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A transitioning global semiconductor supply chain can serve as an immediate incentive for formally establishing an India-Japan-South Korea trilateral.
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The emergence of a multipolar world order is gradually leading to an era of shifting alliances and novel partnerships. In this context, the move towards an India-Japan-South Korea trilateral seems natural, given the mutual ideals shared by all three nations. However, the current geopolitical climate renders the creation of the trilateral particularly relevant and beneficial in one respect: the establishment of a self-sufficient semiconductor ecosystem.
Given their respective strengths within the global semiconductor supply chain, accompanied by growing resentment against the Trump administration’s increasing preponderance with leveraging tariffs as a means of gaining geopolitical leverage, the situation may serve as an opportune moment for all three nations to take advantage of a transitioning global economic order. Though the first meeting of the India-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Policy Planning Dialogue was held on October 21, 2024, the trilateral itself is yet to be established formally. As such, semiconductor cooperation can lay a foundation for the expanding partnership, providing the proverbial fuel to the fire, given its importance in both legacy and emerging technologies.
In a geopolitical environment increasingly dictated by technological innovation, semiconductors have firmly cemented their place as a foundational technology. Consequently, any nation’s progress in emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, 6G, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and electric vehicles relies heavily on its ability to manufacture and procure both legacy and cutting-edge semiconductor chips. In particular, AI chips, arguably the most sought-after and critical piece of technology as of late, are completely reliant on advanced node semiconductors.
While India’s focus is primarily on legacy chips at the moment, Japan and South Korea are targeting both legacy and advanced node chips, with the pursuit of the former being a bid to counter China’s dominance in legacy chip manufacturing. Given the time and capital-intensive nature of the endeavour, mutual cooperation rather than competition would serve as the ideal strategy for the three nations.
Japan has established its position within the semiconductor supply chain, particularly in the fabrication and assembly segments, whether it be in terms of manufacturing, equipment or materials. Japanese firms held about 9 percent market share of global semiconductor production as of 2022. Moreover, in 2021, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) announced its “Strategy for Semiconductor and Digital Industries,” which cites “strategic autonomy” as one of its key tenets. METI’s Semiconductor Revitalization Strategy is all-encompassing, focusing on every segment of the supply chain while promoting research and development (R&D) in future technologies.
On the other hand, South Korea has likewise secured its place as an industry leader, particularly when it comes to memory chips, wherein it accounts for over 60 percent of the global market share (2022), thanks to chaebols such as Samsung and SK Hynix. Since 2021, South Korea has also been working towards enhancing domestic technological capabilities through initiatives such as the “Special Act On The Fostering of National Strategic Technology” as well as the “K-Semiconductor Belt Strategy.” The latter is a US$450 billion undertaking which aims to bolster domestic chip production as well as establish South Korea as a global leader in next-generation chip technologies.
While Japan and South Korea have established themselves as pioneers of semiconductor technology, India is still attempting to establish a foothold in this domain. It aims to do so via its Semicon India Programme, announced in 2021 with an initial investment of INR 76,000 crores (approximately US$9 billion) aimed at developing a foundation for semiconductor manufacturing within the country. Subsequently, a total of ten projects have been announced to date, including with Japanese and South Korean partners such as Renesas and APACT, respectively. Though India is not yet a major player in the global semiconductor supply chain, it holds enormous potential thanks to its demographic dividend.
With the global realignment in semiconductor supply chains initiated by the US and Europe currently underway, accompanied by a growing sentiment of techno-nationalism, all three nations are currently en route to achieving a certain degree of independence across the three major segments of the semiconductor manufacturing process: design, fabrication, and assembly. While India’s focus is primarily on legacy chips at the moment, Japan and South Korea are targeting both legacy and advanced node chips, with the pursuit of the former being a bid to counter China’s dominance in legacy chip manufacturing. Given the time and capital-intensive nature of the endeavour, mutual cooperation rather than competition would serve as the ideal strategy for the three nations.
Despite extensive experience and significant investment in semiconductor manufacturing, both Japan and South Korea suffer from a common pitfall: the shortage of labour and a diminishing skilled workforce. Declining birth rates and a steadily diminishing population have been major causes of concern for both nations. On the other hand, in spite of its lack of comparable experience in the field, this is precisely where India’s strength lies. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), India’s working population (age group 15-59 years) stood at 735 million in 2011. It is further projected to increase to nearly 1 billion by 2036. However, this is also accompanied by an increasing magnitude of unemployment, a situation which will likely be exacerbated in the future. The creation of a trilateral can be accompanied by a formal mechanism for enhanced labour migration and training, enabling all three nations to address their respective weaknesses.
Despite extensive experience and significant investment in semiconductor manufacturing, both Japan and South Korea suffer from a common pitfall: the shortage of labour and a diminishing skilled workforce. Declining birth rates and a steadily diminishing population have been major causes of concern for both nations. On the other hand, in spite of its lack of comparable experience in the field, this is precisely where India’s strength lies.
Furthermore, despite their obvious prowess in manufacturing, neither Japan nor South Korea is a dominant player in semiconductor design. Given that India possesses about 20 percent of global semiconductor design talent, in addition to multiple ongoing initiatives aimed at extensively augmenting the same, furthering cooperation could pay enormous dividends for all three nations. Meanwhile, Japanese and South Korean expertise in semiconductor fabrication and assembly can significantly aid India in addressing gaps within its nascent supply chain. As such, an India-Japan-South Korea trilateral can pay immediate dividends if a certain degree of cooperation and interoperability were to be achieved. This would enable synergising strengths and addressing individual weaknesses, thereby helping achieve mutual resonance in a domain critical for current and future technological innovation.
The American attempt at decoupling technology supply chains from China, followed by retaliation from the latter, has been a major cause of consternation for both Japan and South Korea, particularly when it comes to semiconductors. It is getting progressively more difficult for both countries to manufacture chips in China due to economic pressure from the US. For instance, on August 29, 2025, the US Department of Commerce revoked authorisations for SK Hynix and Samsung, barring them from procuring US semiconductor manufacturing equipment for chip production units in China, causing a subsequent dip in the shares of both South Korean tech giants. On the other hand, both nations are also subject to Chinese retaliation through export controls and other coercive measures. Additionally, incidents such as the protests in Okinawa against US officials have added further resentment among the masses against overbearing Western influence.
Despite their obvious prowess in manufacturing, neither Japan nor South Korea is a dominant player in semiconductor design. Given that India possesses about 20 percent of global semiconductor design talent, in addition to multiple ongoing initiatives aimed at extensively augmenting the same, furthering cooperation could pay enormous dividends for all three nations.
Consequently, the shifting semiconductor supply chain and the accompanying relocation of manufacturing facilities have prompted a sense of urgency amongst both Japan and South Korea, thereby serving as an immediate avenue for initiating an India-Japan-South Korea trilateral. In addition to synergising individual strengths, this will also enable all three countries to limit their dependence on global hegemons and achieve a certain degree of strategic autonomy and leverage within an indispensable technology supply chain. This is especially relevant considering the rapidly growing global demand and competition for AI chips. Furthermore, enhancing trust and interoperability through the pursuit of a common and mutually beneficial cause can lay the foundation for future cooperation in other critical domains such as AI, quantum technologies, robotics, critical minerals, as well as maritime defence and shipbuilding, all of which have been declared as national priorities by the three respective governments.
Prateek Tripathi is a Junior Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Prateek Tripathi is a Junior Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. His work focuses on emerging technologies and deep tech including quantum technology ...
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