Liberalism is in crisis — but is not irredeemable.
This article is part of GP-ORF series — From Alpha Century to Viral World: The Raisina Young Fellows Speak.
The world is witnessing a dramatic increase in the popularity of strongmen in politics, a growth that appears inversely proportional to the level of people’s trust in liberal methods of governance. Populism, which almost always gives birth to strongmen regimes<1>, is not an inherent counter-thesis to liberal democracy; nonetheless, the current reality in a lot of strongmen-led countries paints a vivid picture of a wedge driven by populists between democracy and liberalism, as liberals are being accused of preventing people — through institutions, norms and policies — from realising their collective will, and hence, threatening democracy.
It was not too long ago when it seemed that liberalism would drive the world to where we thought we wanted to go — free democracy, open markets, people-centred governance. It is unclear exactly when or where this vapour of disapproval towards liberalism began, but it somehow managed to seep in across continents. In some countries, the narrative is slowly being shaped by isolated manifestations of discontent, just enough to elicit uncomfortable adjustments from the ruling elite; in others, the discontent was so pronounced that it enabled strongmen to completely dominate the national narrative and transform it into a dramatic protest against the so-called “liberal elitists.”
Regardless of the when and where, if proponents of liberalism wish to revive its relevance in the strongmen era, it is imperative they address two fundamental and more important questions: why and how. Albeit at a varying degree, there are traces of common reasons and methods through which strongmen propel into power by riding, if not steering, the waves of disgruntlement in different parts of the world — from superpowers such as the US and Russia, to post-colonial states such as the Philippines, Nicaragua and Hungary.
Populists are winning in the game of public perception — promising to address a pressing threat or a long-neglected need swiftly, no matter the cost — often trumping on civil liberties. Recent history shows that when the populace buys into a politician’s purpose, they will not care so much about the methods by which this purpose is achieved. Populists sell an idea and if their selling point still resonates with the public, the latter is willing to look past certain “inconveniences” and even dismiss extreme actions as “necessities” to shake the status quo.
Among other reasons, strongmen thrive because of popular support to a core narrative, often involving a notion of an enemy or a threat. In Russia, the enemies were ‘Western vultures’; in Egypt, secular elites; in Hungary, Muslim migrants<2>. Regardless of these narratives’ (in)validity and (il)legitimacy, one cannot deny two factors that have driven the voting public to subscribe to them — clarity and relatability.
To some, the problem is as real as it can get, such as relating the overall immigration problem to a scuffle in the local neighbourhood or an unpleasant encounter with a migrant at a convenience store. At a bigger scale, individual experiences are amplified when related to similar sentiments of other members of a community, although the process through which this amplification occurs is being significantly accelerated by social media.
As more populist campaigns succeed and give birth to strongmen in politics, thereby threatening the gains made towards a liberal world order, proponents of liberalism must reassess how to package their ideals in a manner palatable and appetising for the voting public. Free market, free trade, free democracy, these are all good to hear. However, one cannot expect someone passively benefitting from these freedoms to be more passionate than a neighbour actively inconvenienced or harmed by the ‘enemies’ that populists point to.
To stand a chance at regaining popularity, liberals should start refocusing from advocating means — ways on how society must operate — to convincing the public on the ends — what kind of society we are heading towards. Essential to this is locating where the ‘individual’ lies in the whole gamut of liberal ideals, and clearly communicating how these abstract ideals relate to daily real-life dilemmas. At this point in history, when it is much easier to get the votes of the dissatisfied than the hopefuls, liberals need to seriously rethink their rhetoric.
Popularity and approval are gained by promoting a cause that speaks to the public directly, and nothing speaks more directly to the disenfranchised than results that can be felt. The next best thing is a promise, which populists have handed out so generously. In the arena of public perception, populist sentiments eclipse liberal ideals not necessarily because the former offers a better paradigm. It may simply be because populism promises the stars while the liberals keep trying to sell to the world a blueprint of an aircraft that may or may not take us there.
Dominating public perception, however, will not be enough in the long run. Some argue that populist regimes led by strongmen are self-destructive, as they will be vulnerable to the same unease and discontent that catapulted them into power if they fail to translate their rhetoric into concrete results. Past the buy-in phase, it will boil down to the capability of strongmen to deliver on their promises. Unfortunately for the proponents of liberalism, while falling behind in the arena of public perception, they seem to not have much of an advantage in results delivery either.
The irony of free elections being an avenue where the people cast their protest votes against existing liberal ways has never been more pronounced than it is now. Upon closer examination, these protest votes are not as much against the fundamental ideals of liberalism as against the methods often associated with liberal rule, marred with messy, rigid and inefficient processes. As observed by William Galston, “it seems that the aim of contemporary populism is ‘illiberal democracy’ — a governing system capable of translating popular preferences into public policy without the impediments that have prevented liberal democracies from responding effectively to urgent problems. From this perspective, populism is a threat not to democracy per se but rather to the dominant liberal variant of democracy”<3>.
The demand for a responsive governing system contributed to the increasing popularity of leadership styles that banner strength and decisive action over the bottom-up way of ruling, despite the threats the former poses on individual rights and the rule of law. Populist candidates capitalise on the distrust towards government and institutions to put forward their agenda. Intentionally or otherwise, populist candidates tend to weaken institutions in the guise of radical change. In what was coined as ‘the populist paradox’, leaders whose rise and rule exploit the vulnerabilities of existing systems to combat corruption tend to use their office to further weaken institutional venues by bypassing them, co-opting them with political appointees, and ousting critics<4>.
Imperfect as they are, institutions were established and were able to withstand the test of time for a reason. Institutional mechanisms developed through deliberative democracy, despite being criticised for inefficiency and ineptitude, were products of a long process of building, adjustment and rebuilding. We have yet to see whether the haste that populism offers can ultimately outweigh the stability that liberal institutions have long been delivering. If we look, however, at the global experience in managing the COVID-19 pandemic, examples across the globe provided hints of the weaknesses of strongmen regimes, both in terms of transparency and responsiveness in running governments.
Hopefully, it will not be long before the voting public realises that the way to go is to repair and strengthen institutions, not undermine them. In this area, there exists an opportunity for liberals to reclaim its relevance: to offer solutions to inefficiency and rigidness, rather than being its face.
Repairing institutions, however, is easier said than done, especially with conservatives seemingly too preoccupied in preserving them in their present state. It will entail a conscious and large-scale effort among proponents of liberal ideals to discard and relent traditions and adapt to the evolving demands of the times. For this to even begin, a recalibration of the fundamentals of ‘liberalism’ may be necessary. But first, it is important to understand why anti-establishment movements were able to drive a wedge between liberalism and democracy.
In 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin boldly declared that “the liberal idea has become obsolete.” Liberalism is now being criticised left and right — some only questioning the liberal economic doctrine, while others go as deep as denigrating its social doctrines on secularism and individual rights<5>.
Liberalism is in crisis but is not irredeemable. However, the current tact of prominent liberal proponents arrogantly dismissing the populist trend as uneducated and irrational is simply not the answer. Neither is defending liberalism in its entirety or counting on the hope that liberalism will repair itself.
The apparent truth is that liberalism has been a tool of oppression and marginalisation. There needs to be an acknowledgement that while democracy, rule of law, individual rights and equality — the core of liberalism — are still fundamentally desirable, there are clear losers in the methods being employed to achieve these. Further, this acknowledgement needs to translate into a recalibration, with some bias for the nations, communities and individuals who are bearing the pain that liberalism is responsible for.
In a system where the objective is to protect individual liberty through minimal intervention, and a free hand inadvertently results in the exploitation of individual rights, a major recalibration is needed.
If critics are correct that liberalism had outlived its purpose, perhaps it is time to reformulate one — individual liberty not for the sake of liberty but targeted for the marginalised and the vulnerable.
“Liberalism is not a utopian project, it is a work in perpetual progress”<6>. Liberalism has had a relatively long history of triumphs but unless it evolves at a pace proportionate to the rise of populism, it runs the risk of being sidelined. The wedge driven by populists between liberalism and democracy emerge not only from differences on dogma or philosophical notions, but from real-life experiences — hunger, unemployment, loss of a sense of identity. As such, reversing this wedge will entail correction in multiple levels — matter, matter and method.
<1> Martin Wolf, “The Rise of the Populist Authoritarians,” Financial Times, 22 January 2019.
<2> Ian Bremmer, “The 'Strongmen Era' Is Here. Here’s What It Means for You,” Time, 3 May 2018.
<3> William A. Galston, “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 5–19.
<4>Lica Porcile and Norman Eisen, “The Populist Paradox,” Brookings, 28 October 2020.
<5> Zack Beauchamp, “The Anti-Liberal Moment,” Vox, 9 September 2019.
<6> Martin Wolf, “Liberalism Will Endure but Must Be Renewed,” Financial Times, 3 July 2019.
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Joanna Micah Eufemio is a civil servant with almost a decade of experience in policy studies and development management a Raisina Young Fellow and a ...
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