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The May 2025 post-Pahalgam escalation marked a strategic inflexion point, operationalising a live China–India–Pakistan triadic rivalry and reshaping India’s defence strategy.
Image Source: RAVEENDRAN/staff Getty Images
The recent India-Pakistan crisis, which unfolded between 7 and 10 May 2025, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist attack, marked an inflexion point in India’s defence strategy. Amid New Delhi’s confrontation with Pakistan, the China factor was evident in both diplomatic signalling and battlefield capabilities aimed at pressuring India. Since the Galwan crisis in 2020, China’s assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has already stretched India’s military manpower and capabilities on two different geographical tangents. With the Pahalgam terror attack, Pakistan is also testing the limits of India’s strategic patience, attempting to entangle India in a long, protracted triangular geopolitical conflict. China described ‘Operation Sindoor’ as ‘regrettable’ and that it ‘will safeguard its [Pakistan’s] sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.’ These developments create additional pressures for policymakers in New Delhi, especially considering the structural factor of geography to manage the China-Pakistan ‘threshold alliance’ challenge.
The China-Pakistan relationship has evolved over the decades and matured into a fully comprehensive strategic partnership. China’s support for Pakistan’s military build-up has significantly intensified the strategic challenge for New Delhi. The Op Sindoor–Op Banyan–Um Marsoos episode has effectively operationalised the China-India-Pakistan triadic rivalry in real-time. In this regard, how Pakistan and India integrated and employed their military capabilities during the 7-10 May 2025 crisis has established a critical benchmark for both the utility of force and the assessment of the future of the triadic relationship. In a first-of-its-kind episode, the character of warfare transitioned to a more escalatory, stand-off warfare in action. It reflects a departure from conventional warfighting methods between India and Pakistan. The two countries have amassed technology-based capabilities. China–Pakistan military exercises, centred on shared learning, interoperability in hardware, procedures, and joint planning, constitute a foundational pillar of their wartime military cooperation.. The Chinese-origin capabilities—including JF-17 and J10C, PL-15E beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles, the FM-90 SRSAM, LY-80 (HQ16A) MRSAM and HQ-9/P LRSAM air defence systems and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)—were used by the Pakistan military against India. The element of the ‘kill-chain’ process on 7 May 2025, facilitated by integrating ground and space-based sensor data with frontline fighter jets, resulted in a serious operational challenge for India. The utilisation of electromagnetic battlespace by the Pakistan military has emerged as a serious development, which is further accelerated by Chinese support in capabilities and training. Owing to such tech integration, Pakistan has also reportedly claimed to have shot down Indian fighter jets. The Chinese Beidou satellite navigation system also extended its aid through its real-time Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, supporting precise detection and targeting against India.
The Op Sindoor–Op Banyan–Um Marsoos episode has effectively operationalised the China-India-Pakistan triadic rivalry in real-time.
Conversely, India used Brahmos and French-origin SCALP-EG cruise missiles along with HAMMER glide bombs for stand-off aerial strikes. From 8-10 May, India’s integrated air and missile defence system effectively denied Pakistan any opportunity to impose costs through its offensive actions. The multi-layered system comprises long-range (S-400), medium-range (Barak-8), short-range (Akash, SPYDER), and very short-range modern and legacy systems (Igla-M, Igla-S, L-70). It also comprises the Indian Air Force’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and the Indian Army’s Akashteer system. The ‘whole of operations' approach also reflected the synergy and cooperation among the three services of the Indian military.
The Indian military established the norm of victory by destroying multiple high-value targets deep inside Pakistan through Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)-based operations. This resulted in demands for a ceasefire from Pakistani counterparts. Wars in the technological era, especially in a nuclear environment, will likely remain short, swift, and driven by a need to establish a decisive victory. As an inference, the traditional elements such as mass and quantitative strength of conventional capabilities may not likely factor into creating a decisive advantage over an adversary. The qualitative parameters, such as technology, doctrinal orientation, and strategic guidance, will dictate modern warfare. This emerging proposition from the Operation Sindoor episode holds lessons for the broader contours of India’s defence strategy.
Historically, India-Pakistan relations have remained crisis-prone and may witness another such episode with varying escalation and costs for both parties. The China-India-Pakistan triadic rivalry will only worsen with China and Pakistan tilting the balance as per their favourable terms, with associated costs for New Delhi. Operation Sindoor—a conventional military-based norm of Indian response against Pakistan and its sponsored terror groups—highlights the imperative for New Delhi to enhance its military preparedness and future planning. For this, India must focus on three broad contours: strategic planning, amassing preferential capabilities, and doctrinal innovation.
To bring structural effects, it is important to pursue a ‘system of systems’ approach to defence planning and readiness. This can be achieved by getting both the big picture and the emerging trends with fine details right. As a next step, the fast-tracking of jointness and integration reforms supported by policy measures to synchronise defence acquisition and long-term planning is imperative. This will help enhance organisational efficiency, operational planning, and strategic guidance for defence preparedness. The trade-off between time and qualitative factors of capabilities will also remain a metric for readiness in the long term.
In terms of capabilities, the strategic domains of warfare have evolved significantly, with aerospace being a prominent one. It is especially evident in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Aerospace superiority is essential both for imposing strategic costs on adversaries and for denying them the ability to do the same. The integration of rockets, missiles, drones, and their doctrinal integration with supporting domains—information, cyber, Artificial Intelligence, and electronic warfare—is the new norm in warfare. The fungibility of qualitative factors such as technological advancement and their integration into doctrinal thinking and conduct will result in combat effectiveness. Thus, it establishes the metric of success in reforms and subsequently victory in battlespace and beyond.
India must recalibrate its doctrinal options to employ the use of force, especially for stand-off warfare kind of innovative scenarios vis-à-vis Pakistan.
In the doctrinal aspect, the Indian military and its broader doctrine have remained land warfare-centric for decades. As a result, doctrinally, institutionally, and resource-wise, the balance has remained tilted in favour of the Indian Army vis-à-vis the other two services—the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. On the other hand, Pakistan has adopted an asymmetric doctrinal approach marked by a range of options—primarily a mix of sub-conventional and nuclear strategy—to limit India’s conventional superiority. As a contingency to India’s military action, it has substantial land warfare capabilities and holds tactical nuclear weapons to restrict or deny any decisive advantages to the adversary. Pakistan’s technological military prowess is being both supplemented and supplanted by Chinese military capabilities and the multi-domain-based operational art of warfare. India must recalibrate its doctrinal options to employ the use of force, especially for stand-off warfare kind of innovative scenarios vis-à-vis Pakistan. This highlights the need to upscale a ‘new start within the Cold Start doctrine’ to keep conflicts short and swift in the context of the future doctrinal innovation agenda.
In conclusion, New Delhi must reexamine, recalibrate, and determine its strategic objectives and question the extent of military power. How does it aim to manage the China-supported Pakistan challenge in the next episode of the crisis? These questions should become the line of inquiry and the anchor for wielding power with purpose amid the shifting geopolitical landscape. This immediate victory should not become a fuel for complacency in the face of a long-term challenge.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). He also coordinates the SSP activities. His work focuses on strategic issues in the ...
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