4 August turned out to be a devastating day for Lebanon, a country already struggling from economic collapse, food and power shortages and the Covid-19 pandemic along with a lack of strong government, which has been hollowed by corruption and institutional decay. The
mammoth blast at Beirut port after a large storage of ammonia nitrate caught fire caused shockwaves around the world. More than
135 people were killed on the ground, and thousands more were injured along with billions of dollars worth of infrastructural damage to the densely knit city. The images of the aftermath showed a wasteland, earlier known as the Beirut Port, critical infrastructure responsible for running Lebanon, an import reliant country.
The aftermath of the blast was expected, as people took to the streets to protest against the apathy of the Lebanese government and its systems. The rot in the country’s political classes is not new, and neither is political upheaval unheard of. In fact, over the past years Lebanon had become synonymous with its political structures failing to let go of both its colonial past, decades worth of civil war, and its fractured polity which ranges from the rich elites that have held power for over 30 years, to entities such as Hezbollah, backed by Iran, a militia masquerading as a legitimate political entity, finding safety within the country’s systemic failures.
The rot in the country’s political classes is not new, and neither is political upheaval unheard of.
The lack of a strong governmental architecture may not be the fault of Lebanon alone, but the corruption is. Regional interference in Lebanon’s affairs has been a steady fixture. The country’s Muslim population is divided almost equitably between Shias and Sunnis, which unfortunately makes it a rampant playground for the Middle East’s larger conflicts for influence between the Arab world, Israel and Iran. From the 2017 crisis when then Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned his position while in Saudi Arabia to Iran’s use of Hezbollah and Lebanon as a staging ground for the militias’ operations, finances and manpower, the challenges have only gone up in count. It is important to remember here that political crisis at the granular level of a society means increase in patronage for groups such as Hezbollah, as economic and societal despair divides, and creates camps, and weaponises corruption as a tool even further.
The legitimisation of Hezbollah, both in society and politics (Hezbollah holds 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament), not only draws ire of the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on, but Israel, which prior to this incident, was preparing a military pushback after blaming Hezbollah for trying to challenge its sovereignty around the Hard Dov region surrounded by the disputed Golan Heights area, where UN peacekeepers,
including from India, are helping maintain the status quo. The Israeli military also
blamed the group of attempting to attack Israeli military equipment using missiles, heightening the chances of an Israeli counter significantly. Israeli fighter aircraft
inside Lebanese airspace has also become a regular sight.
Political crisis at the granular level of a society means increase in patronage for groups such as Hezbollah, as economic and societal despair divides, and creates camps, and weaponises corruption as a tool even further.
Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, after briefly condoning the events took this tragedy as an opportunity as well, pushing back on Hezbollah’s potential role of storing ammunitions and explosives at the port, and turning the tragedy into an opportunity for anti-Israel commentary. “We might have knowledge of what exists at Haifa’s port (in northern Israel), but not at Beirut’s port,” he
said. Prior to the events of 4 August, Nasrallah had already challenged the economic crisis facing the country and Beirut’s difficulties in getting a
rescue package cleared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and traditional allies in the West, and hedged his bets on China, which has been
negotiating a large cooperation deal with Iran, Hezbollah’s own personal shahs.
“Chinese companies are ready to inject money into this country (Lebanon). If this happened, it would bring money to the country, bring investment, create job opportunities, allow heavy transport and so on. I say to the Lebanese people, there are alternatives,” he
said in a televised speech in June.
It is arguably wiser for the United Nations to play a larger transitional role via dialogue in Lebanon than individual nations.
The fact that foreign states, governments and agencies alike have
stepped forward to help Lebanon, and have made no qualms in admitting that the funds and aid in most cases will be attempted to be distributed and operationalised via the public and aid agencies, and not the Lebanese government, showcases the depth of the problem. President of France, Emmanuel Macron, took a tour of the streets of Beirut, and these scenes were once again a view to the systemic collapse of the country, as the people of the city aired their grievances to a foreign leader, and not Lebanese President Michael Aoun or Prime Minister Hassan Diab, who earlier in a statement
announced fresh elections under public pressure. The fact that the chances of foreign powers such as France, which has close geo-political relations with the likes of UAE, with both Paris and Abu Dhabi having had supported individuals such as Gen. Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan crisis, opens another challenge to a long-term, stable government chosen by the Lebanese people without the interests of others coming into play. While the intentions may be pure, the practice of converting this purity into political autonomy for another state while using one’s own financial resources is paradoxical to the very understanding of international politics itself. Keeping this in mind, it is arguably wiser for the United Nations to play a larger transitional role via dialogue in Lebanon than individual nations.
The above showcases an attempt to highlight in a limited manner that a course-correction for Lebanon will not be easy despite public anger post the 4 August incident. The people’s movement into the streets, challenging security forces and the political classes, is a reminder of the Arab Spring era, which went through many countries in the region beginning in 2010. However, as recent history has shown, these movements had very limited successes, largely due to the spontaneity of people’s anger and mobilisation via social media ultimately not being backed by a strong political alternative in place to fill in the vacuums. Lebanon would do well to transfer its anger into a long-term political reform process, instead of seating or unseating politicians and institutions with no viable alternatives already in play, which in turn will only help strengthen the likes of Hezbollah.
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