With China’s occupation of four points along the Line of Actual Control (LaC) three in Ladakh and one in Sikkim at Naku La the Modi government finds surprised and few very good options at its disposal. Due to the geographic spread of the current crisis, the Indian government and the Army are under pressure to respond to the intrusions by the Peoples Liberation Army (Army) or PLAA. Since the stand-off became public in middle of May, there is little analysis what India’s options are at least when it comes to specifically the territory that is in contention and the LaC in general. Beyond New Delhi exhorting Beijing to respect five bilateral agreements concluded in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 in the recent discussions, which ended inconclusively in Chusul-Moldo between the Corps Commanders of the two countries. Possession, as the cliché goes, is nine tenths of the law in that it is easier to keep something than to take it. Waving legal and diplomatic instruments is irrelevant in the face of Chinese occupation of Indian-claimed territory, unless Beijing in a fit of magnanimity and conciliation chooses to adhere to the provisions of the bilateral agreements noted above and pull back its forces particularly in between fingers four and eight in Pangong Tso. The Galwan Valley and Hot Springs in Ladakh are amenable to resolution evident with a limited mutual disengagement involving a reduction of force levels by the armies of India and China. But the stand-off in Naku La in Sikkim persists.
Otherwise New Delhi is staring at the serious prospect of losing territory and acceding to Beijing’s fait accompli particularly in Pangong Tso and more menacingly and potentially acquiescing to Beijing’s claims over the entire Galwan River Valley. These losses might not seem large, but they are likely to become an invitation, if the status quo ante is not restored, for future Chinese tactical adventurism and cumulatively these shallow territorial gains potentially establish the conditions for the Chinese military to launch a war with more ambitious territorial aims. Doklam itself was sufficient strategic warning for the recurrence of the crisis we are witnessing today in Ladakh and Sikkim and the tactical summitry as was witnessed last year in Mamallapuram and the year before at Wuhan are merely palliatives. Their limits stand fully exposed today, because they have done nothing to alter Beijing’ aggressive conduct on the LaC. If anything, these summits may have only counterproductively lulled India into complacency revealing the transient benefits they have brought New Delhi. Despite extensive analysis on the magnitude of the PLAA ingress, which were in any case facilitated due to Indian lapses, New Delhi responses deserve careful attention.
New Delhi is likely to be compelled to revise or terminate its budgetary cutback by 20 percent that it urged the Indian Army (IA) to pursue due to the spurt in violence in Kashmir and along the Line of Control (LoC). A re-think on fiscal belt-tightening and securing tactical gains against the Chinese along the LaC should also be on the table. Although, for the latter, the window is fast closing or completely lost, because the Chinese are likely more alert to the Indian Army doing to them what the PLAA did to India.
Chinese gains in Ladakh are the result of Indian lapses and advantages accruing from being with the first mover. Beyond abandoning the idea of reducing Army expenditure, the government is now staring at the prospect of higher increases in spending for a sustained presence along the LaC mirroring the high level of militarisation along the LoC with Pakistan, because Chinese aggression has rendered fiscal austerity impossible. This would mean a year round deployment of a heavy military presence along the entire stretch of the LaC. This is likely to sunder the economising measures the Modi government is insisting the Army implement as well as the other services. To be sure, amidst the current crisis, the government has acted with alacrity by concluding a Military Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) with Australia, upgrading their 2+2 dialogue from the foreign and defence secretary level to the ministerial level. Although, very important, Canberra and for that matter Washington and Tokyo, close strategic partners of India, do not have any intrinsic interests involving the high stakes that New Delhi does in the current territorial stand-off between India and China.
While one may empathise with the Modi government for being blindsided by the pandemic resulting in the Chinese moving into key strategic position along the LaC left vacant by the Indian Army and continues to be encumbered by the distractions caused by the spread of COVID-19, the buck, however stops with Mr. Modi and his strategic advisory team. It was inevitable that China would trigger a crisis of this kind with or without the global health catastrophe, the latter only rendered it easier.
The only glimmer of optimism for the government vis-à-vis China in the negotiations underway to help secure the PLAA’ withdrawal from contested territory is China’s decision to relent and allow all the agreements dating backing to 1993 and in the letter and spirit consistent with the Summit level discussion held between Modi and Xi at Wuhan and Mamallapuram. As Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated lately, “We have reached one consensus – that both sides have to carry out the previous consensus made by the top leadership so as to avoid escalating a disagreement into a dispute.” Whether this will hold true in the coming weeks and produces a salutary outcome is at best uncertain.
Regardless of the outcome of current negotiations to resolve the stand-off, the Modi government is faced with hard realities – the security and the defence of India’s territorial integrity does not come cheap particularly against motivated adversaries such as China and Pakistan. At one level, he is repeating the same mistake Jawaharlal Nehru made by investing heavily in diplomacy without a significant parallel expansion in military capabilities. Nehru almost doubled defence spending following the 1962 war, amidst considerable economic stress. Not that India faces the same situation today as it did following the debacle of 1962, nevertheless the Modi government has few choices, despite present economic difficulties, but to pursue an upward revision in the allocations for defence, especially if the Army is to ensure the robust defence of India’s frontiers.
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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