The “total peace” plan of the Petro administration needs an inclusive approach to eliminate all violent activities by the FARC dissidents
On 6 November 2023, the splinter groups that emerged from the disbanded insurgent organisation called the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also called FARC dissidents, pulled out from the peace talks initiated by President Gustavo Petro in 2022. The recent development came in as a massive roadblock to President Petro, who entered the office in August 2022 on the shoulders of a political campaign that promised “total peace”.
The “total peace” initiative of President Petro sought to correct the failures of the 2016 Peace Deal between the Colombian Government and FARC that failed to eliminate the intensity of violent events and criminal activities conducted by FARC dissidents.
But the question that arises is why violence has continued with the same intensity and why the dissidents rose in the first place despite an ambitious peace deal that promised comprehensive reforms for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR).
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia sprang up in the period 1964-71, when the majority of left-wing guerilla organisations like the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Maoist People's Liberation (EPL), etc. rose by weaponising the long-pending woes and grievances of rural and rejected Colombian regions.
Owing to its structure and stable leadership, FARC controlled vast swathes of territory in the regions bordering the Pacific and neighbouring Venezuela. At its peak, the organisation had around 20,000 active members in 2002, unleashing a reign of terror involving murders, forced displacement, abductions and controlling a booming economy of cocaine cultivation.
After decades of efforts to get a peace accord on the table, in 2016, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace came into existence. The international community expected that 52 years of extreme violence that led to 260,000 deaths, over 20,000 kidnappings, and 80,000 missing individuals, would finally come to an end.
However, peace never prevailed, as FARC was a large organisation spread across Colombia and not everyone was happy about the peace deal that involved surrendering without the realisation of their goals.
The “total peace” initiative of President Petro sought to correct the failures of the 2016 Peace Deal between the Colombian Government and FARC that failed to eliminate the intensity of violent events and criminal activities conducted by FARC dissidents.
In 2017, when the FARC insurgent organisation was disbanded, there was peace, but it was short-lived. FARC's disbandment led to a rise of about 30 dissident organisations spread across 85 out of 1,103 counties of Colombia, operating with an intensity equivalent to pre-2016 levels.
The rise of around 30 dissident groups makes it evident that there are several reasons behind the rise of dissidents and the continuity of violence and other illegal activities post-2016 peace deal. The variety of reasons can be broadly classified into two major factors.
Firstly, the state's assumption of considering FARC as a unified entity during the negotiation process was wrong. It was indeed a well-organised cadre-based outfit working under a central leadership. Still, one also has to consider the nationwide presence of FARC cadres, spread across regions. FARC was divided into seven geographical blocs, amongst which the Eastern Bloc had considerable interest in the continuation of FARC's insurgency operation. The Eastern Bloc controlled the region spanning from the Eastern Plains to the Venezuela border, allowing the front to earn a lump sum from cocaine cultivation and human trafficking. When the negotiations in Havana, Cuba, almost reached the final stage, negotiators made it clear that the transition from cocaine cultivation to legal crops was an essential component of the peace agreement. The members of the Eastern Front were among the first to reject the peace process. The Eastern Bloc emerged as the first dissident group called the Armando Rios Front led by Miguel Botache Santillana alias “Gentil Duarte”.
However, it must be noted that the number of FARC members who had surrendered was far more than the number of dissenters in 2017 when the peace deal came into effect. The comprehensive DDRR reforms cited in the agreement prompted almost 6,804 fighters to surrender, 4000 prisoners were granted amnesty and 8,994 weapons were turned in. However, problems emerged when it came to implementing the other chapters of the peace accords, especially the formalisation of land records, the substitution of cocaine with legal crops and most importantly, the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants.
The Santos administration and the current Petro administration adopted a collective approach to solving the crisis by considering the FARC and the dissidents as one collective entity. The “total peace” plan of the Petro administration has been based on the assumption the FARC residents are a collective, which is not the case.
This brings us to the second major reason behind the rise of dissidents post-2016: the inconsistent position of the political leadership with respect to the peace accords and the inability of the State to fill the void. Former President Juan Manuel Santos received a Nobel Peace Prize for concluding the peace accords, and his political determination to implement the accords led to a successful demobilisation process. For the purpose of rehabilitation and reintegration, the Santos government established 26 Transitional Normalisation Concentration Zones (ZVTNs) and seven encampment-sized Temporary Normalisation Zones (PTNs). About 13,608 combatants were registered as demobilised and are waiting for the reintegration process. However, things changed when Iván Duque Márquez became the president in 2018. The peace process went through turbulence in terms of implementation and funding. His party, the Democratic Center (DC), had criticised the peace accords previously. When they came to power, they did not do away with the accords. Still, they lacked the willingness to implement it properly, especially the chapters on land title formalisations. As a result, many former combatants, who were mostly from rural Colombia, wanted to take up farming. However, the government failed to pass the norms for the implementation of Comprehensive Rural Reform (such as adjustments to the Land Law, the Agrarian Jurisdiction, The Public Land Adjustment Service, the Adjudication of Baldíos) and the substitution of illicit crops.
With the central leadership gone and the state never coming back to fill the void, the dissidents took control of ex-FARC operations like insurgency, drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc. These ex-combatants are perceived as deserters and are tracked and murdered by the dissidents, as the government failed to protect them outside the safe enclosed space of ZVTNs and PTNs. There were early warning centres established, but the government was always late to react, leading to the death of 293 former combatants, which acted as a warning for other demobilised combatants to either join the dissidents or face death. The Duque government's lacklustre crop substitution policy led to the continuation of cocaine cultivation, which prompted many rural residents to join the dissidents and earn a hefty amount from the profiting trade of cocaine.
The Santos administration and the current Petro administration adopted a collective approach to solving the crisis by considering the FARC and the dissidents as one collective entity. The “total peace” plan of the Petro administration has been based on the assumption the FARC residents are a collective, which is not the case. They are fragmented, and there is violent infighting among the splinter groups. A regional approach in collaboration with the indigenous and Afro-Colombian activists, who have been the victims of this conflict for decades, is required as only victims can give an accurate picture of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Colombian administration must adopt an inclusive and not a collective approach.
Dev Jyoti is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation
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