Operational effectiveness and flexibility should be the raison d’etre for the proposed restructuring of the military
‘One man’s prognosis confounds the other man’s prescription.’ This is the state of discussion and dialogue in the nation’s military fraternity—whether serving or veteran—when it comes to the debate on the military reforms being undertaken to promote optimisation and synergy within the forces. When the government appointed the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on 1 January 2020, and created the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) with the CDS as the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence, it was seen as a far reaching, bold, and decisive step towards transformation. Among the duties and functions of the CDS, apart from being the Principal Military Advisor to the Defence Minister on all Tri Service matters, the CDS was also to function as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The mandate of the DMA, inter alia also included, “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.”
Among the duties and functions of the CDS, apart from being the Principal Military Advisor to the Defence Minister on all Tri Service matters, the CDS was also to function as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Optimal utilisation of resources can come through unity of effort in the application of military power. This would happen naturally when the core competency of the land, maritime, and aerospace power is understood with its doctrinal precepts, along with the overall objective that needs to be achieved with the utilisation of the military as an instrument of national power in the given scenario. Joint planning, therefore, becomes a prerequisite for joint operations. Hence, establishment of joint/theatre commands is not an essential or necessary requirement for jointness in operations. This is akin to putting the cart before the horse.
Structures for joint planning have existed for decades. If they have not served their purpose well, then, they either need to be disbanded or strengthened based on logical military thinking and strategy. The CDS, functioning as the Secretary DMA has an advisory role to the Defence Minister, where he is the single point advisor on all Tri Service matters. He also functions as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which is placed above the Service Chiefs. This implies a de-facto operational role, even though it is not explicitly mandated in his charter. This is an anomaly that needs to be resolved while discussing the functioning of the joint/theatre commands. Sound logic and clarity of thought must dictate the reorganisation or restructuring of the military; this should not come be compromised for the parochial interests of any single service. There has to be conviction and belief that it is being done in national interest, and it can only happen when biases and affiliations are shed for the larger gain.
The CDS, functioning as the Secretary DMA has an advisory role to the Defence Minister, where he is the single point advisor on all Tri Service matters.
The charter of the CDS also includes, “To ensure optimal utilisation of infrastructure and rationalise it through jointness among the Services,” and, “to bring about reforms in the functioning of three Services with the aim to augment combat capabilities of the Armed Forces by reducing wasteful expenditure.” There are many static establishments of the three services co-located across the country, governed and managed independently by each service, leading to duplication of resources, manpower, and establishment/infrastructure costs. For instance, the Indian Army manages these establishments through Sub Area and Area HQs that come under the existing regional commands. The Indian Navy also has Area HQs across the country divided into regions and commanded by Flag Officers. The three services could capitalise on the existing Area and Sub Area HQs to manage their static establishments, as well by sparing only requisite and minimal manpower to merge with the Army/Navy establishments, leading to reduction in both infructuous expenditure and duplication of resources. Similarly, some establishments could be done away with completely to reduce revenue expenditure. For example, the Officers Messes, Medicare Centres, Unit Run Canteens etc. could be combined and subsumed into one establishment.
Future wars will have an increasing employment of the space and cyber domains. Special Forces operations would also play a major role in skirmishes with our adversaries. There exists a need to develop these Special Forces into full-fledged joint and integrated commands that would function under the CDS. These commands, along with the existing Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, could well serve as test beds for the proposed joint warfighting structures. Operational effectiveness and flexibility should be the raison d’etre for the proposed restructuring rather than creating additional structures with an untested and de novo chain for their command and control. With live threats and active adversaries, the need to deliberate and act on sound logic, with consensus across the services is more important than the expediency to act and regret subsequently. Each nation has its own challenges and, therefore, there exists a need to evolve and organise your own structures keeping the threats, geography, culture, and the political setup in mind. The three services need to define and agree upon a ‘problem statement’ to guide them in the formulation of joint/theatre commands, which address service-specific concerns and the need to obviate a less than desirable level of acceptance, given our challenges and the desired outcomes. No other nation in the world faces nuclear armed hostile neighbours on either side with unresolved borders. Disruption, therefore, should be minimal and well thought through.
The good part is that the current military leadership is not making statements in haste and there is a sincere attempt at building consensus amongst the service chiefs before arriving at any conclusion.
It is extremely important for the leadership of the day to have the courage and conviction to not only accept what is good in the larger interest of the nation, to think without bias and past perceptions, but also to convey the same in clear and unambiguous terms to the rank and file across the services. The good part is that the current military leadership is not making statements in haste and there is a sincere attempt at building consensus amongst the service chiefs before arriving at any conclusion. A collegiate and consensual ‘problem statement’ is an inescapable and inevitable requirement to begin with lest the reforms meet the fate of earlier efforts in the past. At the same time, however, reforms within the military and the higher defence organisation are long overdue and infructuous debates that lead to bitterness and rancour in the military and the academic strategic community could well be avoided by articulating the vision and roadmap for the Indian Military in its ‘Amrit Kaal’ or the ‘Golden Period’.
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Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani (Retd) is Additional Director General Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) New Delhi.
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