Prime Minister Narendra Modi has an opportunity to prove himself a statesman by bringing Jammu and Kashmir on board.
For long years, Kashmiris in the Valley have complained that Delhi doesn't understand their problems. This is despite political parties in the State allying with national parties, in the main Congress in the past. The single biggest impediment has been the inordinate control exerted by the Ministry of Home Affairs through their instrumentality, Intelligence Bureau, which has monitored and provided inputs on action in the Sunni dominated Valley. Control by minders is often detrimental to the larger process of what PM Modi is now espousing Insaaniyat, Kashmiriyat and Jambooriyat — in many ways a return to the clarion call given by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Hurriyat strongman Syed Ali Shah Geelani has already trashed this by likening it to lip service. Healing and reaching out is a given in the existing circumstances. Though the construct of the BJP-PDP marriage is made in hell, with India's extreme right trying to mollycoddle Kashmir's political right wing which follows a soft separatist and militant mainstreaming line.
Yet, it is an opportunity for PM Modi to prove himself a statesman by bringing the Valley on board. He knows just as successive governments in the past did — that there is no secret sauce to resolving the problem of a Valley increasingly feeling alienated and rapidly distancing itself from Delhi. The Prime Minister has to effectively engage Mehbooba Mufti in vigorous dialogue to break the impasse. He must step in personally. His intervention is crucial and if the new Kashmir Plan requires an element of autonomy, then so be it. What form, shape and hue this charter of autonomy takes up is still in the realm of conjecture, but something constructive needs to be done. Even when Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah spoke in unison, there were issues, pinpricks and differences which derailed the common agenda of showcasing a secular Muslim majority state and pitting it against the flawed model of a theocratic ideology of neighbouring Pakistan. It was a tough act with many uncertainties strewn in the path and yet an attempt was always made to smoothen the complications and believe me, there were many.
In the hubbub called Kashmir in 1950, a seemingly catatonic Sheikh Abdullah, his nous impacted with a war on three fronts, first to carrying on protecting the frontiers by repulsing the raiders, then to deal with the needless reference to the UN which internationalised a domestic matter and finally to combat the growing divide with a Hindu Jammu within the state's boundaries. It was proving all too much for the tall leader. Kashmir's chequered history was to see more upheaval shortly. On May 1, 1951, Regent Karan Singh issued a proclamation convoking a Constituent Assembly. Elections were held in August-September 1951 which were boycotted by pro-Pakistan elements. The session opened on October 31, 1951, with Sheikh Abdullah addressing the assembly for the first time and called on it to frame the states constitution and to give a 'reasoned conclusion regarding accession.' With these words , he exhorted his fellow elected Kashmiris, "We must remember that our struggle for power has now reached its successful climax in convening of this Constituent Assembly. It is for you to translate the vision of New Kashmir into a reality." In this speech, he outlined his plan for an Eastern Switzerland (as one of three options) when he stated, "The third course open to us has still to be discussed. We have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland, of keeping aloof from both States but having friendly relations with them. This might seem attractive in that it would appear to pave the way out of the present deadlock. To us, as a tourist country it could also have certain obvious advantages, but in considering independence we must not ignore practical considerations. Firstly, it is not easy to protect sovereignty and independence in a small country which has not sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering so many countries. Secondly we must have the goodwill of all our neighbours. Can we find powerful guarantors among them to pull together always in assuring us freedom from aggression? I would like to remind you that from August 15 to October 22, 1947, our State was independent and the result was that our weakness was exploited by the neighbour with invasion. What is the guarantee that in future too we may not be victims of a singular aggression." But Pakistan took umbrage and referred the matter to the Security Council on November 14 calling upon India to refrain from proceeding with the plan for a Constituent Assembly.
All this was happening with the resolve that PM Nehru had shown as he remained steadfast and committed to the ideal of Kashmir. His own letter to Sheikh Abdullah on May 13, 1949 setting the tone and tenor of his intent. Returning from a strenuous fortnight in London, he wrote with Nehruvian flair capturing the ethos of the time: I am not much worried about the United Nations aspect of the Kashmir question or even the possibility of military operations, much as I dislike this. But my mind is clear and I shall go ahead with the course we have adopted whatever the consequences. But the internal difficulties and friction in Kashmir are of a different type and unless we come to grips with it, we cannot deal with any problem effectively and the position progressively deteriorates.
The next three or four months are going to be vital months for Kashmir and it is highly important for us that we act correctly during this period and with a full understanding of the position and of each other's minds. We cannot change facts, but we have to understand them and adapt ourselves to them. I am not at all overwhelmed by the Kashmir problem and I have little doubt in my mind that Kashmir or Kashmir State or the great part of it will remain with India. Whatever the future may show, we have to act with great vigour and unanimity in the present and not be deflected from our course because of temporary considerations. The stakes are big and we have to consider them therefore in a big way.
Meanwhile, I was upset by the interview you gave to some foreign papers which appeared in London in regard to the independence of Kashmir. They had a bad effect in London not because anyone considered the question on merit, but because they thought these were mere devices for us to save ourselves from a weak position. Coming as it did just at that time, its effect was most unfortunate and I am sure UNCIP has been been influenced by it also in the wrong direction. I have now heard of your long interview with Vishnu Sahay. It is obvious there is no unity of thought and necessarily of action at the present moment in regard to the Kashmir problem. At any time, this would have been harmful, but at the present delicate moment, it is injurious.
It is obvious that Nehru was crestfallen with Abdullah's attitude and even angry with his fulminations over independence. As such, he was laying the ground rules for future engagements, a template which unfortunately Abdullah did not pay heed to, as we shall see.
Fast forward to March 29, 1951. Sir B. N. Rau representing India at the Security Council said, " Some members of the Council appear to fear that in the process, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly might express its opinion on the question of accession. The Constituent Assembly cannot be physically prevented from expressing its opinion on this question if it so chooses. But this opinion will not bind my government or prejudice the position of this council."
The very next day, the Security Council appointed US Senator Dr. Frank Graham as its representative and UN mediator. He was given a staff of 11 members including Gen. Jacob Devers, former Commander of the 6th Allied Army that invaded Germany in the final assault as his military adviser. The team arrived in India on June 30, 1951 and stayed for 11 weeks. It was the visit to Srinagar and the meeting with Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi that assumed maximum significance during this visit. On July 7, 1951, an emissary bearing Panditji's letter for Abdullah on his dialogue with Graham in Delhi arrived in Srinagar. Graham and his party were to arrive in Srinagar the next day which was a Sunday. Sheikh anxious to know what transpired in the meeting between Graham and Nehru, convened a meeting at Bakshi's house at 5 pm. The emissary's description of the meeting between Nehru and Graham was well received by Sheikh and Bakshi and both agreed to follow Panditji's line.
On Sunday, the day of the arrival of Graham's party, no interest was seen among the general public as was the case earlier when any prominent members of the UNCIP or representative of the Security Council was expected in the city. The general impression among the people both for an against the NC was that Graham won't be able to settle anything.
Only three meetings took place between Graham and Sheikh, first was a courtesy call in which no politics was discussed, except general things like Abdullah's impressions about the state and what Kashmir could offer to a person holidaying there.
In the second meeting, when Graham expressed a desire to know Sheikh Saheb's views on the Kashmir dispute. Sheikh took the same line suggested to him by Panditji by relating the history of political and economic resurgence of the people of Kashmir from 1930 onward. Dr. Graham did very little talking except for the fact that at places where a point seemed too fresh or new to him, he asked Sheikh Saheb to give more details. Such occasions were like when Sheikh stated to him the role of the Muslim League and Jinnah with regard to the Quit Kashmir movement and during 1944 when Jinnah visited the state and wanted Sheikh to convert the NC back to Muslim Conference.
Graham showed his interest to the extent that he asked Sheikh to provide him material in the shape of newspaper reports or any publications concerning these subjects. On the whole, Sheikh's impression reportedly about the second meeting was that it was in the nature of of a general survey of events in Kashmir and in India before Partition. In this meeting, Sheikh did make a passing reference to the role of Britain vis a vis the Congress and the Muslim League.
The third meeting took place on the same day in the evening after the lunch thrown in honour of Graham concluded at Shalimar. Bakshi also participated in the meeting and the nature of talks was more specific on certain issues than in the previous meetings. Sheikh laid great stress on the correctness of India's foreign policy and tried to impress upon Graham not to take Kashmir as an isolated issue, but as part of a bigger problem and in the context of India-Pakistan relations.
While discussing the conflict in Kashmir, Sheikh took a very legal position that he had never taken before. After discussing in detail once again the role of Muslim League, the Congress and the British, he suggested the solution of the problem was an overall plebiscite only after the Ruler's sovereign authority was established in the entire state. (This was his sworn enemy he was talking about, someone who he had got removed from the scene by exerting the utmost pressure on Nehru. A man who he had forced abdication on in favour of his son Yuvraj Karan Singh now Regent. In fact, he ensured that he left the state of J&K for good, it was an permanent removal from the scene of Hari Singh in 1949. It was all too baffling and once again showed how Abdullah kept changing goal posts to suit himself.)
Taking up cudgels on behalf of the sovereign authority — Maharaja of Kashmir — he stressed that as long as the people don't repudiate the Maharaja by any recognised international method, how can UN overthrow him just because it suited the interests of Pakistan? He stretched this point further by saying that if the King of England cannot be moved on the request of any foreign power, in the same way; the Maharaja in his own right cannot be dethroned or made to dismember his own state.
While coming to the sincerity and honesty of purpose of the leaders of India, Pakistan and the rest of the world. Sheikh Saheb was almost lyrical in praising Gandhi and Nehru. He told Dr. Graham that Pandit Nehru would prefer to go down fighting for his principles of truth, honesty and integrity, rather than speak lies like Liaquat Ali Khan and Sir Zafarullah Khan with whom it was a passion to pronounce big lies and to repudiate them when when faced with an awkward situation like the presence of their troops in Kashmir.
As the discussions grew more animated, Dr. Graham put a straight question about the solution of the Kashmir problem in the light of the Security Council's decision. Sheikh and Bakshi in one voice told him that much as they would prefer to help solve the problem, they were not in any manner bound by the decisions of the latest resolution of the Security Council which was rejected outright by them. They stated that to them the solution of the problem could be achieved if the UN gave precedence to justice and fair play over power-blocs.
Abdullah's final reactions to his three meetings with Dr. Graham were that he appeared to be a good natured man, faced with an awkward situation of settling a problem for which his terms of reference gave him very little scope to suggest methods other than laid down in the SC's resolution.
After an interface with the local media, the impression that Dr. Graham gave is that that he was on the fringes of the problem and did not see much chance of his mission succeeding. The ping pong continued and as the haranguing and wrangling over demilitarisation grew worse, Graham's fifth report also saw no headway being made. The Security Council practically gave up the ghost after Sheikh's arrest in 1953. Pakistan receiving military aid from the US and joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, helped India mobilise non aligned world opinion against it.
That was the end of the Graham experiment. Equally the fissures were appearing the Nehru-Abdullah commitment to keep Kashmir as the secular shop window for the idiom of India and the United Nations' interest in the matter was waning due to India's stonewalling.
If PM Modi has chosen the trinity of Insaaniyat, Kashmiriyat and Jambooriyat as the new stencil going forward, then he has to make a meaningful personal contribution by reaching out to Kashmiris within the four walls of the Constitution. Brotherhood or Kashmiriyat is arguably the best mould to build the new order on. The separatists have to be softened and Chief Minister Mehbooba and PDP embraced. While militancy and secession will not be tolerated by the Indian Union, Kashmir is peculiar, it needs a softer approach. Dialogue is critical, the rabidly militant and hurt populace needs to be assuaged. India has a big heart, it needs to absorb everyone. Communication from Delhi is vital to this agenda. It has to be interlocutors with the government's sanction, directly feeding into the PMO, who will have to the reaching out. And this has to go beyond the intelligence agencies. There is no place for azadi in the sovereign Union of India, let that be understood by the separatists. Otherwise, all bets are off. The BJP-PDP alliance has to go beyond its core constituencies of Jammu and Kashmir and merge its thought processes to speak a new lingua franca, one that is common for the State and not petty sectarian politics.
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