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The Caribbean edges toward a Cold War–style standoff as Trump’s strike on Venezuela deepens the drug war and raises risks of regional escalation.
The Caribbean, at present, stands barely one mistake away from a catastrophe. In an unprecedented move, the United States (US) has directly attacked a vessel linked to Venezuelan drug networks in international waters, killing 11 people. Trump invoked imminent threats to American security to take the action and linked it to Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang, involved in narcotics trafficking. Caracas dismissed the incident as a fabrication and denounced it as an imperialist aggression. The Departments of State and Justice have raised the reward under the Narcotics Rewards Program (NRP) to as much as US$50 million for information that leads to the arrest or conviction of Nicolás Maduro on US narcotics law violations.
The situation has rapidly escalated as the Pentagon has since expanded its F-35 fleet in Puerto Rico and strengthened naval patrols. Over 4,500 Marines are on alert, underscoring the seriousness of the escalation. Venezuela has responded in kind, announcing that its coastal defence forces will increase from 10,000 to 25,000 personnel. Drones, naval patrols, and semi-submersible detection systems have been activated, especially in the country’s northwest states—Zulia and Falcón. The Venezuelan Air Force has also flown their F-16 fighters dangerously close to USS Jason Dunham, drawing Trump’s ire.
The US-Venezuela tension in the Caribbean now mirrors a Cold War-style standoff, walking a tightrope between a classic political and ideological divide.
The US-Venezuela tension in the Caribbean now mirrors a Cold War-style standoff, walking a tightrope between a classic political and ideological divide. Critics argue that Washington’s one-sided strike lacks both congressional approval and international legal cover. If such operations become normalised, it could set an example for other powers to justify military action under the banner of counter-narcotics, undermining global norms. The confrontation now demands resolution frameworks that privilege stability over escalation.
Venezuela’s entanglement in the global drug problem—particularly its pronounced impact on the US—has consistently remained a contentious issue. Neighbouring the world’s largest cocaine supplier—Colombia—Venezuela’s topography and location make it a suitable transit hub instead of becoming a significant cocaine producer itself. Venezuelan officials, including the military-linked Cartel de los Soles, have been accused by US agencies of making profits through drug trafficking over the past two decades. Even President Nicolás Maduro and several of his top right-hand men have been charged with narco-terrorism by the US prosecutors. Not long ago, Venezuela’s former intelligence chief, Hugo Carvajal, pleaded guilty to drug trafficking charges in a US court, reinforcing the latter’s claims of systemic complicity.
Venezuela’s entanglement in the global drug problem—particularly its pronounced impact on the US—has consistently remained a contentious issue.
Nonetheless, Caracas has dismissed these allegations, denouncing them as politically motivated attempts to invalidate its government. Venezuela has argued that the US particularly picks on it and ignores the involvement of its allies in Central and Latin America. However, evidence suggests that Venezuela may not be the largest but a significant transit corridor for drugs in the region. In fact, US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data indicate that far greater volumes of cocaine travel through Guatemala or Honduras. Often, this has led Venezuela to accuse the US of disguising the geopolitics of oil as its war on drugs.
The escalation between Washington and Caracas is not unfolding in isolation. The Caribbean may be the theatre, but the script is familiar. When security threats are countered solely through force or punitive measures, it is unlikely to yield the desired outcome and often results in prolonged insecurity. Over two decades, the US has imposed several sanctions ranging from visa restrictions, terrorism-related sanctions, sanctions related to anti-democratic actions, human rights violations, and corruption, drug-trafficking-related sanctions, export controls, and sanctions on the Maduro government, among others. This has led to the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. In March 2025, Washington ordered Chevron to wind down Venezuelan oil exports within 30 days, cutting a lifeline for Caracas at a moment of fiscal strain. Additional sanctions block access to the US capital markets, freeze assets, and penalise firms that transact with Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) – the state-owned oil and gas company.
European countries have also imposed restrictions, though more selectively, focusing on travel bans and asset freezes for Venezuelan officials who are implicated in corruption or human rights abuses. Financial pressure is compounded by ongoing litigation against Citgo, PDVSA’s US-based subsidiary, which risks dismantling one of Caracas’s last major overseas assets.
Even though sanctions have been the mainstay of American political pressure against Venezuela for a long time, the second Trump administration is bent on testing the possibility of military force as well.
The impact of sanctions on the Venezuelan economy has been devastating. Oil production has plummeted, falling below one million barrels per day, while hyperinflation and shortages of food, fuel, and medicine persist. Ordinary Venezuelans bear the brunt even as remittance dependence has grown, public services have collapsed, and millions have fled the country, exacerbating regional migration crises. Contrary to intended results, sanctions have hardened Maduro’s inner circle in their collective stance against the US. Restricted from Western financial systems, Caracas has turned more decisively toward Russia, China, and Iran for loans, oil swaps, military supplies, and political support. In effect, sanctions risk accelerating geopolitical polarisation in the Caribbean while failing to deliver regime change. Even though sanctions have been the mainstay of American political pressure against Venezuela for a long time, the second Trump administration is bent on testing the possibility of military force as well.
History is replete with instances highlighting Washington’s limits of a militarised approach in its backyard. In the past, the US has also signed joint initiatives such as Plan Colombia and Mexico’s Mérida Initiative, which have failed to yield desired results. Perhaps this suggests that the Trump administration must look for solutions beyond military means or coercion. Stability requires a combination of security cooperation, institutional reform, and humanitarian support. Without this, the Caribbean risks becoming the next Cold War frontier.
The challenges in Venezuela are entrenched and layered. Corruption within the judiciary, collusion by security forces, and weak state capacity, resulting from power consolidation and opaque democratic processes, make enforcement inconsistent. Traffickers exploit porous borders with Colombia and use clandestine airstrips, semi-submersibles, and fishing fleets to move narcotics. On the US side, the elephant in the room is growing demand for drugs. The opioid crisis has revealed that without serious investment in treatment, rehabilitation, and education, supply-side crackdowns will achieve little. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) data, millions of Americans with substance use disorders go untreated each year, widening the gap between public health needs and law enforcement-led strategies.
Furthermore, the absence of a robust legal mechanism on the international front to govern such disputes further aggravates the issue. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides technical assistance but lacks enforcement power. Moreover, the Organization of American States (OAS) initiatives are chronically underfunded. A regional response is the need of the hour and could prove to be the more effective approach. A Caribbean Counter-Narcotics Task Force, monitored by neutral countries such as Brazil or Chile, could share intelligence, coordinate patrols, and give smaller Caribbean nations a voice, while reducing their dependence on unilateral US action.
Confidence-building measures such as joint patrols under the UN or regional oversight could ease mistrust and prevent clashes, giving both sides a dignified way out.
Additionally, targeting the finances of drug networks is more effective than intercepting shipments, as cartels use cryptocurrencies, offshore accounts, and shell companies. Stronger regional anti-money laundering standards and coordinated judicial frameworks for extradition and asset freezes would increase the costs of trafficking. Reducing demand is equally important. Portugal’s experience shows that decriminalisation, along with treatment and harm reduction, can address addiction as a health issue. Similar reforms in the US would lower demand for Venezuelan and Colombian cocaine and demonstrate Washington’s willingness to face its own responsibility. Confidence-building measures such as joint patrols under the UN or regional oversight could ease mistrust and prevent clashes, giving both sides a dignified way out. Finally, giving the UNODC more resources would strengthen multinational enforcement, capacity building, and data-sharing.
Shifting from a fragmented ‘war on drugs’ to a united framework could help the US balance enforcement, development, and public health. This will require treating narcotics as primarily governance and human-related security issues instead of treating them as a militarised conflict. For greater acceptability of his war against drugs, the Trump administration will have to avoid double standards in condemning Venezuela while tolerating drug entries from other neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, as the US has struck a second vessel in international waters, resulting in three Venezuelans being killed, and Secretary Rubio has affirmed the US’s stance against drugs, the Caribbean seems to be inching towards a flagration which could engulf the larger region.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Prakreeti Chaudhary is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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Prakreeti Chaudhary is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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