A crisis of trust between developed and developing nations is poisoning the international climate regime. Taking responsibility on both sides is the first step to restoring confidence.
As COP28 in Dubai came to a close, much like at other recent meetings, the plenary hall and the media quarters shared a feeling of achievement with more than a grain of frustration. It seems nobody is really satisfied, let alone happy, with the result.
Yes, a fund for helping vulnerable countries overcome irreversible climate damage was finally operationalised, but the contributions fall short of what is needed, and when and how the money will be delivered is still an open question. While the new language on fossil fuels is finally agreed upon, many see it as watered down and full of loopholes, allowing for major operations in oil, gas, and coal to continue and expand indefinitely. Granted, nations agree that more climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation is needed, but the modes, values and even having quantified adaptation goals are still undecided, while the fate of carbon markets—a crucial financing instrument—is hanging in the air after a last-minute failure in Dubai.
As any negotiator will tell you, if everyone is equally unhappy, then you have a balanced deal. Balanced as these last deals may be, it is hardly a revelation that they also tend to be underwhelming in terms of delivering on the goals of the Paris Agreement—mitigation, adaptation, and finance.
A key reason for this is deepening mistrust between developed and developing nations, most vividly seen in the UNFCCC and G20 processes.
Progress has been incremental at best—in contrast to the increasingly alarming science and the growing realisation of the scale of transformations economies and societies would have to undergo to deal with the climate crisis. A key reason for this is deepening mistrust between developed and developing nations, most vividly seen in the UNFCCC and G20 processes. Dwindling trust makes negotiators see hidden agendas in whatever the other side is suggesting, promotes entrenchment in positions and a papering-over of the really hard issues.
Whenever the world comes together to agree on further climate action, any slight disagreement seems to trigger a barrage of mutual grievances. Taken to the extreme, the accusations sound something like this. The Global North is arrogant and selfish, dismissive of the Global South’s efforts in decarbonisation and denying it the well-deserved chance to develop and achieve living standards of dignity, even less—prosperity. The South, in turn, is sluggish and free-riding, unwilling to take responsibility for its prevalent and growing emissions.
Most of these grudges are not completely groundless. Broken promises are about as bad for trust as it gets. Developed countries have been systematically underdelivering on the US$100 billion climate finance obligation and have been softening that obligation with conditions and qualifications at every turn. They enjoy advantages in technology adoption and capacity that allow them to decarbonise quicker and the higher living standards make climate-consciousness an affordable luxury.
At the same time, developing countries are not in a rush to take up the mitigation ambition that science tells us is necessary to avert the worst impacts of climate change. Even though renewables deployment in key developing economies has been unprecedented and ambitious targets are set for emissions intensity and peaking, the atmosphere only really cares about absolute emissions and GHG concentration. Having the carbon space to develop and getting the financial support needed for net zero makes complete sense in terms of justice, but doesn’t at all if getting to the living standards of developing countries comes at a price of a climate catastrophe for all countries.
Developed countries have been systematically underdelivering on the US$100 billion climate finance obligation and have been softening that obligation with conditions and qualifications at every turn.
Another major issue is the very mechanisms and platforms where these issues are discussed. Developed countries are leveraging their historic and political influence, as well as technical and capacity advantages in multilateral institutions, with all their institutional legacy. This makes developing nations feel like the negotiations game is rigged, from English still dominating the negotiation space to the mundane costs of sending a proper delegation to an international meeting imposed on a low or middle-income bureaucracy.
The rift between the developing and developed nations, albeit the most visible, is not the only one and may not even be the one defining long-term dynamics. Within the developing world—as understood by the infamous annexes to the 1992 Convention—there are the major economies, capable of maintaining infrastructure megaprojects, dominating specific global markets, sending people to space and financing development in poorer countries. And then there are the vulnerable, small-island, land-locked or least developed economies, often demanding the highest ambition given that their literal existence depends on it.
Under the broad moniker of ‘developed’ we do have highly advanced, rich by per capita income, far ahead in their decarbonisation journey. But we also have the larger economies, internally diverse and often dependent on fossil fuel production and consumption, facing political and social challenges to workforce transition and strong interest groups, much like large emerging economies.
However, the divisions between negotiating parties, though proving crucial to the intergovernmental process, may not define the broader long-term efforts to tackle climate change. In this weird age of globalisation-cum-fragmentation, accumulated imbalances and inequality, other delineations have to be addressed.
Under the broad moniker of ‘developed’ we do have highly advanced, rich by per capita income, far ahead in their decarbonisation journey.
Whether the world will succeed in averting a climate disaster or not, one can be sure that the elites will be better off. It is not the vulnerable countries that will be hit hardest, but the dispossessed in all countries. The blessed upper classes in Mumbai, San Paolo and Riyadh will be just as protected as their peers in London, Tokyo, and Melbourne, while the manual labourers of San Diego, Moscow, and Brussels—just as vulnerable as those in Kinshasa, Jakarta, or Bogota.
The damages and the costs will be differentiated at every level of analysis. The superrich will be able to afford a bunker on a far-off mountain, the ‘regularly’ rich – all-day air conditioning. The relatively poor could perhaps afford to migrate from the unbearable heat or rising sea, but those suffering extreme poverty will simply continue to suffer, with no exit strategy whatsoever.
What could be some of the ways to deal with these divides?
Simply honouring commitments would be a good place to start, but countries should go beyond that and start thinking about making better and more honest ones in the first place. The dilution of decision texts, the caveats and the jargon mean that internationally agreed climate policy documents, be it COP decisions or G20 declarations are often read with a sceptical smirk by both the negotiators themselves and their constituencies. The aforementioned COP decision on the Global Stocktake puts the UN-speak asterisk of ‘as appropriate’ 18 times throughout the document—three times in a single paragraph at one point – and conditions 16 other statements with references to national circumstances. A separate paragraph even ‘reaffirms the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions’.
This is not to devalue the importance of national circumstances, crucial for efficient climate action, but to call for common sense. The nationally determined element is deeply engrained in the Paris Agreement and it is really unlikely that any nation would do something going against the grain of local context. Qualifying these commitments and pledges at every turn, however, makes it impossible for the reader to understand what is it that parties are committing to and whether they intend to do something. Such nuances only further erode trust.
The dilution of decision texts, the caveats and the jargon mean that internationally agreed climate policy documents, be it COP decisions or G20 declarations are often read with a sceptical smirk by both the negotiators themselves and their constituencies.
Another good way to restore confidence would be for both sides to take responsibility for their impact on the planet and not wait for others to do so. Justice is important to create trust, but so is goodwill. As long as parties avoid responsibility, be it for accumulated, per capita or current absolute emissions, climate finance, or local adaptation, traded carbon or consumption patterns, and use this to stall action, the world will keep doubting that climate change is much of a problem. If governments, informed by science, can afford to wait for others to act, then the threat might not be that existential, right?
The third approach could be truthful pragmatism, as an alternative to dogma and formulaic reiterations. What does ‘keeping 1.5 within reach’ actually mean? What happens if we don’t get there? How much climate finance do we need? How are we going to spend it and where can we find that? Which development challenges do we intend to prioritize against climate change? Do we really need to bring everything to universal multilateral fora if emissions reductions are a global good anyway?
There should be no naïve expectation that nations sitting at the high table of climate policy will become collectively and individually committed, self-aware, responsible and truthful to the point where trust will flow. After all, we are trying to solve an existential issue through the ever-imperfect means of global politics and economics. Non-state actors have to build horizontal alliances and solidarities, taking as much responsibility as they can.
But for states, this is the only game in town and a collectively beneficial outcome will require that they overcome victimhood and embrace agency in building trust with others.
Anton Tsvetov is an international climate policy consultant and former negotiator in the UNFCCC and G20.
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Anton Tsvetov is an international climate policy consultant and former negotiator in the UNFCCC and G20. ...
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