Introduction

At the India-Russia summit in Goa in October 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi dropped a tactful hint to President Vladimir Putin about Moscow’s shifting priorities in South Asia by referencing a Russian proverb: “An old friend is better than two new ones.”^[1] The allusion was made against the backdrop of emerging Russia-Pakistan engagement, including in the domains of defence and security, as well as the already established strategic bond between Russia and China. Since then, the Moscow-Islamabad connection has continued to expand, covering new areas, reaching higher levels of cooperation, and witnessing more frequent consultations. This increasingly positive growth trajectory is taking shape despite historical animosity during some periods of the Cold War, political and financial fragility in Islamabad, and Russia’s strategic partnership with India, whose importance to Moscow has only intensified post-2022. At the same time, some of these issues continue to impact the scope of Russia’s cooperation with Pakistan, constraining the implementation of signed agreements and future deliberations.

Indeed, the Russia-Pakistan relationship has managed to rise from the ashes several times in history despite the occasional crises. The resurgence of bilateral ties has been determined primarily by external factors—i.e., Soviet/Russian and Pakistani relations with the United States (US) and China. Today this variable remains relevant as Islamabad seeks to diversify relations, relying on Chinese military and security assistance, and financial support from multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), often facilitated by US approval. Moscow, for its part, has been looking to fill the gaps left by the US and has, on several occasions, taken advantage of the tense periods in US-Pakistan relations to heighten its engagement with Islamabad.

This paper will trace the factors that have shaped the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement, explain the possible reasons for Moscow’s sustained bet on building a comprehensive dialogue with Islamabad, and identify the new drivers of bilateral engagement that have emerged after February 2022. It also explores the potential repercussions of the growing Russia-Pakistan cooperation for Indian interests and New Delhi’s relationship with Moscow.

A Historical Overview

Throughout the Cold War, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-Pakistan relations^[a] were overshadowed by the burgeoning Indo-Soviet relationship, which proved resilient in various geopolitical flashpoints. It would be wrong to say that Moscow, despite prioritising relations with New Delhi, has completely overlooked Islamabad in its South Asia policy. Even when Pakistan was a member of the US- and UK-led military-political blocs such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), it saw Russia as an emerging economic partner. In the 1960s, even after the “U-2 crisis”,^[b] Moscow and Islamabad developed their ties through the 1964 agreement on the supply of Soviet agricultural equipment and the 1966 agreement on economic and technical assistance, paving the way for projects in energy, agriculture, and communications.^[2] In 1968, two years after brokering the Tashkent peace agreement between India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union exploited the cooling of the US’s approach to Islamabad by providing Pakistan with T-54 and T-55 tanks, Mi-8T helicopters and towed artillery.

The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation greatly altered the geopolitical landscape of South Asia. For the next two decades, it prevented any defence interaction between the USSR and Pakistan, with Moscow perceiving the region entirely through Indian optics.

Even after finding themselves in an adverse geopolitical environment and on opposite sides of strategic blocs, the USSR and Pakistan maintained economic and technical cooperation, as exemplified in the decade after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.^[c] The largest and most successful bilateral project was the 1.1 million tonne per annum steel plant in Karachi, built with more than US$600 million in Soviet loans and completed in 1985. The plant supplied more than two-thirds of Pakistan’s iron and steel needs, creating new jobs and stimulating the development of related industries. The project’s importance to the Pakistani economy led to swift follow-up negotiations to modernise the plant and increase its capacity to three million tonnes of steel per year, resulting in a new intergovernmental agreement in 1989.^[3]

The 1990s saw a mixed dynamic in bilateral relations. On one hand, Moscow cosied up to Pakistan politically. The December 1991 visit of Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, a former pilot shot down by a Pakistani F-16 in 1988 and a survivor of imprisonment, was aimed at securing the release of Afghan war hostages.^[4] This was followed by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s visit to Islamabad in April 1993, which resulted in the initialling of the Treaty on Principles of Bilateral Relations and the establishment of a working group on the release of former Soviet servicemen from Afghan captivity.^[5]

There were different, and sometimes conflicting approaches to a new Asia policy in Moscow, including a split between different policy-making groups over whether to maintain cooperation with India or promote relations with Pakistan.^[6] In addition, political ties with Pakistan were complicated by the “Chechen factor” and Islamabad’s support for the Afghan Taliban.^[d]

Further economic cooperation struggled due to Russia’s difficult financial situation, which forced Moscow to cut back on many projects in Pakistan. In addition, Russian companies lost government support and faced increased competition from Chinese firms, which offered more favourable construction terms. Pakistan’s growing orientation towards, and even financial dependence on, Western countries was another factor limiting cooperation.

There were a few exceptions to the otherwise dwindling trade and economic cooperation. Russian companies were involved in the establishment of an electric lamp factory and a tractor assembly plant. Additionally, Russia’s Technopromexport, under an intergovernmental agreement, assisted in the construction and modernisation of the Multan Thermal Power Plant, which has a total capacity of 630 MW. Another example was a US$8-million agreement signed in 1996 to bring Pakistan’s BADR-2 satellite into orbit, which was fulfilled five years later when it was successfully launched from Baikonur by a Russian Zenit-2 carrier rocket.^[7]

Official exchanges at the turn of the century were perceived differently in Moscow and Islamabad. While Pakistani scholars and the media often described the summits as “a new era”^[8] in relations, Russian views were more reserved and critical of the pace and content of the bilateral dialogue.

The official visit of the then President General Pervez Musharraf to Russia in February 2003 and his negotiations with Vladimir Putin had produced no results. Even a tempting offer from Islamabad to provide Russia with “access to warm seas”^[9] went unheeded by the Russian side.^[10] In April 2007, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov paid a visit to Pakistan, making it the highest-level official visit to the country since the 1968 trip by the then Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin. Regardless of symbolism, the relationship lacked a solid basis for progress. The memoranda signed during the meetings were indicative of good intentions; however, they failed to lead anywhere. 

A Pivotal Period 

The rapprochement between Russia and Pakistan dates back to the early 2010s. As in the past, it appears that Moscow viewed the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent crisis in US-Pakistan relations as an opportunity to step in. As a result, Russia has not only intensified its coordination with Pakistan regarding the Afghan settlement, but also embarked on a new course of bilateral defence cooperation.

Two events are perceived as “breakthroughs”^[11] in the Russia-Pakistan relationship. The first is the quadrilateral initiative (Dushanbe Four), which brought together the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan between 2009 and 2011. Starting with the meeting in Dushanbe, these summits helped foster an environment “conducive to expanding cooperation between Russia and Pakistan,” as evidenced by “the establishment of more frequent and confidential high-level interactions.”^[12] The quadrilateral format focused mainly on security issues such as fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, with a geographical focus on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In 2011, the leaders also discussed several economic projects, including the Central Asia – South Asia Electricity Trade and Transmission Project (CASA-1000)—in which Moscow was prepared to invest US$500 million—and the construction of a railway line connecting Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan.^[13] However, the quadrilateral cooperation ended abruptly when President Putin decided to skip the Islamabad summit in October 2012. Even though the letter sent from the Kremlin to the then President Asif Zardari did not explain why the visit had been cancelled, this was perceived as a “diplomatic setback” for Pakistan, which had pinned high hopes on Putin’s visit to formalise “the silent reset” in bilateral relations.^[14] Throughout the history of diplomatic ties, Soviet and Russian leaders have never visited Islamabad, which has considerably limited the relationship. As then Russian Ambassador to Pakistan, Alexey Dedov explained in 2016, this is partly due to “a lack of substance” in the bilateral agenda, which has been missing despite the “preparation of plans” for expanding cooperation.^[15]

A second flashpoint in Russia-Pakistan relations emerged in 2014. Some experts believe that the rapprochement between Moscow and Islamabad occurred within the context of Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West, following the Ukraine crisis, and the ensuing need to explore relationships in Asia.^[16] Others argue that, owing to uncertainty surrounding the US’s and NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as intertwined interests in tackling terrorism, organised crime, and drug trafficking, Russia could not ignore threats facing and emanating from Pakistan.^[17] In any case, 2014 was marked by an intensification of military and security dialogue between the two countries.

Overtures in Defence Ties

As early as October 1991, even before the formal dissolution of the USSR and a bilateral agreement on the main principles of bilateral cooperation, Islamabad requested Moscow to consider the sale of US$3 billion worth of defensive weapons and spare parts to Pakistan.^[18] In 1992, Russia was on the verge of signing a contract with Pakistan for the supply of Su-27 fighter jets, with the Foreign Ministry having approved the proposal. The military-industrial complex, however, managed to persuade the president at that time, Boris Yeltsin, that a one-off arms sale to Pakistan would ultimately cost Russia the huge Indian market.^[19]

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, some Russian officials and experts supported the idea of supplying Pakistan with military equipment and technology. The establishment of military-technical cooperation with Islamabad was regarded as “promising” and in line with “Russian national security interests.”^[20] Pakistan expressed its willingness to make large-scale military purchases from Russia—ranging from fighter jets and attack helicopters to air-to-air missiles, tanks, stealth frigates and artillery guns—and even considered the possibility of importing some of these platforms through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries,^[21] although this intention has largely remained unfulfilled. Russia has prioritised India as the most important market for its arms and was cautious about providing Pakistan with military equipment. The only exception was the 1996 agreement to supply 12 Mi-17 military cargo helicopters, supplemented in 2002 by a contract for a further 12 Mi-171 helicopters.^[22]

Islamabad was reluctant to import the Russian defence systems from CIS countries because, in most cases, they were unable to ensure sufficient servicing and spare parts supply. The key factors in favour of Pakistan’s 1996-97 deal with Ukraine for the purchase of 320 T-80UD tanks were the competitive price and the latter’s ability to provide maintenance and support, including the provision of engines for these tanks.^[23]

While there has been little headway in expanding military ties since then, unlocking the potential of Russia’s defence ties with Pakistan has been the subject of debate in the Russian expert community. There have been a number of arguments as to why Russia should arm Pakistan. For one, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was believed that Moscow should be interested in a genuine balance of power in South Asia, which was heavily tilted in India’s favour, to prevent Pakistan—in the context of the US embargo on military supplies—from betting on the further development of nuclear weapons and the deployment of their delivery systems.^[24] Second, the idea was attractive because the Russian military-industrial complex was among the few industries whose production remained competitive in global markets and could bring more foreign currency into the country.^[25] Despite the developing relationship and murmurs from a section of experts and practitioners about the need to explore defence cooperation, between 1996 and 2010, Russia exported only Mi-17 dual-use helicopters to Pakistan, albeit in large numbers—reportedly from 30 to 70 machines.^[26]

Russia’s strategic partnership with India, in which military-technical cooperation takes a special place, has always been a constraint on Russia’s defence ties with Pakistan. In March 2010, following talks with the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Putin stated: “I would like to stress that Russia does not pursue military-technical cooperation with Pakistan, taking into account the concerns of [our] Indian partners.”^[27] When asked by Indian journalists in October 2012 on Moscow’s plans to send arms to Pakistan, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin seconded Putin’s statement: “[Russia is] always cooperating with India to ensure safety of the region. We [have] never created trouble for India in the region as compared to other countries. If someone says otherwise, spit in his face.”^[28] However, the subsequent years saw an increase in Russian-Pakistani military interactions, including the sales of military equipment.

Building on the growing momentum of political consultations on Afghanistan and the rift in US-Pakistan relations,^[e] the preliminary contacts between the two militaries started in 2011-2012. This process started with the visit of the Russian Army Chief of Staff, Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, to Pakistan in May 2011, wherein he met with the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Khalid Shameem Wynne. These meetings were followed by Gen Kayani’s visit to Moscow in October 2012, which proceeded as planned despite Putin’s cancelled trip to Islamabad. The discussions focused on the potential expansion of defence ties through joint military exercises, the exchange of trainees and trainers, and Pakistan’s purchase of Russian arms.^[29]

Bilateral defence ties culminated in November 2014 with the visit of the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, to Islamabad—the first of its kind in more than four decades—and the signing of a military cooperation agreement. That same year, Russia announced the imminent delivery of military equipment to Pakistan, a move that was widely reported as “the lifting of an embargo.”^[30] In reality, all the Russian restrictions on arms sales to Pakistan were never part of any legal embargo and were largely self-imposed out of sensitivity to Indian security concerns.^[31]

Since 2014, Russia’s military sales to Pakistan have been relatively limited, with deliveries not exceeding 4 Mi-35M helicopters, a batch of Mi-171 convertible helicopters, and 52 9K129 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile weapons systems. Given Pakistan’s restricted financial resources, the driving factors behind Russia’s willingness to engage in defence cooperation are not entirely evident.

Moscow’s overture to Islamabad can be primarily attributed to a number of factors. In addition to Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, Russia appears to have reacted to the growing engagement between the US and India, seeking, apparently through signalling, to discourage New Delhi from getting too close to Washington.^[32] These efforts were reinforced by the military establishment’s desire—in response to India’s diversification efforts—to emerge as an arms exporter to both India and Pakistan, similar to that of France and the United States. As Russia has suffered a series of painful setbacks^[f] in the Indian defence market, Russian military experts have begun to doubt the relevance of “privileges” in the India-Russia equation. This resentment over India’s choices has also led to more regular questions: first, if other Indian partners, such as France, are allowed to export arms to both Russia and Pakistan, why should Russia limit itself in not entering the Pakistani market; and second, if India does not see Russia as a primary provider of arms imports and declines Russian bids, why should Russia not offer the same weapons and equipment to Pakistan?^[33] Finally, there has been a sense that Pakistan needs Russia as a source of diversification with a supply shortage from the West and a looming dependence on imports from China.

Over the years, Islamabad’s claims about Russia’s supplies of advanced weaponry have been a bluster aimed at pinpricking India and driving a wedge between Moscow and New Delhi. One might recall how, in February 2021, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa shared with the media that Russia and Pakistan had signed contracts “for the supply of anti-tank systems, air defence equipment and small arms.”^[34] These “contracts”, however, never materialised. To be fair, Moscow has also fuelled speculations by suggesting the possibility of sending military supplies to Pakistan. During his visit to Islamabad in April 2021, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed Russia’s “readiness to continue providing assistance [in] strengthening Pakistan’s counterterrorism capability,” including by supplying “relevant equipment.”^[35]

For Pakistan, military cooperation with Russia, no matter how embryonic, has been a bargaining chip in its deteriorating relations with the US. Russia-Pakistan military interactions are progressing alongside troubles in the US-Pakistan dialogue in the same field. For instance, the 2018 MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) on naval cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad, which allowed the Pakistani servicemen to undergo training at Russian military educational institutions, was signed at the same time as the Trump administration’s decision to halt US military exchange programmes with Pakistan.^[36]

It is also important to take China into account. Beijing has played a limited role in facilitating Russia’s engagement with Pakistan. However, due to China supplying its FC-1/JF-17 fighter jets to Pakistan, the latter has become dependent on Russian RD-93 engines. According to the 2007 Russia-China agreement, Moscow granted Beijing the right to re-export the engines to third countries, including Pakistan.^[37] Following the Russia-Pakistan military cooperation agreement of 2014, Pakistani officials claimed that they would be able to purchase RD-93 engines directly from Russia, revealing plans to order up to 150 of them. However, this information has not been confirmed since then.

The war in Ukraine has loomed over the potential of Russia-Pakistan military cooperation. Although Islamabad has consistently abstained on the issue at the global level in an attempt to follow “strict neutrality”, the Pakistani Army reportedly supplied ammunition to Ukraine.^[38] While the Pakistani government on several occasions rejected the claims about alleged arms exports intended for the Ukrainian Army, there were reports regarding leaked documents stating that Pakistan supplied arms to Ukraine “in return for the bailout (…) by the International Monetary Fund in a deal brokered by the United States.”^[39] Between February and March 2023 alone, Pakistan reportedly supplied Ukraine with around 172,000 122mm rounds for BM-21 ‘Grad’ systems and 60,000 155mm howitzer shells.^[40] Moscow’s reaction to these reports has been uncertain. In August 2023, the Russian Ambassador to India, Denis Alipov, stated that this information had been “taken seriously” and that, “if confirmed”, it would constitute a “very explicit anti-Russia action” that “Russia cannot ignore.”^[41] However, further comments from Moscow suggest that Russia has downplayed the reports as “unverified” and continues to regard Pakistan’s stance on the war in Ukraine as “independent” and “neutral.”^[42]

In an indication of sustained military cooperation, Russia and Pakistan have continued to conduct joint military exercises since 2022. The ‘Druzhba’ (Friendship) counter-terrorism drills have been held seven times between 2016 and 2024. The first iteration of these drills raised hackles in New Delhi. Held from 24 September to 10 October 2016, the exercises took place shortly after the Uri terrorist attack, prompting India to launch “surgical strikes.” An even bigger source of interest for India was the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that the exercise would take place at two locations: the Cherat base in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the Army High Altitude School in Rattu, Gilgit-Baltistan^[43]—a territory claimed by India as part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. It was only after New Delhi shared its “well-known sensitivities” with Moscow that the Russian Embassy in New Delhi issued a statement promising that the drills would not be held in any “sensitive or problematic areas.”^[44]

In addition to anti-terrorist drills, Russia and Pakistan have participated in regular bilateral naval exercises called ‘Arabian Monsoon’ since 2014. These exercises focus on combating criminal groups and countering drug trafficking. There are also several multilateral exercises, which include the Pakistan Navy’s ‘Aman’ exercises, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) ‘Peace Mission’, and a series of drills hosted by Russia before the war in Ukraine (see Table 1).

Table 1. Russia’s Military Exercises with Pakistan (2014-2025)

Date	Drills Code Name	Location	Type
October 2014	Arabian Monsoon	North Arabian Sea	Bilateral
December 2015	Arabian Monsoon	North Arabian Sea	Bilateral
September-October 2016	Druzhba	Cherat, Pakistan	Bilateral
February 2017	Aman	North Arabian Sea	Multilateral
September-October 2017	Druzhba	Karachay-Cherkessiya, Russia	Bilateral
August 2018	SCO Peace Mission	Chelyabinsk, Russia	Multilateral
October-November 2018	Druzhba	Pabbi, Pakistan	Bilateral
December 2018	Arabian Monsoon	North Arabian Sea	Bilateral
September 2019	Tsentr	Orenburg, Russia	Multilateral
October 2019	Druzhba	Krasnodar, Russia	Bilateral
September 2020	Kavkaz	Astrakhan, Russia	Multilateral
November 2020	Druzhba	Tarbela, Pakistan	Bilateral
February 2021	Aman / Arabian Monsoon	North Arabian Sea	Multilateral / Bilateral
September 2021	SCO Peace Mission	Orenburg, Russia	Multilateral
September-October 2021	Druzhba	Krasnodar, Russia	Bilateral
October 2024	Druzhba	Pabbi, Pakistan	Bilateral
February 2025	Aman	North Arabian Sea	Multilateral
March 2025	Arabian Monsoon	North Arabian Sea	Bilateral

Source: Author’s own

Afghanistan as a Place for Divergence and Coordination

The tense situation in Afghanistan has been the primary focus of Russia’s regional policies. During the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Russia and Pakistan were on opposite sides of the Afghan crisis due to Pakistani support for the Taliban movement. By contrast, in the same period, New Delhi and Moscow supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and provided logistical and material assistance and limited military support. Moscow’s main concern over the Afghan situation has always been to prevent the spill-over effect of insecurity and instability on its territory. United in their stance against terrorist groupings, Moscow and New Delhi acted against the Taliban and, as a result, shared common ground regarding Islamabad’s role in the region.

The situation began to change in the early 2010s with the decline of US power in the region—especially in Afghanistan—and the shift in Russian foreign policy approaches towards South Asia. Since then, Russia’s rapprochement with Pakistan has revolved around the Afghan issue and overall regional security.

Over the past decade, Russia’s diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Afghan crisis, whether through the ‘Moscow format’ or the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, have consistently recognised Pakistan’s importance in regional affairs. In some cases, Russia’s cooperation with Pakistan has come at the expense of its relations with India. For instance, in 2016, when Russia was considering a regional format for discussions on the Afghan settlement, many Indian experts voiced serious concerns about the decision to consult China and Pakistan on the matter, fearing that an emerging trilateral alliance might exclude India from Afghanistan.^[45] At that time, Moscow viewed Pakistan as a key player in regional security and the resolution of the Afghan crisis. This was reflected in the words of Zamir Kabulov, the presidential representative for Afghanistan: “We understand India’s concerns, but we can’t win the war on terror without Pakistani support.”^[46] From 2019 to 2021, Pakistan was part of the ‘extended troika’ format on Afghanistan, alongside the US, Russia and China.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, Moscow and Islamabad have remained in close sync regarding their approaches to Afghanistan. Since September 2021, informal discussions have taken place between China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia, who have joined forces to criticise the US and its allies for the situation in Afghanistan and oppose the re-establishment of “military bases in and around Afghanistan.”^[47] The quadrilateral consultations have taken place on the sidelines of multilateral forums such as the SCO and the United Nations General Assembly. Moscow’s initiative to include India and convene a G5 core group comprising China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia to forge a “regional consensus” has failed due to Pakistan’s objection.^[48] Although the four countries appear united in their views that “NATO members should bear the primary responsibility” for the current situation in Afghanistan,^[49] discrepancies in their respective approaches to building cooperation with the Taliban have limited the efficiency of quadrilateral meetings.

While Pakistan had provided logistical, military and political support to the Afghan Taliban for years and was seen as a beneficiary of their return to power in Kabul, the relationship between Islamabad and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has become tense, spilling over into an open conflict with mutual cross-border attacks. Meanwhile, Moscow has continued to nurture relations with the Taliban, even removing the grouping from its national list of terrorist organisations in April 2025. This decision has been viewed by some in Islamabad as “troubling” and a “disregard for the views and concerns of neighbouring countries”, including Pakistan, which has called for “stronger action” against the Afghan Taliban for supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).^[50] Pakistan has also responded cautiously to Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government, neither criticising nor welcoming the move.^[51] Differences in approach towards the Afghan Taliban and building relations with the IEA appear to be a looming fault line between Moscow and Islamabad, even though they continue to exchange views on Afghanistan and regional security regularly.

The Institutionalisation of Bilateral Ties

Despite the political turmoil in Islamabad, bilateral dialogue has remained intact since 2022. In a historical coincidence, Imran Khan—the first Pakistani prime minister to visit Russia in 20 years—found himself in Moscow on the day the Russian ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine was launched.

Subsequently, Vladimir Putin has held three meetings with Pakistani prime ministers on the margins of multilateral summits. He engaged in talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the SCO Heads of State meetings in Samarkand and Astana in September 2022 and July 2024, respectively. Additionally, he held a meeting with the acting Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar at the Belt and Road forum in Beijing in October 2023 (see Annexe, Table 2).

The bilateral agenda has been promoted through the meetings of the inter-governmental commission (IGC),^[g]  co-chaired by the energy ministers, which focuses on addressing the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in trade, energy, transport infrastructure, science and technologies. Following a pause in 2022, the bilateral IGC sessions were held in both 2023 and 2024.

At a lower level, regular mechanisms have been established to institutionalise bilateral interaction. These include the working group on counter-terrorism and other security challenges,^[h] as well as the consultative group on strategic stability,^[i] which looks into issues such as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. There is also an annual format of political consultations between deputy foreign ministers, who review the state of the relationship and identify potential areas for cooperation.

Since 2018, the two sides have maintained the meetings of the Joint Military Consultative Committee (JMCC), which addresses bilateral defence cooperation, as well as the regional security issues such as the situation in Afghanistan. After a hiatus in 2022, the JMCC resumed its activities, convening consecutively in 2023 and 2024.

Furthermore, bilateral ties at the parliamentary level have been moving forward. This was reflected in the visit to Islamabad by a delegation from the Russian Federation Council (the upper house of parliament),^[j] which, in addition to meetings with representatives of the Pakistani Senate and the caretaker government, also acted as international observers at the country’s general elections in February 2024.^[52] In October 2024, there was an exchange of visits: first, a Russian parliamentary delegation led by Valentina Matvienko, the Speaker of the Federation Council, visited Islamabad; then, Pakistan’s delegation led by Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, Speaker of the National Assembly, visited Moscow. These visits resulted in the signing of MoUs with the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan, respectively, paving the way for the intensification of parliamentary diplomacy.

The frequency of high-level discussions between Moscow and Islamabad demonstrates a commitment from both parties to maintain regular dialogue. However, while these meetings have provided an opportunity to exchange views on various topics, they have not yielded practical results.

Russia’s Shifting Approach to Kashmir and India-Pakistan Dynamics

While the Soviet Union consistently backed India on Kashmir at the United Nations throughout the Cold War, Moscow’s stance became more ambiguous following outreach from Islamabad in the early 1990s. New Delhi’s confidence in Moscow’s support was shattered after the visit of a Russian delegation to Islamabad in December 1991. The joint communiqué following the talks mentioned “the deteriorating human rights conditions in Kashmir” and also stated that “the Russian side acknowledged Pakistan’s position [on the dispute] and expressed hope that the issue would be resolved peacefully through negotiations between Pakistan and India on the basis of international agreements.”^[53] Indian observers and officials could not ignore the fact that for the first time Moscow referred to “international agreements”—failing to mention the Simla Agreement—and acknowledged the existence of a human rights problem.^[54] President Yeltsin, during his trip to India in January 1993, attempted to dispel Indian doubts by saying that Russia “supports India’s position on Kashmir firmly and unwaveringly.”^[55] However, two months later, during an official visit to Pakistan, Foreign Minister Kozyrev expressed a more neutral position on Kashmir, stating that Russia favoured a solution “without taking any side.”^[56]

By the end of the 1990s, Moscow began to support India’s stance more consistently but did not rule out a mediatory role between India and Pakistan, if both would demand it. In June 2002, amidst high tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, President Putin launched a mediation effort by inviting Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf to Moscow for talks after holding separate meetings with each of them in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Putin expressed hope that the talks in Moscow would facilitate possible measures “not only to ease the growing conflict [between India and Pakistan], but to move away from confrontation in general.”^[57] While Islamabad accepted the Russian proposal, New Delhi rejected this idea. Notwithstanding, the Russian media reported that Putin had acted as a “mediator and peacemaker.”^[58] Curiously, as the United States was making diplomatic moves to defuse the crisis in India-Pakistan relations, the issue came up in Putin’s phone conversation with then US President George W. Bush, who “praised [the Russian president’s] efforts” and agreed to work together to de-escalate the tensions.^[59] Putin’s mediation efforts were followed up a year later by the then Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, who paid consecutive visits to Islamabad and New Delhi in June 2003.

A similar episode of Russia’s mediation proposal took place in 2019, following the Pulwama terror attack and the exchange of airstrikes between India and Pakistan. In response to the tense situation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not exclude Moscow helping to mediate between the two countries and providing the venue for their talks. This “offer” was accepted by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, who expressed readiness to discuss the settlement, with Moscow’s assistance.^[60] India, in contrast, stated that the mediation issue was a “fiction” and that the two sides would manage without any intermediaries.^[61]

Russia’s reaction to the Indian government’s decision to revoke Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and change the administrative status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has not been clearly communicated. On one hand, Russia was the first UNSC member to back India’s decision, which was mentioned during the Foreign Ministry’s press briefing as a move “within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of India.”^[62] On the other hand, Moscow chose not to block Beijing’s proposal to hold closed-door consultations on the Kashmir issue, which were brought onto the UNSC agenda for the first time since 1965.^[63]

Russia’s response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April 2025 in many ways showcased the extent to which Russia has become a neutral party. Coincidentally, on the same day the attack happened, Moscow hosted the Russia-Pakistan working group on counter-terrorism, where the two sides “confirmed the proximity of key approaches in the fight against terrorism.”^[64] And on 23 April, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko co-chaired inter-ministerial consultations with the Pakistani Special Secretary Shafqat Ali Khan and highlighted “positive dynamics of [bilateral] cooperation and prospects (for) trade, economic, humanitarian, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and security spheres.”^[65]

Russia’s official reaction to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam was communicated through the Russian Embassy in New Delhi, first in the statement by the Ambassador Denis Alipov and later as a letter from President Putin. It took more than 10 days for the phone conversation between the Russian and Indian foreign ministers to take place. Moscow has expressed its usual diplomatic stance calling for “the settlement of differences between New Delhi and Islamabad through bilateral political and diplomatic means in accordance with the provisions of the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration.”^[66] However, in his conversation with the Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Lavrov offered Russian good offices “to facilitate a political settlement of the situation, if Islamabad and New Delhi are mutually willing.”^[67] On 5 May 2025, Putin phoned Modi “to reiterate his sincere condolences over the loss of Indian lives in the barbaric terrorist attack in Pahalgam” and emphasise “the need for an uncompromising fight against terrorism in all its manifestations.”^[68]

Overall, while generally supportive of India’s positions on Kashmir, Russia has expressed concern about the potential escalation of the regional situation. Its growing cooperation with Pakistan has arguably made Moscow too neutral an observer, neither openly backing New Delhi’s case, nor able to exert influence on Islamabad. Post-Pahalgam, Moscow did not question Islamabad for supporting cross-border terrorism, but instead emphasised the prominence of the Russia-Pakistan relations.

While the Russian authorities used to frequently request that Islamabad “fulfil its obligations in neutralising militant extremist organisations in Pakistan,”^[69] over the past decade, Russia has adopted a much more diplomatic approach to the issue, presumably to avoid offending its partner. A comparison of Moscow’s statements following the Pahalgam attack with those after the Uri terrorist attack in 2016 is quite revealing. In the case of the former, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed concern that “according to New Delhi, the army base near Uri [had been] attacked from Pakistani territory”^[70] and hoped that “the Pakistani government [would] take effective measures to stop the activities of terrorist groups.”^[71] The then Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakin, was even more forthright, stating that “terrorists and bandits came from Pakistan, from Pakistan territory”^[72] and that “any country has the right to defend itself from such kind of transborder terrorism.” In both 2019 and 2025, this kind of overt support for New Delhi was absent from the Russian official position.

From an Indian perspective, Moscow’s inconsistent statements on Kashmir in recent years have created space for misperceptions and growing doubts that Russia’s support has turned somewhat ambiguous and lukewarm.^[73]

The Role of the SCO

Pakistan joined the SCO as an observer state in 2005, alongside India and Iran. Russia supported Islamabad’s interest in accession to the organisation for two reasons. First, in the era of the global war on terror, Moscow realised that security threats emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border could seriously impact Russian security. Second, in the same year, Russia secured Pakistan’s support for its observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League. From the outset, Pakistan was keen to become a full member of the organisation, viewing this as an opportunity to strengthen its international standing by fostering multilateral connections across Eurasia, reducing its dependence on the West, improving relations with Russia, and marketing its port facilities to Central Asian states for trade and commerce.^[74]

In retrospect, Pakistan’s commitment to contributing to the SCO agenda by combating the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism—the organisation’s primary focus—has failed to yield tangible results, as Islamabad continues to grapple with stability and security challenges domestically. Contrary to many expectations, New Delhi and Islamabad’s joining the SCO as full members in 2017 did not bridge their differences; rather, it complicated the decision-making process, with no consensus on core issues such as regional terrorism. In addition to divergent approaches, the occasional crises between New Delhi and Islamabad has further paralysed the SCO’s functioning. Although the organisation is not mandated to intervene in bilateral disputes, strained India-Pakistan relations have spilled over into its agenda, making it complicated to issue joint statements.

Despite its modest track record in resolving security threats across Eurasia, Moscow continues to invest considerable effort in promoting the SCO as a flagship regional organisation. The SCO offers a valuable platform for political interaction at the bilateral level, including with Pakistan. Moreover, as Pakistan’s leadership seems to echo some of Russia’s aspirations regarding the prospect of a “connected Eurasia,”^[75] the SCO remains an instrumental forum for exploring ambitious geo-economic projects.

Economic Ties: Going Round in Circles

Economic cooperation between Russia and Pakistan has been fraught, with high expectations and little headway. Many bilateral projects have been on the agenda for the past two decades or so, but have failed to materialise. For instance, in 2006, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, along with two companies from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, won the auction to purchase 40 percent of Pakistan Steel Mills for US$362 million. Although this was initially considered a success story for Russian investment in the Pakistani economy, the Supreme Court of Pakistan later suspended the privatisation process and the deal was annulled.^[76] Moscow has not lost faith in the project and has consistently demonstrated its readiness to assist in the modernisation of the Karachi metallurgical plant. During the Sharif-Matvienko talks in September 2024, Islamabad requested that the issue be revisited, inviting Russia to build a new plant instead of upgrading the old one. This led to the preparation of a roadmap for construction during the intergovernmental commission meeting in late 2024,^[77] although the timeframe for implementation is unclear.

In a similar vein, Moscow and Islamabad have been discussing a range of multilateral and bilateral projects in the energy domain. For at least three decades, Pakistani authorities have aspired to offer the country as a conduit for energy pipelines. However, this vision has been hindered by a combination of geopolitical and economic factors, including the unstable security situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, sanctions against Iran and Russia, and uncertainty over the prospects of recouping the investment.^[78]

The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline was first proposed in 1996, but it faced hesitations from New Delhi due to obvious security concerns. Subsequently, Pakistan’s inability to construct its segment of the pipeline, citing sanctions imposed on Iran as an excuse, further complicated the project. Russia has been involved in the initiative for a long time, with Gazprom participating in the development of four gas fields in Iran and expressing a willingness to fund the project’s feasibility study, as reflected in several MoUs.^[79] However, the Russian company has recently realised the project’s low viability, focusing more on its bilateral projects with Tehran, including the idea of supplying Russian gas to Iran via Azerbaijan.

Another long-standing project is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which had come to a standstill due to the war in Afghanistan, but has lately been revived following the start of construction on the 150-km Serhetabat-Herat section announced by the Taliban regime in December 2024.^[80] While the pipeline offers few prospects for India due to Pakistan’s potential leverage over energy supplies, Russia has been exploring its involvement in the project for years and has seemingly renewed its interest in light of its evolving cooperation with the Taliban and its increased focus on reorienting gas exports southwards and eastwards. Gazprom has been seeking to upgrade the Central Asia–Centre gas pipeline system to transport Russian gas from Western Siberia to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.^[81] If linked to Russian gas supplies via Central Asia, TAPI could be used to supply gas to the ‘Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline’, potentially bringing Russian energy flows to the Indian Ocean.

The problem for such an ambitious plan is, however, the need to construct or modernise many missing links. One of them is the ‘Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline (PSGP)’ project that has been on the agenda for a decade. Russia and Pakistan signed an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the ‘North-South Gas Pipeline’ in 2015. The project involves a 1,100-kilometre pipeline with a capacity of up to 12.4 billion cubic metres per year. The pipeline is to connect liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals between Karachi and Lahore, where LNG-based power plants are to be built.^[82] The project was delayed for two reasons: first, the sides could not agree on the tariffs for gas transportation; second, Pakistan was apprehensive of the US sanctions against Rostec, whose subsidiary RT-Global Resources was the contractor from the Russian side. As a result, Moscow and Islamabad decided to revise the agreement: change the conditions and the name of the project.

The new version of the agreement gives Pakistan a controlling stake in the PSGP (74 percent), while Russia retains massive influence over the selection of contractors, design, engineering, and other technical aspects, as well as holding a blocking stake. In order to address Pakistan’s concerns about sanctions, Russia has set up a special company that will act as a new contractor on the Russian side. Despite having been discussed at length over the last two years, including at the highest level, the project is still in its “initial stage” and the parties are continuing to coordinate “all legal and financial obligations.”^[83] Moscow and Islamabad are stuck in reconfiguring the technical modalities of the project, which now include the source of gas for the PSGP. As the high LNG prices remain unaffordable for Pakistan’s cash-strapped economy, the pipeline gas seems a more attractive option to source the PGSP. However, all the options through which Russia could assist, namely the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, the TAPI pipeline or a pipeline from Western Siberia through Central Asia, are shrouded in uncertainty.

While the financial, technical and geopolitical viability of all these projects is in question, the topic of developing energy infrastructure in the region continues to circulate in public, evoking the idea of a “ring of regional gas corridors”^[84] and Pakistan’s potential role as an intersection point for the IPI, TAPI and ‘Pakistan Stream’ projects.

Pakistan’s Place in Regional Connectivity Projects

 

Russia has begun to recognise Pakistan’s geostrategic location as the country fits well into Moscow’s vision for the development of different transport corridors across Eurasia. Despite the absence of Pakistan’s formal accession to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Russian companies have been utilising its routes for the transportation of goods to and imports from Pakistan. In September 2023, Russia delivered the inaugural consignment of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Pakistan. The delivery of 100,000 metric tons of LPG was shipped from Russia’s Orsk refinery in the Orenburg region through Iran’s Sarakhs special economic zone,^[85] thereby employing the transport infrastructure of the INSTC’s Eastern branch. Nevertheless, subsequent shipments of LPG to Pakistan have yet to materialise, despite the ongoing talks.

In March 2024, the Pakistani National Logistics Corporation (NLC) dispatched a convoy of 16 trucks laden with kinnows (a type of mandarin cultivated in the Pakistani province of Punjab) to Russia. The trucks traversed the Western branch of the INSTC, passing through the territories of Iran and Azerbaijan en route to the Russian cities of Derbent and Grozny.^[86] As Moscow and Islamabad have signed agreements to simplify customs procedures and provide tariff preferences for Pakistani products, it is likely that food shipments via this route, as well as through the territories of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, will become common practice.

Moscow also supports several routes across the Afghan territory. The first is the Torghundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railroad, which is being promoted by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and is seen by Russia as an extension of the INSTC. The second is the Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan multimodal corridor, which has been discussed by the working group of participant countries since April 2024. The project, if implemented, would provide Moscow with access to the Indian Ocean through the Pakistani port of Karachi and reduce its dependence on Iranian transport infrastructure.^[87] However, the ‘Kabul corridor’—which runs from Termez in Uzbekistan to Kharlachi in Pakistan, through the Afghan towns of Naibabad and Logar—is the missing link of the project.

These transport corridors have occupied an important place in Moscow’s attempts to break out from the Western isolation and find new markets. It must be acknowledged, however, that persistent issues impede the further development of Russia’s trade and business connections with Pakistan.

First, the economic crisis in Pakistan, coupled with Western sanctions on the Russian economy, has resulted in an inability to find a viable solution to the issue of transactions. During his meeting with Putin on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Astana in July 2024, Sharif suggested reverting to Cold War-era practices by expanding bilateral trade through a barter system to overcome financial and banking problems.^[88] Subsequently, two agricultural companies from Russia and Pakistan entered into barter trade agreements.^[k] Second, the absence of a direct transport link between Russia and Pakistan poses challenges for trade logistics. Goods are primarily transferred between the two countries via either multimodal or autotruck transportation, with the shipments crossing Iranian and Afghan territory.

In theory, Pakistan could form part of a wider INSTC rail network, but its railways require modernisation, particularly the Quetta-Taftan railway linking the Balochistan province to the Iranian border. Pakistan’s economy faces structural problems and is dependent on IMF loan assistance. Even though Moscow and Islamabad signed an MoU on trade and connectivity in September 2024,^[89] Russia does not currently appear to be in a position to invest significant sums in the Pakistani infrastructure. Reports of Russian and UAE (United Arab Emirates) interest in investing close to US$1 billion in Pakistan’s ailing rail sector, including the upgrading of the Quetta-Taftan line,^[90] are questionable and have yet to be confirmed. Additionally, Iran’s rail infrastructure along the border with Pakistan is not fully integrated with the other INSTC lines. Consequently, although Islamabad is considering formal integration into the INSTC network, the current focus appears to be on connectivity diplomacy rather than establishing a functional transport infrastructure, with the majority of projects remaining on paper.

Bilateral trade: A Marginal Rise

 

Russia is not among Pakistan’s top 20 trading partners. Despite being the twelfth largest exporter to Pakistan in 2023, Russia’s share of exports was just 1.77 percent.^[91] Trade volumes between the two countries have increased over the past three years. In 2023, bilateral trade turnover reached US$1.1 billion, which is 50-percent higher than in 2022.^[l] Russia has a trade surplus with Pakistan, with exports amounting to US$782 million and imports, US$289 million.^[m] Agricultural products dominate Russian supplies to Pakistan, with grain accounting for 75 percent of total bilateral trade in 2023.^[92] During the 2023/24 agricultural season, Russia exported 2.1 million tonnes of wheat, constituting around 70 percent of Pakistan’s total imports of the commodity. It is estimated that, by 2030, Russia’s exports of agro-industrial products to Pakistan could reach 2.8 million tonnes, worth up to US$900 million. The most promising products are grain crops (such as wheat and barley), legumes, and vegetable oil cakes and meal.^[93]

The establishment of oil supplies from Russia to Pakistan has been fraught with challenges. A long-term agreement between the two sides has proven elusive owing to the limited throughput capacity of Pakistani ports, which complicates both the logistics and pricing of supplies. Following extensive discussions, Russia and Pakistan have reached an agreement to import Russian crude oil on a commercial basis in April 2023. Islamabad called this a trial shipment to test the capacities of domestic refineries to process oil from Russia.

In June 2023, Russia delivered two batches of crude oil amounting to 100,000 tonnes. In October 2023, the Pakistani government authorised companies to enter into direct commercial contracts with Russian oil exporters. However, this decision has not resulted in any new deals. In December 2024, the Pakistani media reported that “Pakistan Refinery Limited (PRL) will import 12 cargoes from Russia in one year under the new understanding reached between the two countries.”^[94] Yet, this was not followed up with any new shipments of Russian crude to Pakistan.

Pakistani refineries are not designed to deal with hard Russian crude. This is compounded by the higher transportation costs as compared to the crude from the Gulf, as well as payment issues that Russia and Pakistan have been unable to resolve due to Islamabad’s constraints on foreign exchange reserves.^[95] This makes Pakistan more inclined to proceed with imports of the light crude from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. To reverse this trend and enable its refineries to process Russian oil, Pakistan would require significant investment in the refining sector, which neither Islamabad nor Moscow are in a position to provide, owing to their respective economic struggles. Despite some achievements in terms of the number of meetings and volume of trade, economic relations are approaching a “glass ceiling,”^[96] with limitations outweighing opportunities for further cooperation.

Looking Ahead

Moscow’s engagement with Islamabad has increased considerably over the past 10-15 years. It would be prudent, however, to not exaggerate Pakistan’s importance to Russian regional interests. For Moscow, Pakistan is neither a sufficiently lucrative market for Russian products (except agriculture) nor a close geopolitical partner. Nonetheless, the relationship has gradually progressed, driven by the need of both countries to expand their network of friendly states.

In Russia, Pakistan is mainly viewed through the lens of geostrategic and geo-economic considerations. It is regarded as an important player in Eurasia for security reasons and as a potential transit hub. The Russian authorities continue to harbour hopes for numerous transport and energy projects extending through Pakistan to India. Despite being aware of the history, they are—for reasons that are difficult to comprehend—underestimating the depth of India’s mistrust of Pakistan, as well as New Delhi’s reluctance to engage in multilateral projects with Pakistan.

From a Pakistani perspective, Russia is just another partner that is instrumental in maintaining a variety of foreign policy options. Reaching out to Moscow has long been a means for Islamabad to secure concessions in its dialogue with Washington. When the US overlooks Pakistan in its regional approaches, Islamabad seeks to balance its relationships with the West by partnering with Russia, including as part of groupings such as the quadrilateral format alongside China and Iran.

The lack of visits by the Russian president is a weakness in the Russia-Pakistan ties. This appears to be due to three main reasons: security concerns; insufficient progress on the bilateral agenda, which sees occasional ups and downs; and prioritisation of the partnership with India. Nevertheless, there is notable regularity in high-level contact between the two countries. It could be argued that the relationship has evolved from being a transactional model focused on a few areas of convergence to being a more diversified and comprehensive one, incorporating various areas and formats of cooperation.

India must take note of the defence interaction between Russia and Pakistan. Bilateral military exercises between the Russian and Pakistani armed forces have become standard practice. Although the supply of military equipment has been limited, the two sides maintain close contact. It is not yet clear how this cooperation will evolve in the aftermath of Russia-Ukraine war, but it will depend on the state of the Russian military-industrial complex and the Russia-India partnership, including in defence.

The idea of further unlocking military supplies to Pakistan is arguably the result of two trends: first, resentment within Russia’s military establishment at India’s shift towards importing arms from other countries; and second, the growing political concerns about India’s expanding partnership with the US and other Western powers. By engaging with Islamabad on defence and security matters, Moscow has sent clear signals to New Delhi. However, Russia’s ambitions to expand cooperation with Pakistan will be limited by structural factors, such as Islamabad’s inadequate financial resources to fund any large-scale deals. Additionally, due to enduring ties between Moscow and New Delhi, proponents of closer military ties with Pakistan in Russia find themselves in a situation that can best be described as, ‘All cats love fish, but fear to wet their paws.’ As long as the longstanding Russia-India defence connection remains mutually beneficial, Moscow is unlikely to open Pandora’s box by offering advanced weapon systems to Islamabad.

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Aleksei Zakharov is Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Annexe

Table 2. High-level visits, diplomatic, parliamentary, military and security engagements between Russia and Pakistan (February 2022 – June 2025)

Date	Event	Venue	Agenda/Outcome
Leaders’ meetings
23-24 February 2022	Prime Minister Imran Khan meets with President Vladimir Putin	Moscow, Russia	Regional topics, including developments in South Asia
15 September 2022	President Putin meets with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif	SCO Heads of State Summit, Samarkand, Uzbekistan	Energy, trade, investment and strategic areas
16 October 2023	President Putin meets with the acting Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar	Belt and Road Forum, Beijing, China	Trade and economy, particularly energy and agriculture
3 July 2024	President Putin meets with Prime Minister Sharif	SCO Heads of State Summit, Astana, Kazakhstan	Energy and agro-industrial cooperation, financial and banking issues; bilateral trade under a barter system
Government-to-Government
18-20 January 2023	Eighth IGC meeting co-chaired by Energy Minister Nikolay Shulginov and Economic Affairs Minister Sardar Ayaz Sadiq	Islamabad, Pakistan	Bilateral business cooperation
18-19 September 2024	Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk meets with Prime Minister Sharif and other high-ranking officials	Islamabad, Pakistan	MoU on Trade, Connectivity and Other Areas of Mutual Cooperation
15-16 October 2024	Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin meets with Prime Minister Sharif and other high-ranking officials	SCO Heads of Government Council, Islamabad, Pakistan	Energy, industry, agriculture, infrastructure construction, logistics, and transport
4 December 2024	Ninth IGC meeting co-chaired by Ministers of Energy Sergey Tsivilyov and Awais Ahmad Khan Leghari	Moscow, Russia	Eight MoUs signed (trade, energy, connectivity, education)
28 February 2025	First Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin visits Pakistan	Islamabad, Pakistan	Meetings with ministers of Pakistan’s economic bloc
18-21 June 2025	Minister for Petroleum Ali Pervaiz Malik meets with Minister of Energy Tsivilyov and with Gazprom executives	Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia	Cooperation in oil and gas and hydropower sectors; joint ventures between Pakistan’s Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and Gazprom International
Diplomatic Exchanges
29-30 January 2023	Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari meets with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov	Moscow, Russia	Topical issues of bilateral, regional and international agenda
4 May 2023	Foreign Minister Lavrov meets with Foreign Minister Bhutto-Zardari	SCO Foreign Ministers Council, Panaji, India	Regional and international affairs, the situation in Afghanistan
20-21 June 2023	Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko meets with Foreign Secretary Dr. Asad Majeed Khan	Inter-ministerial political consultations, Islamabad, Pakistan	Afghan settlement, bilateral trade and economic cooperation; new security threats
16 November 2023	Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin visits Pakistan	Working group on counter-terrorism, Islamabad, Pakistan	Terrorist threats at the global and regional levels
12 December 2023	Additional Foreign Secretary (Europe), Amb Shafqat Ali Khan visits Moscow	Moscow, Russia	Regional issues (Afghanistan); cooperation at the UN and the SCO
8 February 2024	Additional Foreign Secretary (Arms Control and Disarmament) Mohammad Kamran Akhtar visits Russia	Consultative group on strategic stability, Moscow, Russia	International security and regional stability, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
21 May 2024	Foreign Minister Lavrov meets with Deputy Prime Minister – Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar	SCO Foreign Ministers Council, Astana, Kazakhstan	Russia-Pakistan relations; interactions at international platforms (UN, SCO)
17 April 2025	Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov visits Pakistan	Consultative group on strategic stability, Islamabad, Pakistan	International security, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation; space, new and emerging technologies, including the military use of AI
22 April 2025	Additional Secretary Nabeel Munir visits Moscow	Working group on counter-terrorism, Moscow, Russia	Terrorist threats at the national, regional and global levels (Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East)
23 April 2025	Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko visits Pakistan	Inter-ministerial political consultations, Islamabad, Pakistan	Trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and security collaboration
2-4 June 2025	Syed Tariq Fatemi, the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, meets with Foreign Minister Lavrov	Moscow, Russia	Bilateral relations, regional and international security; Pakistan’s view of the situation in Indo-Pakistani relations
Military and Security Interactions
14-15 August 2023	Secretary of Defence Lt Gen. Hamood- uz- Zaman Khan meets with Deputy Defence Minister Col. Gen. Alexander Fomin	Army International Forum, Moscow, Russia	Potential to expand defence cooperation
14 December 2023	Secretary of Defence Lt Gen. Hamood- uz- Zaman meets with Deputy Defence Minister Col. Gen. Fomin	JMCC Meeting, Moscow, Russia	Bilateral defence cooperation, politico-military situation in Afghanistan
9-11 July 2024	Pakistan’s military delegation led by Gen. Sahir Shamshad Mirza, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, meets with Col. Gen. Fomin, Aleksandr Venediktov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, and Col. Gen. Sergey Istrakov, Deputy Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces	Moscow, Russia	Military-to-military technical cooperation, regional security situation and the menace of terrorism
4-5 October 2024	Col. Gen. Istrakov meets with Gen. Sahir Shamshad Mirza	Rawalpindi, Pakistan	Defence cooperation, evolving security situation in the region
28-31 October 2024	Russian military delegation led by Col. Gen. Fomin meets Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir and Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar Sidhu	JMCC Meeting, Islamabad, Pakistan	Defence cooperation and military and political situation in the region
23 June 2025	Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Asim Malik meets with Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Aleksandr Venediktov	SCO Security Council’s Secretaries Meeting, Beijing, China	Resumption of bilateral contacts between the security councils
Parliamentary Exchanges
27-29 October 2024	Russia’s parliamentary delegation led by Valentina Matvienko, Speaker of the Federal Assembly’s Federation Council, visits Pakistan	Islamabad, Pakistan	MoU between the Federation Council and the Senate of Pakistan
27 November – 1 December	Pakistan’s parliamentary delegation, led by Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, Speaker National Assembly, visits Russia	Moscow, Russia	MoU between the State Duma and the National Assembly of Pakistan
11-13 May 2025	Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, Chairman Senate of Pakistan, visits Russia	Moscow, Russia	Parliamentary cooperation

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• Pakistan
• Russia and Eurasia
• pak russia energy cooperation
• russia pakistan bilateral ties
• russia pakistan cooperation
• russia pakistan relations
• russia pakistan relationship
• russia pakistan strategic partnership
• russia pakistan ties
• russia pakistan trade

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