Read the first part of the series here.
Gobbledygook of the generals
The section of Pakistan’s National Security Policy (NSP) on conventional military threats starts with the sentence: “With a regressive and dangerous ideology gripping the collective conscience in our immediate neighbourhood, the prospects of violent conflict have grown immensely.” It probably alludes to Imran Khan and Moeed Yusuf’s pet bugbear—India—but applies more to their pet project and ideological ally—Taliban’s Emirate. Of course, given the mindset of the Pakistanis, it is entirely possible that they believe that the Taliban represents some kind of progressive and benign ideology that isn’t gripping the collective conscience of Pakistan as much as it is Afghanistan. The rest of the section repeats the same old formulations that Pakistanis have been spouting ad nauseam—“full spectrum deterrence”, “credible minimum nuclear deterrence”, avoiding an “arms race”, and, of course, the latest obsession of retired military officials, “Hybrid Warfare”, for which they propose the clichéd “holistic, interconnected whole-of-nation approach to neutralise attempts to undermine Pakistan’s security and stability”. This is pure bureaucratic gobbledygook that impresses no one except those who take the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) appointed ‘defence analysts’ seriously.
The internal security section identifies terrorism, violent sub-nationalism, extremism and sectarianism, and narcotics and organised crime as the main challenges. It declares that “Pakistan pursues a policy of zero tolerance for any groups involved in terrorist activities on its soil.” But if it is not bad grammar, then the sentence suggests that the zero tolerance policy doesn’t extend to terror activities in other countries. The NSP claims that it will not allow “the exploitation and manipulation of ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines through violent extremist ideologies.” This is rich coming from a regime whose leader Imran Khan has supported and identified himself with the Tehreek-e-Labbaik’s (TLP) movement while in the opposition, and which has pandered to violent Islamist extremist groups while in government. The document goes on to promise “swift and uncompromising action” against those “producing and disseminating hate speech and material”. But none of this resolve was there when Imran Khan was forced to drop the noted economist Atif Mian from the Economic Advisory Council just because he belongs to the heterodox Ahmadiyya sect.
The internal security section identifies terrorism, violent sub-nationalism, extremism and sectarianism, and narcotics and organised crime as the main challenges.
The foreign policy section reveals the real purpose of this entire NSP exercise: “To reverse any unfair negativity attached to its image due to sustained disinformation and influence operations by adversaries.” For Pakistan to think that its negative image is because of disinformation and not because of its involvement in terrorism and allowing Islamic terrorists to operate with almost complete impunity is to live in denial.
Same Old on India, Kashmir
On India and Kashmir, the NSP reiterates a seven decades’ policy and has absolutely no new nuance. It repeats the standard line: “A just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains a vital national security interest for Pakistan.” It rejects the constitutional reforms in the erstwhile state and parrots the old line of continuing with “moral, diplomatic, political support”. The only new element introduced is “legal support”. All this will continue until the objective of right to self-determination under the UNSC resolutions is reached. As was to be expected, relations with India are predicated on a “just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.” To J&K, the Islamic Republic has added the so-called “Hindutva-driven politics in India” as another issue of serious concern. There is also the usual lament about Indian arms build-up and the exceptionalism granted to India in international non-proliferation regimes which was contributing to strategic instability in the region.
Nothing highlights the unchanged paradigm more than the bits about India and J&K in the NSP. On the eve of the unveiling of the NSP, Moeed Yusuf gave an interview to a Pakistani newspaper and asked India “to jump on the bandwagon to benefit from regional connectivity”. But he added the caveat of Kashmir. Earlier, an unnamed official had told journalists that “if there was a dialogue and progress in it, there would be a possibility of normalising trade and commercial ties with India.” This got many in India excited over the NSP. But they missed how trade was linked not just to a dialogue but also progress in it before trade and commerce could be normalised. This is clearly a non-starter.
The thing is that in India, there seems to have been a major rethink on the old policy of first developing stakes through the instrumentality of trade and commerce, and then moving on to address the thornier issues that impact bilateral relations. As the recent downslide in ties with China have demonstrated, this policy works only up to a point. In other words, the downward trajectory of relations with China have shown the limits of trade, commerce and now connectivity in normalising bilateral relations that have been bedevilled by border and sovereignty issues. Extend the China experience to Pakistan, and it appears as if India is reaching the point where until Pakistan backs down from its irredentism on Kashmir, there is little chance of any forward movement.
For Pakistan to think that its negative image is because of disinformation and not because of its involvement in terrorism and allowing Islamic terrorists to operate with almost complete impunity is to live in denial.
Clearly, if Jammu and Kashmir continues to remain at the “core of the bilateral relationship” with India, then it will remain a poisoned well. Pakistanis hope that a change in leadership in India—this isn’t in the NSP but has been said by the ‘unnamed official’ quoted above—will bring a dispensation in New Delhi which will be tempted to drink from this poisoned well, as has happened so many times in the past.
Balancing act between US and China
The foreign policy section states that relations with China are based on “trust and strategic convergence” and will continue to be strengthened. Despite the obvious pitfalls that are manifesting in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the NSP has doubled down on this project. It has said that CPEC is “redefining regional connectivity and providing impetus to Pakistan’s economy with the potential to jump-start domestic growth, alleviate poverty, and improve regional connectivity.” The thing is that CPEC remains the only game in town for Pakistan. There is virtually no other investor coming in. Politically, diplomatically, strategically, and economically, Pakistan's dependence on China has only increased.
The thing is that in India, there seems to have been a major rethink on the old policy of first developing stakes through the instrumentality of trade and commerce, and then moving on to address the thornier issues that impact bilateral relations.
The US no longer enjoys the salience it did in the past—it is now relegated to ‘rest of the world’ and figures below Middle-East and West Asia but above UK and Europe, and Central Asia and Russia. The NSP clearly states that “Pakistan does not subscribe to camp politics”. This is a message to the US that while Pakistan wants to maintain relations with the US, it will not become the US’ catspaw against China or any other country (except perhaps India). While accepting that “cooperation with the United States will remain critical for regional peace and stability”, the NSP gives priority to broadening the partnership “beyond a narrow counter-terrorism focus”. The thing is that even as it gets closer into China’s embrace, Pakistan cannot do without the US and the West because of its trade direction, diaspora, aid, and financial linkages. The effort is to balance the relationship between China and the US. But this is easier said than done, especially given the growing contestation between the US and China. The challenge for Pakistan will be to ensure it doesn’t fall between these two stools.
The final section of the NSP is on human security and deals with issues like population, health, climate and water, food security, and because it is politically correct, gender security. But much of what is contained in this section is a bit like motherhood and apple pie. Instead of the NSP, Tilak Devasher’s book “Pakistan: Courting the Abyss”, contains a far more comprehensive analysis of the challenges that Pakistan confronts in the domain of human security.
The effort is to balance the relationship between China and the US. But this is easier said than done, especially given the growing contestation between the US and China.
Damp Squib
In the final analysis, there is very little to commend the NSP. It is at best part of an elaborate image building exercise, aimed at portraying “Pakistan’s reality as a responsible state that offers an economic hub for regional and global activity while striving for peace within and beyond its borders.” The buzzwords that pepper the NSP are aimed at impressing gullible western audiences but do not signal any paradigm shift in Pakistan’s strategic worldview or orientation. High on style but superficial on substance, the NSP is neither convincing nor compelling. It is unlikely to generate any serious debate simply because does little to signal any break from the past. Worse, while the NSP calls for “policy continuity to navigate evolving challenges and turn them into opportunities”, this document is unlikely to outlast the Imran Khan regime because the opposition parties have no use for it. And with the buzz that Imran Khan might be on the way out in the next couple of months, the longevity of this policy is not going to be more than a few months. In the end, the NSP is nothing but a waste of time and effort of the people who drafted it, and even more of the people who are reading it.
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