The ceaseless effort of India and Nepal to strengthen their bilateral relationship is yet again in news, as Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Prachanda, visited India at the formal invitation of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) President, Jagat Prakash Nadda. This meeting was also graced by S. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India and subsequently by Ajit Doval, Indian National Security Advisor, thereby elevating its relevance and importance in the Indo-Nepal strategic liaison. This entire initiative was an integral part of the ‘Know-BJP’ drive, precisely to enhance party-to-party ties and build sustainable management of office which could in turn curate programmes of mutual benefit. Interestingly, this meeting also comes three months after the visit of the present Prime Minister of Nepal, Sher Bahadur Deuba, who had also visited the BJP headquarters, the first Nepalese PM to do so, primarily in the capacity of being the President of the ruling Nepali Congress party.

When Dahal explicitly pointed out the need of the hour as a revamped Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) along with resolving unsettled issues, the world indeed took a keen interest as the bilateral relationship has often found itself in the doldrums in the past few years.

As the Chairman of the Nepalese political party Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre and former Prime Minister of the Himalayan Nation, Dahal is also a key partner and ally in the coalition of the present government. Consequently, the discussions that he has had during this visit are likely to be a strong reflection of what Kathmandu expects from New Delhi. Thus, when Dahal explicitly pointed out the need of the hour as a revamped Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) along with resolving unsettled issues, the world indeed took a keen interest as the bilateral relationship has often found itself in the doldrums in the past few years.

The perennial problems of the Treaty of 1950

The Treaty of 1950 were mainly endorsed and authenticated at a time when the world was paying the price of the ongoing Cold War and the importance of Nepal for India was becoming increasingly vital due to its geographical proximity to China-occupied Tibet. Synonymously, the internal struggle going on in the landlocked nation against the Rana rulers in power supposedly had their bases in India which required an immediate solution. Thus, it was extremely congenial for the rulers to get into a special relationship with India that would eventually help curb the democratic movements. The provisions that were documented were based on mutual socio-economic necessities with the unrestricted movement of people across the open border. The paperwork very clearly stated that the citizens of one country could freely participate in the industrial and economic developments of the other country as well (Clause 7) along with other provisions like giving first preference to Indians in Nepal for natural resources that can help in developmental projects among others. However, the first streak of misunderstanding became overtly expressed in 1959 when the confidential document that had details of the discussions negotiated besides the treaty was leaked, creating an uproar of negative sentiments amongst the public. Again, there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction over the signatories—Nepali King Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana and Indian Ambassador Chandreshwar Narayan Singh—two people with a mismatch in their titular positions, often considered disdainful for the smaller nation.

The paperwork very clearly stated that the citizens of one country could freely participate in the industrial and economic developments of the other country as well (Clause 7) along with other provisions like giving first preference to Indians in Nepal for natural resources that can help in developmental projects among others.

Since then, time and again, the treaty has been under scrutiny by the Nepalese side, finding faults, especially in Articles 1, 2, 5, 6,7, and 10. Some of the problems stemmed from issues like the Nepalese claim of not being informed by India about its war against China (1962) or with West Pakistan (1965) and East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh in 1971), which India invariably denied. Again, there were contradictions in equal rights for residence, job opportunities, and the acquisition of property in each other’s territories. However, post the 1980s, both countries failed miserably in following the articles of the treaty. While Nepal, after bringing about the work-permit system for foreigners, could not live up to the decision; Nepalese migrants in the Northeastern region of India (Meghalaya and Assam mainly) were also deported due to the anti-migrant sentiments. Similarly, a sentiment to place a cap on taking Nepalese Gorkhas in the Indian Army’s Gorkha Regiment, with priority to the Indian Gorkhas instead was also afloat. Again, there have been increasing Nepalese allegations that even though India promised anti-monopoly and balanced treatment for Nepalese traders, they could never establish themselves in the Indian markets, while the Indian traders made the best of the Nepalese economy, in both the public and the private sectors.

The current realities

The present realities of the India–Nepal relationship, in the past decade of the 21^st century also had an opinion of reviewing the treaty, because, by this time, both the countries had already been through two crucial economic blockades (one in the 1989 and one in 2015). So, when India agreed to the re-evaluation, the Eminent Person’s Group (EPG) meetings began (2016) to be scheduled with the mandate of serious deliberations. To be more precise, by this time, India had already realised China’s growing footfall in Nepal and the fact that both are integral partners in the former’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the one hand, when Nepal was facing border disputes with India, the most recent one being the Kalapani map row (2019) over the locations of Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Susta, consultative meetings were successful in the Nepal-China planned Trans Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity network or the Nepal-China Rail link and industrial park. Intriguingly, in October 2021, it was Prachanda himself who was leading the CPN (Maoist) in such a meeting in Nepal, along with the other political parties, to materialise such a plan of action. In stark contrast, even though the EPG meeting was primarily initiated in 2016, with Indian PM Narendra Modi and his Nepalese counterpart K.P Sharma Oli, no proper outcome has come out of it yet, despite repeated attempts to discuss border, hydropower—an important asset of Nepal, trade, and resource sharing.

Nepal is also mindful of the recent multilateral developments in South Asia with institutions like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) transport and economic corridor, for which it requires the equal partnership of India.

Nonetheless, Nepal is well aware of the benefits that it has been reaping from the ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ of the Indian government along with the approach of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikaas’. So, even though before coming to India for his trip, Prachanda met the Chinese delegation led by Liu, to call upon the President and the Prime Minister, Nepal is not in a position to react nonchalantly towards the coalition partnership with India. Additionally, Nepal is also mindful of the recent multilateral developments in South Asia with institutions like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) transport and economic corridor, for which it requires the equal partnership of India. Through such projects, Nepal would be able to manifest its cross-border rail link and road networks like the Janakpur–Jainagar Railway project or the Janakpur-Ayodhya twin city project agreement, which are stalled because of the ‘lack of political will from both the countries’. These are the stagnant aspects of the bilateral connectivity initiatives that Prachanda might have indicated to bring about a solution. To add to this, since BJP is the only political party that the Nepali political leadership is meeting frequently, it may keep us guessing that in the future too, this particular set of leaders would want to communicate with each other more promptly, supporting each other’s power for their own benefit. In a country like Nepal where the governments keep changing more often than not, the support of the BJP is also something crucial to keep in check in southern Nepal, which shares its border with India, especially the Madhesis, having a direct impact on Nepalese politics. Nevertheless, what is noteworthy is the zeal and enthusiasm of the countries, especially Nepal, because its stakes are higher, given the geographical locale it is set in. Hopes are also ripe that such bilateral exchanges will culminate into something fruitful and productive shortly.

• Neighbourhood
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Bay of Bengal
• BIMSTEC
• Economic
• hydropower
• Indo-Nepal
• Nepal-China
• Prachanda
• treaty

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