Military cooperation between China and Pakistan is extensive and deep. Despite the current political and economic upheaval in Pakistan, it is unlikely to destabilise the Sino-Pakistani military relationship. The depth of the dyadic cooperation between China and Pakistan can be gauged by the fact that Wang Yi, who was China’s erstwhile foreign minister and now director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission (OFAC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), categorically stated that despite the magnitude of Pakistan’s ongoing domestic crisis, Beijing stands firmly
behind Pakistani sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability, and unity. The Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) Senior Leadership as well as the Central Military Commission (CMC), do not view the present crisis as affecting the bilateral relationship. During the
Pakistani Navy Chief Amjad Khan Niazi’s visit in May 2023, Chinese Defence Minister
Li Shangfu stated emphatically that military cooperation stood at the core of the bilateral relationship observing: “The two militaries should expand into new areas of exchanges, create new high points of cooperation to continuously enhance their ability to deal with all sorts risks and challenges, and jointly maintain the security interests of the two countries and of the region”. It may seem audacious that the Chinese see a shared responsibility with Pakistan, despite the current political and economic crisis engulfing the latter, in managing the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). To Beijing, however, it is a no-brainer, Pakistan remains the lynchpin to China’s access to the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf (PG) and indispensable to its military power projection in the IOR.
It may seem audacious that the Chinese see a shared responsibility with Pakistan, despite the current political and economic crisis engulfing the latter, in managing the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Indeed, steadiness is a constant in the Sino-Pakistani strategic dyad. For instance, during the Cultural Revolution (CR) under Mao Zedong’s reign as leader of the Middle Kingdom, the Mao-led leadership literally sealed China’s contact with the outside world. However, the only state with whom the Chinese maintained formal diplomatic ties was Pakistan. Both Beijing and Rawalpindi have evolved in leaps and bounds since, and today, they form a potent dyadic challenge to India. China played a key role in not just aiding the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme by directly transferring the design of a tested device in the late 1980s, it also
supplied Pakistan ballistic missiles such as the M-9 and M-11. These brazen acts of nuclear and missile proliferation by Beijing have compounded the security challenges facing India. Reinforcing this strong nuclear and missile bond is Sino-Pakistani cooperation that extends from the domain of conventional military engagement to space and Missile Defence (MD). The latter two areas, namely space and MD merit close scrutiny.
Space cooperation
The Sino-Pakistani nexus in the space domain covers Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and satellite navigation services. While Beijing has extended cooperation to Pakistan in the areas of space exploration, science, and astronaut training for many years, the Chinese plugged Pakistan into their indigenously-built BeiDou
Satellite Navigation (SatNav) system since 2013, which is China’s equivalent of the American-built Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) network. In 2020, the Chinese Satellite Navigation Office (CSNO) agreed to set up the BeiDou-linked Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) in Pakistan. Space-borne ISR cooperation should significantly enhance the accuracy and penetrability of the Pakistani missile forces to strike targets across India. In a nutshell, the BeiDou SatNav capability should and will augment Rawalpindi’s precision strike capabilities geared towards counterforce attacks. The BeiDou system should also significantly increase interoperability between Chinese and Pakistani forces.
More menacingly, the Chinese recently supplied the Pakistanis with SLC-18 radar system. It is an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) integrated with digital technology, which can search, track, and detect satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) as well as ballistic missiles, and believed to be the first of its kind AESA radar that can operate over an extended range and at low frequency.
Flexibility is the essence of this radar system in that it can contract and expand its tracking range. India had the advantage of comprehensively tracking and detecting missile and other force movements across Pakistan, now Pakistan will have the capability to track not just India’s ballistic missile capabilities but also be equally capable of
making a catalogued prediction of Indian satellite movement in LEO. The data acquired through the SLC-18 AESA radar will not only be utilised by the Pakistanis, but it will also be transferred for China’s use. More worryingly, this decision by the Chinese not only demonstrates Beijing’s capacity to develop cutting-edge technologies but equally transfer it to what the People’s Republic of China (PRC) deems as friendly countries. The SLC-18 is an advanced capability developed by the Chinese, reflecting the deep nexus between Pakistan and its principal strategic patron. In addition to space cooperation, the Chinese and the Pakistanis have also forged a close compact in the area of MD.
The SLC-18 is an advanced capability developed by the Chinese, reflecting the deep nexus between Pakistan and its principal strategic patron.
The Sino-Pakistani MD nexus
Two years ago, the Pakistan Army (PA) acquired the Chinese-made Air Defence (AD) system HQ-9/P called the High-to-Medium Air Defence System Surface to Air Missile (HMADSAM) system from the Chinese. H9-9/P, which is likely to significantly enhance Pakistan’s capability against aerial threats, bringing to the fore another dimension of the collusive threat posed by India’s two largest neighbours. It is part of Pakistan’s
“Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence (CLIAD)”. Some
reports suggest that it is a Chinese variant of the S-300 or at least bears a similarity to the long-range Russian-origin S-300 Surface to Air Missile (SAM). Initially believed to be capable of engaging both missiles and aircraft at a distance of 100 kilometres (kms) with the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) declaring exaggeratedly that it has a potent “single-shot kill probability”, the HQ-9/P is likely only capable of intercepting fixed-wing aircraft at 100 kms and the Radar Cross Section (RCS) to meet this range is not completely known.
Undeniably, India’s task is cut out to develop a countervailing capability to neutralise the SLC-18 and develop a matching capability to take on the Chinese. India will also need to strengthen its missile forces not just in variety, but equally in numbers against both states. Notwithstanding the tumultuous state of Pakistan’s economy and politics today, the current domestic turbulence is transient, whereas the Sino-Pakistani strategic nexus is enduring.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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