Tackling Pakistan’s anti-India security strategy

Last week, Pakistan released its new National Security Policy. It lays down the Pakistani establishment’s vision of the regional security environment and threats to its national security. India figures prominently in the document—a good reminder about Pakistan’s threat perception of its eastern neighbour. The document also mentions that geoeconomics will anchor Pakistan’s geostrategic orientation. However, with dwindling economic fortunes, no connectivity to the Central or South East Asian markets, and mounting debts to China, Islamabad’s geoeconomic ambitions are already a non-starter. So how should the Indian national security establishment respond to the Pakistani security strategy?

Pakistan’s maleficence in Jammu and Kashmir and on the border has kept the Indian security establishment preoccupied.

Since independence, Pakistan’s maleficence in Jammu and Kashmir and on the border has kept the Indian security establishment preoccupied. New Delhi used its conventional military superiority to decisively tackle this challenge, as was seen during the subsequent conflicts in 1965 and 1971. Noticeably, India’s military effort came at the cost of underbalancing military threat from China in the ‘50s and ‘60s.^<1> Nonetheless, Pakistan persisted as a central security concern for India. Both countries’ acquisition of nuclear weapons further complicated the bilateral security dynamics.

Cross-border terrorism and Kashmir

To break through India’s superior conventional capabilities, Pakistan resorted to the policy of bleeding India with ‘thousand cuts’ through sub-conventional warfare. Pakistani military’s active support to separatist insurgencies in J&K and Punjab in the 1980s and activities of anti-India terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) subsequently fostered what Christine C. Fair termed as ‘jihad under the nuclear umbrella.’ With this, Pakistan ensured that the Indian security establishment remains seized of the terrorism problem. When it came to responding to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism, the Indian security establishment has traditionally been risk-averse. Its chief concern was the fear of escalation and nuclear exchange, which India’s military retaliation might have triggered. In the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Indian policymakers seriously considered military retaliation but ultimately decided against it, as narrated by then Foreign Secretary and later National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon.

Pakistani military’s active support to separatist insurgencies in J&K and Punjab in the 1980s and activities of anti-India terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) subsequently fostered what Christine C. Fair termed as ‘jihad under the nuclear umbrella.’

But, as the intensity of the attacks surged in recent years, India has shed its defensive posture, enabled by the political will to take risks. By responding militarily to a terrorist attack through a ‘surgical strike’ (September 2016) and Balakot airstrike (February 2019), the Indian security establishment demonstrated that it is willing to call Pakistan’s bluff on nuclear escalation. The lack of significant response from Pakistan to India’s actions further vindicated India’s calculations. This has now set the template for response to future cross-border terrorist attacks. India’s military response may have had a deterrent effect on future Pakistani actions. In any case, Pakistan-based groups now have to factor in the likely Indian military response in planning future terrorist attacks. But, Pakistan is adept at reinventing its terrorism tactics. This is visible from its shift from a mass-casualty terrorist attack in a major Indian city (2005 Delhi serial blasts, 2006 Mumbai train bombings, and 2008 Mumbai) to attacks targeting Indian security forces (Gurdaspur 2015, Pathankot 2016, Uri 2016, and Pulwama 2019) in bordering regions of Punjab and J&K. This tactic has undergone further change since August 2019, when India administratively reconstituted the state of J&K. Since then, Pakistan’s proxies, utilising the local support networks, have carried out more insidious low-casualty attacks within Kashmir Valley targeting security forces, civilians, religious minorities, and political workers. These infractions are so minor that security agencies are forced to respond locally, without Pakistan facing the heat.

The National Investigation Agency has rightly been cracking down on this hawala network in Kashmir for the last few years.

The Indian security establishment has to factor this new normal in Kashmir now and prepare for it as it threatens to undo India’s gains on the ground in Kashmir post-5 August 2019. To ensure that Pakistan remains on its toes and deterred by Indian actions, India will need to make sure that Pakistan doesn’t evade accountability on terrorist financing. In particular, India will have to continue highlighting at the relevant forums like the Financial Action Task Force the critical role of informal financial channels like Hawala in terrorist financing in keeping alive the vast infrastructure of groups like LeT and JeM. The National Investigation Agency has rightly been cracking down on this hawala network in Kashmir for the last few years. In addition, as Rajesh Rajagopalan has argued, India should continue reiterating its opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to highlight Pakistan’s illegal occupation of the Indian territory of Gilgit Baltistan and get back at China. But even as it maintains a tough posture towards Pakistan’s pathological behaviour, India has an opportunity to give breathing space for the security forces in Kashmir. This can be done by taking political initiatives that can capitalise on its post-August 2019 moves and bolster its position in the long term.

Cyberspace

Besides cross-border terrorism and Kashmir, Pakistan has amped up activities against India in another domain—cyberspace, as evident from the recently scaled-up cyberattacks against Indian computer networks and the propaganda drive on social media platforms. Pakistan-based hackers are no longer engaged in just defacing Indian websites but also launching penetrating malware attacks like ‘ReverseRat 2.0’, which target government officials and computer networks to steal confidential data and disrupt the functioning of critical infrastructure services. India has already strengthened its cyber security by creating new agencies like Defence Cyber Agency to counter such attacks. This will need to be accompanied by an offensive posture—just like Pakistan’s cyber security policy, which has categorically stated that a cyberattack on Pakistan’s critical infrastructure will be considered “an act of aggression against national sovereignty”. It adds that Pakistan will take “appropriate response measures” for such an attack. India must put offensive cyber capabilities at the core of its soon-to-be-launched National Cyber Security Strategy.

Pakistan-based hackers are no longer engaged in just defacing Indian websites but also launching penetrating malware attacks like ‘ReverseRat 2.0’, which target government officials and computer networks to steal confidential data and disrupt the functioning of critical infrastructure services.

The current frigid major power relations offer no early prospect for a global cyber agreement or cooperation. This cyberspace anarchy leaves no option for the nations but to adopt an offensive posture. Accordingly, India needs to strengthen the resilience of its critical infrastructure and prepare for potential China-Pakistan collaboration in cyberspace.

Conclusion

India’s efforts to functionalise a dysfunctional bilateral relationship like Pakistan have not yielded success despite Prime Minister Modi’s repeated efforts for serious outreach. On the contrary, the failure of these efforts has now reinforced the Indian security establishment’s pessimism on dialogue and reconciliation. Moreover, the nature of bilateral security competition and the growing power differential—military, economic, technological, and diplomatic influence—between the two countries imposes limits on the extent to which this relationship can transform. Pakistan may couch its geopolitical ambitions under the banner of geoeconomics, but that won’t change the stark realities surrounding its destabilising role in the region. Until the Pakistani elite and military establishment fundamentally change the policy vis-à-vis anti-India terrorist groups, Kashmir, and moderate its anti-India propaganda, India is unlikely to change its stance.

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<1> Underbalancing is a phenomenon in international relations, where a state is unable to recognise a clear and present danger, or even after recognising the danger responds in paltry and imprudent ways.

• Neighbourhood
• Cyber Security
• India
• Pakistan
• CHINA-PAKISTAN
• cyberattacks
• CYBERSPACE
• Economic
• National Security Policy
• security strategy
• terrorist

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