrastructure ventures and reinforce its influence in border regions. Since the onset of Operation 1027 and the signing of the Kyaukphyu project addendum, Beijing has been trying to initiate dialogues and peace treaties between the EAOs and the military forces.

In September 2024, the junta made its first attempt at political outreach, emphasising elections as a potential pathway to peace. However, this initiative was widely perceived as a strategic move to alleviate international pressure without requiring meaningful concessions to domestic opposition, most of whom have been banned from contesting or addressing internal grievances.  Resistance forces have rejected the junta’s overtures, emphasising demands such as eliminating the military from politics, adopting a federal Constitution, and holding the military accountable for wrongdoings. A shift emerged in December 2024, when the MNDAA and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) agreed to conduct peace talks with the junta.^[71] The MNDAA subsequently entered into a ceasefire with the military in January 2025,^[k],[72] mediated by China. Despite Beijing having facilitated five rounds of settlements prior, progress remains elusive. While ceasefires with other groups may follow, the long-term effectiveness of these dialogues in resolving the conflict amid Myanmar’s evolving political landscape remains uncertain.

Militarisation of Projects 

In response to the attack on the Chinese Consulate in October 2024, Beijing proposed the establishment of a China–Myanmar joint security company^[l] to safeguard its interests.^[73] A working committee has been formed by the junta to draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for this initiative. This reflects Beijing's waning confidence in the junta's ability to safeguard its investments and personnel. As the military continues to lose ground to pro-democracy forces, Beijing is reinforcing its presence while maintaining financial and military support for the regime.

This joint venture between a Chinese security firm and Myanmar’s junta marks a shift, likely facilitating arms shipments to the military. However, with revolutionary groups controlling key Chinese project sites, the effectiveness of private security forces remains uncertain. Persuading these groups to allow project resumptions without resistance is a challenge. Additionally, closer cooperation under the Global Security Initiative, launched in 2022,^[m] raises concerns about the militarisation of economic corridors and broader regional instability.^[74] To reassure Beijing, the NUG argues that collaboration with revolutionary forces is the only way to guarantee the security of Chinese investments.^[75] While private firms can protect against violence from locals and armed groups, they offer no defence against natural disasters. The 28 March 2025 earthquake exemplifies this challenge, affecting regions with key CMEC projects, particularly in Mandalay,^[n] and further delaying timelines.

Whether China adopts a militarised approach remains unclear, but its expanding security presence in Myanmar raises strategic concerns for India, particularly near the delayed Kaladan project. Bangladesh and Thailand may also view this growing influence as a potential threat to their security interests.

India’s Strategic Shift

Amid Myanmar’s evolving crisis, India is shifting away from its long-standing policy of engaging only with the ruling regime, followed since 1991. Since early 2024, New Delhi has actively engaged with EAOs and the NUG to address security concerns and monitor connectivity projects.^[76]

This shift is crucial for ensuring infrastructure continuity and managing regional security dynamics. Unlike China’s coercive approach, India seeks to position itself as a mediator, emphasising development, inclusive governance, and a federal political framework.

India's stance has been reiterated at various diplomatic forums, including the BIMSTEC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (July 2024), the UN General Assembly (September 2024), the ASEAN Summit (October 2024),^[77] and most recently, the 6^th BIMSTEC Summit (April 2025). Moreover, India has also led relief efforts through Operation Brahma, providing aid and medical support after the recent earthquake, which caused much damage in the Sagaing and Mandalay regions—where IMT-TH projects are underway and may have been impacted.^[78]

India’s limited push for democratic reforms in Myanmar has drawn criticism, with its proactive diplomacy risking a decline in its favourable perception among opposition groups. By actively engaging diverse stakeholders and leveraging its democratic credentials, India can play a more constructive role in Myanmar’s crisis while safeguarding its strategic and economic interests. The success of infrastructure projects will depend on Myanmar's political and social stabilisation. 

Debate on China’s Debt Trap

China's infrastructure lending has sparked global debate about the risks and benefits. Critics highlight concerns about debt sustainability, transparency, and potential sovereignty issues, while supporters argue these projects aid much-needed development. Countries like Sri Lanka and those in Africa have become focal points, each offering distinct case studies.

In Sri Lanka, the leasing of Hambantota Port to a Chinese company, after the country struggled to service its debt, became emblematic of what some term “debt-trap diplomacy”. However, further analysis suggests that Sri Lanka’s economic crisis stemmed as much from domestic mismanagement as from external debt. Meanwhile, China’s debt restructuring practices, including deferrals under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative, have faced criticism for opacity, with undisclosed terms complicating global financial coordination.

Myanmar, heavily reliant on Chinese investments, faces a different challenge. Projects like the Myitsone Dam have faced domestic backlash over environmental and social concerns, leading to their suspension. Following the 2021 military coup and increasing isolation due to Western backlash and ASEAN’s non-compliance with the 5-point consensus, Myanmar’s dependence on China has grown, raising questions about the long-term viability and sustainability of these investments. The junta’s consideration of reviving the Myitsone project underscores this dilemma, where economic desperation outweighs public opposition.

Thailand provides a contrast. With a stronger economy and diversified international partnerships, it has managed Chinese investments more strategically. While engaging in infrastructure projects with China, Thailand maintains leverage by rejecting proposals that jeopardise costs or sovereignty. Regulatory frameworks and robust security measures further ensure balanced foreign engagement.

China has adjusted its approach to address criticisms. Post-BRI 2.0 in 2019 and the third BRI Summit in 2023, recent shifts focus on smaller, greener, and tech-driven projects, such as solar farms and 5G infrastructure, moving away from large-scale endeavours.^[79] These changes aim to reduce risks, align with global sustainability goals, and address corruption concerns.^[80]

India offers an alternative model with demand-driven credit lines. By fostering mutually beneficial partnerships without heavy conditions, India supports infrastructure development while enhancing its trade footprint. However, to compete with China, India must improve project implementation timelines, particularly in critical regions like Southeast Asia.^[81] While the operationalisation of Sittwe is a significant achievement, continuing other projects is crucial to demonstrating its effectiveness.

Concerns Over Environmental Sustainability

Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar and Thailand, primarily under the BRI, have raised notable environmental concerns. In Myanmar, hydropower projects like the Myitsone Dam threaten biodiversity and local food security by disrupting fish populations and displacing thousands of residents near the Ayeyarwady River. Public backlash over these ecological and societal issues led to the project’s suspension, though discussions about reviving it resurfaced in 2024.

In Thailand, China’s dam construction along the Mekong River has disrupted water flow, sediment transport, and ecosystems, endangering fish migration critical to local livelihoods. Proposals to blast river rapids under the Lancang-Mekong project risk irreversible ecological damage. In response, Thai authorities have paused parts of the project, reflecting growing environmental concerns.

China has sought to address such criticisms through frameworks like the Green Investment Principles for the BRI (2018) and the Green Development Guidelines (2021), which emphasise sustainability in overseas investments. Recent efforts focus on “smaller” and “greener” projects, clean energy initiatives, and collaboration with regional frameworks like the Mekong River Commission to mitigate ecological impacts. However, challenges remain in harmonising development goals with environmental protection, managing local resistance, and addressing regional geopolitical tensions.

Indian projects are generally smaller and focus on localised infrastructure improvements. While they have faced criticisms—such as insufficient communication of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) results and limited local involvement, especially concerning the Kaladan project—these concerns are typically less severe than those linked to Chinese initiatives. India's emphasis on diplomacy and people-centric approaches aims to align projects more closely with community needs, though implementation gaps remain. Thus, while both face environmental scrutiny, the scale, nature of concerns, and transparency of processes set them apart.

Proactive Role of India

As geopolitical dynamics in the Mekong region evolve, countries are increasingly aiming to diversify partnerships to avoid over-dependence on any single power. While China’s BRI has cemented its economic dominance, concerns over sovereignty and economic overreach have led nations like Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam to explore alternative collaborations.

India has positioned itself as an alternative partner for development through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) framework, emphasising sustainable and inclusive growth. New Delhi has extended approximately US$1.76 billion in Lines of Credit for projects in infrastructure, digital connectivity, rural electrification, and water resource management.^[82] Its Quick Impact Projects (QIP) initiative addresses local needs by improving physical infrastructure and addressing social challenges like education, sanitation, and women's empowerment. In October 2024, India signed five Memorandums of Understanding with Myanmar under the QIP framework, targeting agricultural development, disaster management, and elementary education with a US$250,000 grant.^[83]

India also provides US$5 million annually through grants under the Border Area Development Program^[o] and the Rakhine State Development Programme in Myanmar.^[84] While these projects have the potential to significantly impact Myanmar’s socio-economic development, the country's political instability remains a major challenge to their implementation, especially with constant airstrikes and wars in these areas. Rakhine State has experienced infrastructure destruction due to both armed conflict and natural disasters in recent years. Between November 13, 2023, and May 13, 2024, the ongoing conflict in Rakhine and the Paletwa region of Chin State resulted in the destruction of approximately 5,849 houses, 19 schools, 13 clinics and hospitals, 55 monasteries, 2 religious buildings, 26 government buildings, and 11 roads and bridges.^[85]

India's relatively lower investment in the Mekong region stems from the absence of a cohesive, government-led investment strategy, unlike the structured approaches of countries like China, South Korea, and Japan.^[86] While Indian companies have shown interest, a lack of coordinated support limits their ability to capitalise on emerging opportunities. To address this gap, the Government of India initiated a study in 2015 through the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) to explore the feasibility of establishing a Project Development and Facilitation Framework (PDFF).^[87] This initiative aimed to identify viable industrial sectors for Indian investments in CLMV countries and outline mechanisms to harness these opportunities. However, the sporadic nature of such efforts underscores the need for sustained and regular studies to ensure their relevance and impact.

To improve its effectiveness in the Mekong region, India must adopt a comprehensive monitoring mechanism to evaluate and oversee its infrastructure projects. Although an ad-hoc monitoring mechanism was introduced in 2009 to oversee its projects with Myanmar, it lacked continuity and has not been consistently pursued.^[88] Establishing a permanent framework, complemented by joint working groups and intergovernmental committees, will ensure better execution and alignment with regional development goals.

India can further solidify its role in the Mekong subregion by tailoring its support to local needs, particularly in infrastructure development, capacity building, and sustainable growth initiatives. By engaging closely with local governments and communities, New Delhi can position itself as a reliable development partner. Moreover, leveraging cultural diplomacy and fostering people-to-people exchanges—areas where India already excels—can enhance its soft power influence and deepen ties with countries like Myanmar and Thailand.

India often pursues a non-interventionist stance, avoiding over-reliance on military or strategic dominance in its infrastructure projects. In contrast, China's initiatives, such as the CMEC in Myanmar, have faced criticism for being overly linked to its geopolitical ambitions, leading to local resistance and sovereignty concerns.

India’s approach centres on sustainable development and regional cooperation, contrasting with China’s often transactional and strategic focus. By leveraging soft power and emphasising inclusivity, India positions itself as a partner for equitable growth in the region.

While China dominates connectivity narratives in Myanmar and Thailand, other stakeholders, such as ASEAN, Japan, and the US, play crucial roles. ASEAN has asserted its centrality, insisting that connectivity initiatives align with its master plan. Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure stands out for prioritising transparency and sustainability, directly countering criticisms of China’s BRI. Japan wants to engage with India in third countries like Myanmar, offering India a meaningful opportunity to invest more constructively. Meanwhile, the US, through its Indo-Pacific Strategy, promotes alternatives to Chinese influence by emphasising private-sector investments over state-led funding.

Conclusion

The evolving connectivity dynamics in Myanmar and Thailand underscore the broader geopolitical contest between India and China, both pursuing strategic and economic goals. While China's BRI and India's Act East Policy have driven infrastructure development and regional integration, challenges persist—including Myanmar’s political instability, environmental concerns, and uneven power dynamics.

Public perception is critical to the success and long-term sustainability of infrastructure projects, and in Myanmar, it remains a challenge for Chinese investments. Various scholars and studies have shown that past controversies—most notably that over the Myitsone Dam—continue to fuel distrust.^[89] For initiatives like the CMEC to succeed, greater social engagement, partnerships with credible local actors, and genuine dialogue with communities are essential. China’s traditional model—loan-driven, contractor-led megaprojects—faces growing resistance, underscoring the need for a more community-centred strategy that Beijing often neglects.

In Thailand, public perception of Chinese infrastructure projects varies by region. Non-border regions tend to see these projects as economic opportunities, while border regions hold more critical views, shaped by issues like land acquisition disputes, environmental concerns, and inadequate community consultation. Despite promises of employment, benefits are uneven, with most jobs going to Chinese workers while local communities remain underpaid or underutilised.

Indian infrastructure projects, though facing challenges, are perceived more positively. In Myanmar, initiatives like the KMMTTP have been criticised over delays, lack of consultation, and environmental impact, leading to localised opposition. In contrast, India-led projects in Thailand, particularly the IMT-TH, are viewed as contributing to regional connectivity and mutual benefit. However, instability in Myanmar has dampened enthusiasm due to prolonged timelines. Despite these setbacks, Indian projects are seen as less intrusive and more focused on long-term benefit, positioning India as a balancing force rather than a dominant power.^[90]

Yet, India must recalibrate its implementation strategy to translate goodwill into tangible results effectively. The contrasting approaches of China's resource-driven, expansive projects and India's people-centric, sustainable initiatives highlight the complexities of development in geopolitically sensitive regions. Collaborative efforts among regional stakeholders, including ASEAN, Japan, and the US, are essential to ensure these projects contribute equitably to the host nations. A balanced, inclusive approach to connectivity can drive sustainable development, fostering peace and stability in Southeast Asia while pursuing the global imperatives of transparency, environmental responsibility, and mutual benefit.

Endnotes

• Neighbourhood
• China
• India
• south Asia
• china bri
• china bri initiative
• china bri projects
• china myanmar relations
• connectivity projects india and myanmar
• connectivity projects india and thailand
• india and indo pacific
• india myanmar relations
• india thailand relations
• india's connectivity projects with myanmar
• india's connectivity projects with thailand
• indian infrastructure projects in myanmar
• indian infrastructure projects in thailand
• trilateral highway project

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