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Despite symbolic cooperation, Moscow is unlikely to risk its lucrative defence partnership with New Delhi for Pakistan.
News of Russia’s supplies to Pakistan of RD-93MA engines, which power Pakistani JF-17 Block III fighter jets, has become part of a domestic political debate in India, prompting an emotional backlash in the media. While Moscow is indeed proceeding with these deliveries, including the upgraded variants, this is hardly a new development. Even if, as some critics have levelled, Russia ignored Indian requests to halt these exports, this has been the case since at least 2007. Therefore, the renewed attention to this issue at this juncture merits scrutiny. That said, it is still worth revisiting Russia’s defence engagement with Pakistan to weigh in on its future trajectory.
There should be no illusions about Russia’s intention to sell defence systems to Pakistan. Russian military experts have long argued that Moscow should reconsider its approach to South Asia and reap the benefits of supplying both India and Pakistan with weaponry. The oft-cited argument is that, unlike Russia, other arms suppliers to India, such as the US and France, have been able to sell weapons to both New Delhi and Islamabad while still being preferred over Russian bids during tenders. Meanwhile, the argument goes, Russia has been compelled to restrict itself in the name of “privileges” in its partnership with India.
Beyond Islamabad’s limited purchasing capacity, there are deep-seated concerns over the alignment of Russian and Pakistani regional objectives and the broader “unpredictability” of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the long run.
It is important to consider these arguments in context. This debate dates back to the 1990s when Moscow was on the verge of providing Pakistan with Su-27s. Despite strong lobbying from the foreign ministry and a general warming of Russia-Pakistan political ties, the deal was eventually abandoned. This was followed by further discussions, fuelled by Pakistan’s desire to purchase various defence platforms from Russia, including air-to-air missiles, tanks, stealth frigates, and artillery guns. Most of these Pakistani proposals led nowhere and were blocked by Russia due to Indian objections. What did materialise, however, was the Russian provision of Mi-17/171 dual-use transport helicopters, which were delivered to Pakistan in several batches between 1996 and 2016, as well as four Mi-35M combat helicopters (Refer to Table 1).
Table 1. Russia’s Supplies of Arms to Pakistan (1995-2025) 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
As India has sought to reduce its dependence on Russian-origin military hardware, the “commercialisation” of defence supplies to Pakistan has gained prominence in Moscow. Russian experts estimated in 2019 that Pakistan’s demand for Russian arms could potentially reach US$8-9 billion. What these projections often fail to consider, however, is the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy, which is cash-strapped and reliant on external support. This means that any significant deal would only be viable if Russia were to extend a loan to the Pakistani government. Not only would this alienate a reliable and financially stable partner, but such an arrangement would hardly be beneficial for Russia’s own economic interests, particularly at a time when Moscow itself needs hard currency. Beyond Islamabad’s limited purchasing capacity, there are deep-seated concerns over the alignment of Russian and Pakistani regional objectives and the broader “unpredictability” of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the long run.
In 2007 and 2010, Rosoboronexport reached deals to export 250 RD-93 engines to China, with an option for an additional 400 units and the right to transfer them to third countries, including Pakistan. Following the Russia-Pakistan military cooperation agreement of November 2014, Pakistani officials claimed that they would be able to purchase these engines directly from Russia, expressing interest in training engine specialists there and seeking Moscow’s assistance with the modernisation of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex’s engine-repair facilities. However, there has been no confirmation that Russia has entered into any such arrangement beyond the delivery of engines and spare parts — and even these are exported to Pakistan via China.
Despite China’s efforts to replace the RD-93 with the domestically developed WS-13 engine, both China and Pakistan remain dependent on Russian-made engines, which are regarded as more reliable and durable.
The RD-93 is an export variant of the RD-33 engine used in Russian MiG-29 fighter jets, primarily designed to power the Chinese Chengdu FC-1/Pakistani JF-17 Thunder. The RD-93MA is an upgraded version of the RD-93, offering an increased thrust of 9,300 kg compared to 8,300 kg. While the first two JF-17 variants relied on the RD-93, the enhanced power output of the RD-93MA is geared towards the JF-17 Block III, enabling the aircraft to carry heavier payloads, integrate advanced avionics, and achieve higher speeds. According to SIPRI data, Russia has delivered more than 200 RD-93 engines to Pakistan since 2007 (Figure 1).
Beyond enhanced performance, the supply of Russian engines for China-Pakistan fighter jets is also a matter of reliability. Despite China’s efforts to replace the RD-93 with the domestically developed WS-13 engine, both China and Pakistan remain dependent on Russian-made engines, which are regarded as more reliable and durable. Prominent Russian experts argue that India should view the continued supply of Russian engines for the JF-17 in a positive light, given that New Delhi is well aware of the jets’ capabilities when powered by the RD-93/RD-93MA and can therefore predict their operational performance.
Figure 1. The Schedule of RD-93 Supplies from Russia to Pakistan
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (some figures are estimates)
Another aspect of Russia-Pakistan engagement involves joint military drills, which have become a regular feature. The latest edition of Druzhba counter-terrorism exercise took place in Russia’s Southern Military District from 15 to 27 September 2025. The exercise focused on “drone warfare, fighting in built-up areas and counter-improvised explosive devices.” These exercises have been held regularly since September 2016, with exceptions in 2022 and 2023.
A naval component has also been embedded within the framework of bilateral interactions. In March 2025, the Russian and Pakistani navies conducted the Arabian Monsoon joint exercise in the North Arabian Sea, aimed at “enhancing interoperability and demonstrating a joint commitment to countering common maritime security threats.”
Moscow will continue to engage in limited defence cooperation with Islamabad —including through military exercises and selective arms supplies—within the boundaries accepted by successive Indian governments.
Officials from both sides have also been engaged in regular meetings of the Joint Military Consultative Committee (JMCC), which has convened consecutively for the past seven years, except in 2022. The most recent consultations took place in Moscow in August 2025 and were co-chaired by Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Colonel General Alexander Fomin, and Pakistan’s Defence Secretary, Retired Lieutenant General Muhammad Ali.
Russia’s strategic partnership with India, particularly the close military and technical cooperation, has always constrained Moscow’s defence engagement with Pakistan. Even in times of turbulence and uncertainty, decision-makers in Moscow have recognised that developing substantial defence ties with Islamabad could cost access to the more lucrative Indian market, which generates billions of dollars for Russia.
Curiously, the controversy over the RD-93 engines has resurfaced at a time when the India-Russia defence partnership is back on track, with major items such as the delivery of additional S-400s, potential joint production of S-500 air defence systems, and the Su-57 fighter jet deal high on the bilateral agenda. Russia is unlikely to jeopardise these strategically and commercially significant opportunities with India for the sake of modest gains with Pakistan. That said, Moscow will continue to engage in limited defence cooperation with Islamabad —including through military exercises and selective arms supplies—within the boundaries accepted by successive Indian governments.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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